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Abstract
Abstract
Medication is a leading cause of iatrogenic injury throughout the world and this has 
spawned a rapidly growing body of patient safety research. Lack of standardisation of 
terminology and research methods, and international variations in healthcare delivery pose 
problems when interpreting study findings. Within the UK, intravenous medicines 
prepared in hospital clinical areas have been identified as an area requiring further 
investigation.
A Delphi consensus technique was used to agree a practical error definition for intravenous 
medicines assembly and preparation in hospital clinical areas, suitable for 
multiprofessional and international use. This included a framework of inclusion and 
exclusion criteria which, if  adopted for future research, would reduce variability and allow 
comparison of results. The definition and framework was translated into an observational 
data collection tool and validated for observational audit in adult and paediatric ward areas.
In depth interviews were used to elucidate nurses’ views and opinions regarding problems 
they experienced with intravenous medicines assembly and preparation and how they 
resolved them. They suggested that priority should be given to minimising interruptions, to 
the design and provision o f a dedicated workspace, and to use of needle-free devices. 
Appropriate information on intravenous preparation needed to be readily accessible within 
clinical areas.
Standardisation o f the taxonomy, standards applied, and competency required for 
intravenous medicines preparation is needed. Pharmaceutical manufacturers should 
improve product design to minimise the number and complexity o f manipulations required 
in the workplace. A human factors approach should be used to analyse and plan medicines 
safety solutions.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.0 General Introduction
The founding principles o f medical ethics include non-maleficence, the avoidance of evil 
or harm, sometimes expressed as ‘primum non-nocere\ above all, do no harm. These 
phrases can be traced back to ancient historical records, such as the Oath of the Hindu 
Physician, c.1500 BC [Kanoti, 1986; p.3]. “First, do no harm**
and Hippocrates [c.460-377 BC]
“As to diseases make a habit o f  two things -  to help or at least to do no harm. ”
This principle is applied to clinical trials as the Helsinki Declaration [World Medical 
Association, 2004].
Each time any treatment is planned for a patient, the healthcare professional must consider 
this principle and only proceed if, on balance, the potential for patient benefit outweighs 
harm. On each and every occasion a medication is ordered and administered there is the 
possibility that it may produce undesirable as well as desirable effects [Anon., 1998; van 
den Bemt et al., 2000]. This bears special relevance as medicines are the most common 
healthcare intervention [Classen & Metzer, 2003] and the leading cause of iatrogenic 
injury [Morimoto et al., 2004].
1.1 Risks in healthcare
Risk is inherent as part o f everyday life, and healthcare delivery is no exception [Wilson,
2004]. Risk has been defined as
“The probability or likelihood that harm may occur, coupled with the consequences 
o f that harm " [Burrows, 2004;p. 10].
Harm interferes with the organisation’s goal, which for the National Health Service (NHS) 
is to deliver healthcare. This can be manifest in numerous ways, e.g. physical or emotional 
injury, litigation, or loss of reputation.
The concept of risk management was introduced into the NHS in the 1990s, as a 
comprehensive process to identify, assess and control risk; it has been described simply as 
‘good management practice’ [Burrows, 2004]. Risk management encompasses all types of 
risk, and those related to patient care are clinical risks.
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A landmark government report [Department o f Health, 2000a] revealed that the NHS made 
unacceptable mistakes and failed to leam from mistakes and prevent future errors. It 
revealed that one out o f every ten hospital admissions suffered due to errors or negligent 
care, half of which were avoidable. The NHS was mandated to review its approach and 
leam from failures; patient safety emerged as a high profile issue. This coincided with a 
series of well publicised incidents that focused public attention on NHS deficiencies, such 
as the enquiry into paediatric cardiac surgery at The Bristol Royal Infirmary, the Ritchie 
inquiry of gynaecologist Rodney Leward, the murders by the general practitioner Harold 
Shipman, the retention o f organs at The Royal Liverpool Children's Hospital and the 
intrathecal administration of vincristine at Queen's Medical Centre [Ashraf 2000; 
Department of Health, 2000b, 2001a; Kennedy, 2001; Redfem, 2001; Toft, 2001, Woods, 
2001]. The provision o f safe healthcare became a national priority. In tandem, patient 
safety was recognised internationally as a major risk to world health [World Health 
Organisation, 2002]. It has been proposed that for most countries, the key issue in 
healthcare quality and risk management is patient safety [National Audit Office, 2005].
1.1.1 Healthcare reforms in England
The key focus o f the late 1980s and early 1990s healthcare reforms were financial savings, 
maximising throughput, and achieving value for money, which led to the establishment of 
an internal market [Department of Health, 1998; Smith, 1998]. This detracted from issues 
such as care and quality [Scally and Donaldson, 1998]. Headline news o f unsatisfactory or 
negligent care, combined with concerns about waiting times and wide regional variations 
had undermined public confidence in the NHS [Department o f Health, 1997, 1998; Scally 
& Donaldson, 1998; King's Fund, 1999]. The Government attempted to readdress this 
imbalance, using quality as the key driving force behind modernisation o f the NHS, so that 
quality and efficiency were essential partners [Department o f Health, 1997, 1998]. Their 
aim was to provide consistent and equitable health care based solely on an individual's 
need [Department o f Health, 1997]. Quality was made a personal and collective 
responsibility o f everyone in an NHS organisation, with the Chief Executive taking 
statutory responsibility for quality [Department o f Health, 1998; Kings Fund, 1999]. This 
was taken a step further with the publication o f ‘Standards fo r  Better Health in England \ 
in which quality and safety are priorities. Ten core standards are described which 
organisations should achieve and the public can expect; with safety pivotal as the first of 
seven domains [Department o f Health, 2004].
2
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1.1.2 Clinical governance
The concept o f clinical governance was introduced as the means to achieve, monitor and
maintain quality in healthcare [NHS Executive, 1999a]. Its generally accepted definition is
“A framework through which NHS organisations are accountable fo r  continuously 
improving the quality o f  their services and safeguarding high standards o f  care by creating 
an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish." [NHS Executive, 
1999a;p.6].
This has been rephrased succinctly as “corporate responsibility fo r  clinical quality”, in 
reality ensuring that all healthcare professionals provide patient care that is satisfactory, 
consistent and responsive [Anon., 1999;p.288; Wilson, 2004].
It is proposed that clinical governance is composed of the following key features [Anon.,
1999]:
a. Defining standards.
b. Ensuring the capability and resources are available to deliver those standards.
c. Measuring that the standards were achieved.
The final goal is to implement and manage any change required to ensure the standards are 
consistently met, and preferably exceeded [Gilmore, 2000].
Wilson [2004] has defined the component processes that make up clinical governance as:
■ Clinical audit.
■ Evidence-based practice.
■ Promoting clinical effectiveness.
■ Detecting and investigating adverse healthcare events.
■ Analysing the root causes of adverse events.
■ Improving practice using data leaned from claims, complaints, adverse event 
investigations, monitoring standards and out comes o f care.
Clinical Governance is not a new concept; it incorporates under an umbrella term many 
quality issues that have been around for decades, and raises the quality profile whilst 
attaching to it a patient centred emphasis [Dean, 2000].
It was thought unrealistic to expect the quality framework to be implemented overnight; it 
was envisaged it would take ten years to achieve [Department o f Health, 1997] but this 
deadline is rapidly approaching. Many o f the suggested tools for achieving clinical 
governance are well established including clinical audit, critical incident reporting,
3
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guidelines, care pathways, individual appraisal and evidence based medicine. It has been 
suggested that pharmacy could play an invaluable role in this process, both within the 
profession itself and also on a larger scale by applying its skills at the medicines usage 
level [Smith, 1998]. Medicines management performance indicators that could be 
employed include adverse drug reaction reporting, medication error rates, competency 
assessment and pharmacist intervention recording [Anon., 1999].
1.1.2.1 External clinical governance monitoring
Comprehensive national standards for priority health areas are being developed by the 
National Institute for Healthcare and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and through National 
Service Frameworks (NSF) [Anon., 1999; Kings Fund, 1999]. NICE is responsible for 
providing national guidance on health promotion, preventing 'ill health’; new and existing 
medicines, treatments and interventional procedures within the NHS from both clinical and 
cost effectiveness standpoints [National Prescribing Centre, 2006]. NSFs will lay down 
what care a patient with a particular condition should expect from the NHS. It will map out 
a 'blueprint’ of how services for care areas should be offered, with scheduled performance 
targets against which progress will be judged. They were designed to abolish regional 
variations in patient care [Anon., 1999]. The prime role o f these national standards was to 
provide guidance on global clinical effectiveness; the responsibility for translating this into 
the most appropriate action for an individual patient remains with their doctor. Cost should 
not feature within the guidance, indeed decisions on the availability o f resources for 
funding their recommendation lies with the Secretary o f State [Anon., 1999]. 
Accountability for monitoring standards, such as these, has been delegated to an 
independent body, the Healthcare Commission. Its core role is to assess the provision, 
quality, economy and efficiency of healthcare. Its other responsibilities include an annual 
performance review of each NHS Trust in England, as well as investigating and remedying 
service failures and unresolved complaints [Commission for Healthcare Audit and 
Inspection, 2005]. Other agencies also perform assessments and inspections of healthcare; 
these include the Health and Safety Executive, National Audit Office (NAO) and Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST).
1.1.2.2 Internal clinical governance processes
The Government envisages professional self-regulation, regulated in turn by the Health 
Professions Council, and life long learning through continual professional development, as
4
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the means to ensure that staff delivering care are competent, suitably trained, keeping 
abreast of developments and conforming to their own profession’s standards, so ensuring 
healthcare staff are equipped to deliver quality patient care. [Department o f Health, 1998; 
Wilson, 2004].
1.1.23 Corporate governance
This ensures that organisations have robust internal control systems for identifying risks 
that could affect their aims and objectives, for evaluating the type and extent of these risks, 
and then for effectively, efficiently and economically managing them [Wilson, 2004]. In 
addition, between 1999 and 2004 Controls Assurance Standards existed, where 
organisation undertook self-assessments against predefined criteria which were 
subsequently signed off by the Trust Board. This included standards on the risk 
management system and the safe and secure handling o f medicines, within medicines 
management. From August 2004 this was superseded by assessment against ‘Standards for  
Better Health' [NAO, 2005]. In addition a new standard in ‘safe medicines practice’ was 
introduced into the CNST risk management standards with compliance required by 2005. 
This was developed in conjunction with the NHS Litigation Authority and the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) [Devaney et al., 2003].
1.2 The patient safety agenda in England
Concern about the quality o f healthcare provision in the United Sates of America (USA) 
fuelled global interest [Kohn et a l, 2000] and prompted a comprehensive review of the 
NHS which culminated in the publication of the Chief Medical Officer’s report ‘An 
Organisation with a Memory* [Department of Health, 2000a]. The findings revealed that 
errors in healthcare killed more people than motor vehicle accidents or breast cancer. The 
report identified the nature and scale o f unintentional injury, and that little reporting, 
learning and sharing had arisen from incidents; patients were suffering unnecessary harm. 
It highlighted the need for cultural change with preventative measures to be implemented 
following learning from adverse events and near misses. As a result o f repeated serious 
errors, four key targets were set. The two medicines-related targets were:
■ To reduce to zero the number of patients dying or being paralysed by 
maladministered spinal injections by 2001.
■ To reduce by 40% the number of serious errors in the use of prescribed drugs by 
2005.
5
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The follow-on response report ‘Building a Safer NHS fo r  Patients' detailed how the 
Government planned to address patient safety [Department of Health, 2001b].
Pivotal to achieving this NHS learning was the establishment in 2001 o f a national 
coordinating body, the NPSA, a special health authority to spearhead patient safety efforts. 
Its goal was to improve the quality and safety of patient care through the reporting, 
analysing and learning from adverse events and near misses [Department of Health, 
2001b]. Central to the NPSA was the establishment o f a national system for collating 
reports of patient safety incidents, using a standard terminology and format, enabling 
analysis and identification of priority areas for action. This has been called the National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). Other important achievements required were a 
change in culture, sharing learning from other government bodies and enquiries and the 
embedding o f root cause analysis expertise in NHS organisations.
The NPSA document ‘Seven Steps to Patient Safety ' described what NHS organisations 
should do to improve patient safety [NPSA, 2003a], the component steps being:
1. Building a safety culture.
2. Leading and supporting your staff.
3. Integrating risk management activity.
4. Promoting reporting.
5. Involving and communicating with patients and the public.
6. Learning and sharing safety lessons.
7. Implementing solutions to prevent harm.
This good practice guide allowed Trusts to benchmark how their organisation was 
performing and to create action plans to improve patient safety.
In 2005, the NAO examined whether the targets of improving the safety culture and 
reporting of, and learning from, incidents had been achieved by a survey of 265 acute 
hospitals, ambulance and mental health trusts [NAO, 2005]. At local level they found 
improvements in incident reporting, establishing a safety culture and less under-reporting. 
However, there remained areas where the blame culture prevailed and there was under­
reporting of certain incidents, mainly medication-related and those producing serious harm. 
Further work was advocated to address these failings; increase reporting, improve
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communication, ensure learning was disseminated widely and that organisations developed 
from being predominately reactive to proactive.
The report highlighted delays with national initiatives that had prevented compliance with 
the Government’s previously established timescales [Department o f Health, 2001b]. The 
core objectives o f establishing common patient safety taxonomy and implementing the 
NRLS had been achieved [NAO, 2005].
U  Medicines safety
Medicines are important within healthcare as they are received by virtually all inpatients, 
with a typical hospital administering 7,000 individual doses per day. Hospitals were 
spending £1.5 billion/year on medicines, but these were not always optimally used, with 
errors occurring too often [Audit Commission, 2001]. Medication errors were an early 
priority for the NPSA [Smith, 2004]. They accounted for 10-20% of adverse events and 
were one o f the main culprits for iatrogenic injury. Iatrogenic mortality and morbidity were 
important for hospitals as they resulted in prolonged stays and increased expenditure 
[Bates et al., 1997]. Numerous contributory factors have been suggested:
■ A rapid pace of development, with more powerful and technologically 
sophisticated medicines marketed.
■ An exponential growth o f knowledge that is impossible to keep up to date with and 
creates additional training needs.
■ Pioneering advances facilitated interventions on a wider patient audience.
■ Changes in healthcare provision, with hospital environments more turbulent and 
complex, increased workload, faster patient throughput, and ‘sicker’ patients.
■ Demographic changes with an ageing population and a higher prevalence of acute 
and chronic ill health.
■ Raised societal expectations with more freedom, access to education and 
information, increased consumerism and the development o f a compensation 
culture.
■ High profile cases stimulating media attention.
■ Growing awareness that healthcare failures are not solely an organisation’s failing 
but also impact on the government; comprehensive reform was needed. 
[Department o f Health 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2000c; Warner et al.f 1998; Clinical
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Initiatives Centre, 2000; Office for National Statistics, 2000; Audit Commission, 
2001; Wilson, 2004].
A comprehensive report that collated the size and scale o f medication errors, and identified 
error-prone aspects and good practice to reduce medicines risks marked an important 
milestone in the United Kingdom (UK) [Smith, 2004]. This contained 126 
recommendations requiring combined action at local and national level.
1.4 The patient safety language
Patient safety literature uses a variety of nomenclature, misuses terminology and lacks
standardisation [Chang et al., 2005; Woods et al., 2005].
“Idiosyncratic terminology and frameworks fo r  the study o f  medical errors and 
related injuries have been tolerated but are an increasing problem" [Woods et al., 
2005;p.422].
Several groups have proposed a common taxonomy in their areas o f interest e.g. 
paediatrics, near misses and adverse events [NPSA, 2003a; Chang et al., 2005; Woods et 
al., 2005]. The World Health Organisation (WHO) is currently developing a global patient 
safety terminology [Edwards, 2005a].
When evaluating medicines related issues this becomes more complex, as definitions vary 
depending on their use. Those developed for pharmacovigilance have been applied to 
health care risk management and error and safety research [Nebeker et al., 2002, 2004]. 
Researchers have proposed methods for identifying and classifying safety issues in an 
attempt to create a clear and consistent approach to medicines safety research [NCC 
MERP, 1998; Morimoto et al., 2004; Yu et al., 2005]. It has been suggested that any 
definition needs to sit within a framework that ensures parameters are explicitly defined to 
ensure correct and transparent interpretation [Nebeker et al., 2002]. Aronson and Femer 
[2005] cite the importance of good communication combined with consistent terminology, 
as English is difficult to master, especially as a second language.
Yu and colleagues [2005] searched 160 medication safety websites and found 33 websites 
with a total o f 119 definitions and 25 different medicine safety terms. They concluded that 
current medicines safety terminology is variable and ambiguous, for example, ‘near-miss’ 
had 12 different definitions, resulting in haphazard classification. There is an urgent need 
for a common nomenclature that all health professionals use in the patient safety field [Yu 
etal,  2005].
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1.4.1 Definitions
The following definitions encompass the main terms, their meanings and their inter­
relationships. Where available, preference has been given to NPSA defined terms, other 
toms have been selected by leading experts in the field.
Patient safety
“The identification, analysis and management o f  patient-related risks and 
incidents, in order to make patient care safer and minimise harm to patients
This replaces the older term ‘Clinical Risk* [NPSA, 2003a;p.97].
Patient safety incident (PSI)
“Any unintended or unexpected incident(s) that could have or did lead to harm fo r  
one or more persons receiving NHS-funded healthcare. ”
Where “ ‘Patient safety incident' is an umbrella term which is used to describe a single 
incident or a series o f  incidents that occur over time. "
This replaces the following older terms: adverse incident, adverse event, clinical incident, 
critical incident, medical error, clinical error, and medical mistake. The new term was an 
attempt to move away from terminology that implied individual causality and blame 
[NPSA, 2003a;p.97].
Patient safety incident (level of severity no harm)
“A patient safety incident that caused no harm but was not prevented ('impact not 
prevented ’)  or a patient safety incident that was prevented " [NPSA, 2003a;p.97].
Patient safety incident (prevented)
“A patient safety incident that had the potential to cause harm but was prevented, 
resulting in no harm to patients receiving NHS-funded healthcare. ”
This replaces the previously used terms near miss or close call [NPSA, 2003a;p.97].
Patient safety incident involving medicines
This is an umbrella term that encompasses all medication-derived patient safety incidents
[Cousins, 2005a]. Therefore, it could replace the older term, ‘medication misadventure’,
where the definition was:
“An iatrogenic hazard or incident. That is an inherent risk when medication 
therapy is indicated. That is created through either omission or commission by the 
administration o f  a medicine or medicines during which a patient may be harmed, with 
effects ranging from mild discomfort to fatality. Whose outcome may or may not be 
independent o f  the pre-existing pathology or disease process. That may be attributable to
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error (human /  system or both), immunologic response, or idiosyncratic response. That is 
always unexpected or undesirable to the patient and health professional” [Anon., 
1998;p. 165].
Or simply “An incident includes any irregularity in the process o f  medication use” 
[Morimoto et al., 2004;p.306].
This encompasses medication errors, adverse drug events, adverse drug reactions and 
therapeutic failures [Zellmer, 1993; Morimoto et al., 2004]. The NPSA has developed a 
new term of ‘safe medication practice ' which describes attempts to minimise the risks of 
patient safety incidents involving medicines [Cousins, 2005a].
Medication e rro r
“Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or 
patient harm while the medication is in the control o f  the health care professional, patient, 
or consumer. Such events may be related to professional practice, health care products, 
procedures, and systems, including prescribing; order communication; product labelling, 
packaging, and nomenclature; compounding; dispensing; distribution; administration; 
education; monitoring and use” [NCC MERP, 1998;p.6].
This definition was developed by the National Co-ordinating Council for Medication Error 
Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) in the USA and has subsequently been adopted by 
the NPSA [Smith, 2004]. In simple terms, it is an error that occurs at any stage in the 
medication-use process [Ghandi et al., 2000].
Adverse drug event (ADE)
“Injury resulting from medical intervention related to a drug” [Bates et al., 1995a; 
p.29], which has subsequently been shortened to “an injury due to medication ” [Morimoto 
et al., 2004; p.307]. Implicit in this definition is suspicion of some causality between the 
injury and the drug.
ADEs can then be subdivided, as detailed below [Morimoto et al., 2004;pp.306-307]:
“A  potential ADE is a medication error with the potential to cause an injury but 
which does not actually cause an injury, either because o f  specific circumstances or 
because the error is intercepted and corrected. ”
“A  preventable ADE is an injury that is the result o f  an error at any stage in the 
medication use. ”
"An ameliorable ADE is an injury o f  which the severity or duration could have 
been substantially reduced i f  different actions had been taken. ”
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Adverse drug reaction (ADR)
“A response to a drug which is noxious and unintended, and which occurs at doses 
normally used in man fo r  the prophylaxis, diagnosis, or therapy o f  the disease, or fo r  the 
modification o f  physiological junction” [WHO, 1970;p.l03; Delamothe, 1992;p.465].
This excludes accidental or deliberate overdose [WHO, 2000;p.2].
There is some debate as to whether ADRs could arise from a medication error which also
produces an undesirable outcome [van den Bemt et al., 2000; Aronson & Femer, 2005]. It
has been argued that the WHO definition only refers to appropriate medication use, and
this would exclude medication errors [Lazarou et al., 1998; Ghandi et al., 2000]. This is
because medication errors are inappropriate use of medication and are preventable,
whereas ADRs are usually not preventable and injury arises from the intrinsic properties of
the medicine and not error [Otero & Schmitt, 2005]. Opponents o f this argue that ADEs
rely in part on the medicine’s intrinsic properties, and that in time some injuries presumed
to be unavoidable may be considered unacceptable and / or avoidable [Nebeker et al.,
2005]. This issue is currently unresolved as publications from groups that include leaders
in safe medicines practice disagree [Anon., 1998; Morimoto et al., 2004; Nebeker et al.,
2004]. ADRs are divided into type A (predictable) and type B (idiosyncratic) reactions,
defined [Pirmohamed et al., 1998;p.l295]:
“Type A reactions represent an augmentation o f  the pharmacological actions o f  a 
drug. They are dose-dependent and are therefore readily reversible on reducing the dose 
or withdrawing the drug. ”
“Type B  reactions are bizarre and cannot be predicted from known pharmacology 
o f the drug. ”
Type A reactions account for 80% of ADRs and are potentially preventable, since they 
arise from known pharmacological effects [Pirmohamed et al., 1998; Wiffen et al., 2002]. 
In contrast type B reactions “usually occur from the initial use o f  a drug in a patient and 
are not predictable, therefore not preventable” [Wiffen et al., 2002;pp.2-3].
Side effect
“Any unintended effect o f  a pharmaceutical product occurring at doses normally 
used in man which is related to the pharmacological properties o f  the drug” [Delamothe, 
1992; p.465].
Expected side-effects are ADEs e.g. hair loss with chemotherapy [Anon, 1998].
Medication errors are more prevalent than ADEs, but relatively few medication errors 
cause patient harm, and therefore an ADE [Bates et al., 1995b]. The relationship between 
these medicines related terms is illustrated in figure 1.1. In this scheme, Bates and
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colleagues, they have defined ADRs as not preventable; therefore nonpreventable ADEs 
are ADRs [Morimoto et al., 2004].
Preventable
Medication errors
ADEs
Potential
ADEs
Adverse drug 
reactionsAmeliorable
Figure 1.1. Relationships between patient safety incidents involving medication (size not 
to scale) [from Mortimoto et al., 2004; p.307].
The causality assessment of an adverse drug reaction
The attribution of a causal link is not a prerequisite for suspecting that an adverse drug 
event or adverse drug reaction has taken place. It is therefore useful to attach some weight 
to the likelihood that an ADR was thought to be due to a suspected drug. It is also 
important since most pharmacovigilance work is concerned with suspected reactions 
[Meyboom et al., 2000]. Neither definition requires certainty o f causality; it has been 
proposed that the terms can be used interchangeably [Meyboom et al., 2000]. However, as 
ADEs may be drug related, or totally unrelated, it is important these terms are clearly 
distinguished. ADEs could be considered to be a more global term that incorporates the 
subset of ADRs. WHO have developed a framework for assessing the causality of ADRs, 
which is provided below:
Certain:
“A clinical event, including laboratory test abnormality, occurring in a plausible 
time relationship to drug administration, and which cannot be explained by concurrent 
disease or other drugs or chemicals. The response to withdrawal o f  the drug (dechallenge) 
should be clinically plausible. The event must be definitive pharmacologically or 
phenomenologically, using a satisfactory rechallenge i f  necessary e.g. penicillin 
anaphylaxis " [WHO, 2000; pp.3-4].
Probable/likely:
“A clinical event, including laboratory test abnormality, occurring with a 
reasonable time sequence to drug administration, unlikely to be attributed to concurrent 
disease or other drugs or chemicals, and which follows a clinically reasonable response on
12
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withdrawal (dechallenge). Rechallenge information is not required to fulfil this definition ” 
[WHO, 2000;p.3].
Possible:
"A clinical event, including laboratory test abnormality, with a reasonable time 
sequence to which more data is essential fo r  a proper assessment or the additional data 
are under examination ” [WHO, 2000;pp.3-4].
Unassessible/unclassifiable:
“A report suggesting an adverse reaction, which cannot be judged because 
information is insufficient or contradictory, and which cannot be supplemented or verified" 
[WHO, 2000;p.4].
1.4.2 Classification
There are numerous criteria employed for classifying different aspects o f medication 
errors, adverse drug events and reactions. These are often used in combination to provide a 
more comprehensive picture [Ghandi et a l, 2000; Morimoto et a l, 2004].
a) Type of incident. Incidents are independently reviewed, then classified, usually by two 
people as medication errors, ADE, potential ADE, or none o f these [Ghandi et a l, 
2000; Morimoto et a l, 2004].
b) Preventability. Reviewers assess the likelihood that an event could be prevented and 
assign weighting to this. For example: definitely preventable, probably preventable, 
probably not preventable and definitely not preventable [Dubois & Brook, 1988].
c) Severity of incident. An assessment o f the seriousness or severity is assigned, often 
from a linear rating scale. For example, ADR severity assessment scale ranging from: 
an ADR occurred but did not necessitate a change in treatment to a fatal ADR [Hartwig 
et a l, 1992]. A linear rating scale has been validated for assessing the outcome of 
medication errors where zero represents no potential patient effect and ten would be 
fatal [Dean & Barber, 1999].
d) Causality assessment. One of the available tools to assess drug causality can be 
applied e.g. Kramer or Naranjo algorithm for ADRs [Kramer et a l, 1979; Naranjo et 
al, 1981], or the TRIP system for detrimental drug related events [Wills & Brown,
2000]. Alternatively, a rating scale that assesses the researcher’s level o f certainty that 
an event was drug induced rather than due to an underlying disease process. An 
example of the scale would be i) virtually no evidence, ii) slight to moderate evidence, 
iii) unlikely causality, less than 50:50 but close call; up to vi) virtually certain evidence 
of causation [Wilson et a l, 1995].
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Harm
Im pairm en t of the  
physical, em otiona l, o r  
psychological function o r 
structure of th e  body 
a n d /o r  pain  resulting 
therefrom .
Monitoring
To observe or record 
re levan t physiological 
o r psychological signs.
Intervention
May include change 
in th era p y  or active 
m edical/surgical 
trea tm en t.
Intervention 
Necessary to 
Sustain Life
Includes cardiovascular 
and  respiratory  support 
(e.g ., CPR, defibrilla tion , 
in tu batio n , etc.)
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Category I:
An error occurred that 
may have contributed to 
or resulted in the 
patient's death
Category A:
Circumstances or 
events that have the 
capocity to couse error
Category B:
An error occurred but 
the error did not reach 
the patient {An "error 
of omission" does 
reach the patient)
Category H:
An error occurred that 
required intervention 
necessary to sustain life
Category G:
An error occurred that 
ay have contributed to or 
resulted in permanent 
patient harm
Category C:
An error occurred that 
reached the patient but did 
not cause patient harm
Category D i'V .
An error occurred th a tSS| 
reached the patient and 
required monitoring to 
confirm that it resulted in no 
l harm to the patient and/or 
V required intervention to y  
\  preclude harm
/  Category F: /  \
An error occurred that may /  \
have contributed to or /  \
resulted in temporary harm /  *
to the patient and required /  Category E:
 ^ initial or prolonged /  An error occurred that 
hospitalization /  may have contributed 
/  to or resulted in 
/  temporary harm to the
/  patient and required 
/  intervention
Figure 1.2 NCC MERP index for 
categorising medication errors
0 No Erroro Error, No Harmo Error, Harm0Error, Death
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The NCC MERP has adapted the Hartwig et al., [1991] error classification index. Their 
index, promoted to help achieve standardisation and consistency in error reporting, uses 
patient outcome as the prime focus [Dunn & Wolfe, 1997]. An overview of how 
medication errors are categorised by the NCC MERP is provided in figure 1.2. It has 
subsequently been updated to distinguish between Category C errors reaching the patient 
that are administered and those that are not [NCC MERP, 1998].
1.4.3 Safety culture
The NPSA [2003a] identified that a cultural shift from blame to openness was vital to
improve patient safety; organisations needed to embed safety as a core belief, encouraging
mistakes to be shared.
“A safety culture is where sta ff within an organisation have a constant and active 
awareness o f  the potential fo r  things to go wrong. Both the sta ff and the organisation are 
able to acknowledge mistakes, learn from them, and take action to put things right ” 
[NPSA, 2003a;p.l7].
A key principle in achieving this is the creation of an ‘open and fair environment’. This 
entails acting openly and honestly in all matters, including the fair treatment of those 
involved in patient safety incidents. Staff remain professionally accountable, but insight 
from human error theory shows that in nearly all cases incidents are unintentional. This 
understanding underpins a shift from the ‘blame’ culture to one where staff share 
information on incidents. This is coupled with the awareness that organisations need to 
understand what is happening and, to identify issues that contribute to incidents before 
steps can be taken to address them, and so improve safety.
1.43.1 Why errors occur
There are two approaches to human error, systems-based and person-based. In the persons
approach all attention from an error is focused on an individual, where they are blamed for
forgetfulness, inattention or moral weakness [Reason, 2000]. This arises from two
fictitious myths [NPSA, 2003a;p.22]:
“Theperfection myth: i f  people try hard enough, they will not make any errors.
The punishment myth: i f  we punish people when they make errors, they will make fewer o f  
them; that remedial and disciplinary action will lead to improvement by channelling or 
increasing motivation. ”
The persons based approach is deeply embedded within healthcare. This ‘blame culture’ 
creates a vicious cycle where incidents are hidden; organisations remain unaware of the
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risks and error prone areas and so do not take corrective actions. This is summarised in 
figure 1.3.
Management 
even more
convinced
People seen to choose 
erroneous course of 
action
STARTS HERE
Deliberate actions 
deserve sanctions
Little or no effect 
on error rates
Exhort and punish 
those making errors
Management view this 
as deliberate disregard 
of warnings, etc.
Figure 1.3 The blame cycle [from Reason et al., 2001;p.ii22]
The systems approach is based upon the assumption that people are not machines; they are 
fallible and will make mistakes, even in the safest organisations. It focuses more widely; 
errors are seen as consequences not causes, and consideration is given to the environment 
and organisational factors contributing to an incident. This is based on the assumption that 
the human condition cannot be changed, but the environment in which they work can be. 
The NPSA have adopted this systems approach to safety [NPSA, 2003a]. This can be 
illustrated by the ‘Swiss cheese modeT of system failure, where healthcare, with its 
numerous inbuilt safe guards, is described as slices o f Swiss cheese, and each slice equates 
to a defence, barrier or safeguard that protects the patient from error. Each hole indicates a 
flaw (active failure or latent condition) that would fail to prevent an error passing on to the 
next slice of cheese. In an ideal world, these slices would have no holes in them; but in 
reality the holes appear in different shapes and sizes and different places within the cheese 
at different times. An error occurs when defences fail and a whole series of holes are all 
aligned, shown in figure 1.4 [Reason, 2000].
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S o m e  h o le s  d u e  
to  ac tiv e  fa ilu res
H azards
O th er h o le s  d u e  to  
la te n t c o n d itio n s  
(re s id e n t "p a th o g en s '* )L o sses
S u c c e ss iv e  la y e rs  o f d e fe n c e s , b a rr ie rs  a n d  sa fe g u a rd s
Figure 1.4 The "Swiss cheese" model o f accident causation [from Reason et al., 
2001;p.ii21]
Reason suggested that to understand organisational accidents, an understanding o f four 
domains is required. These were:
1. Latent failures -management decisions and organisational processes and culture.
2. Trigger factors - local work, task and environmental conditions.
3. Individual unsafe acts.
4. Failed defenses.
Latent conditions have been described as “the inevitable ‘resident pathogens * within the 
system. ” [Reason, 2000;p.769] These are created by strategic decisions at management and 
organisational level from designers, builders, procedure writers, top level management and 
Government strategies. Latent conditions can be manifest in two ways:
■ Local work and task conditions give rise to error-provoking conditions in the 
working area, such as understaffing, time pressures, and fatigue at ward level.
■ Long lasting holes or weaknesses in the systems* defences such as unworkable 
procedures and equipment failure.
Fallible decisions may create latent failures within the system, which are transmitted down 
the departmental pathway into the workplace where they give rise to task and 
environmental precursors likely to promote unsafe acts [Taylor-Adams et al., 1999]. Latent 
failures may lie undetected for a many years, before they are aligned with a local trigger 
and active failure creates an incident [Reason, 2000].
Active failures can be divided into violations, which are intentional rule bending, and 
errors, which are unintentional. Errors can be subdivided into:
• Slips arising from lack o f concentration.
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Lapses caused by ‘memory block’.
Mistakes, either rule-based where rules are forgotten or get confused, or memory- 
based associated with insufficient knowledge [Anon., 2006a].
Active failures have been defined as
"Unsafe acts committed by people who are in direct contact with the patient or system. 
They take a variety o f forms: slips, lapses, fumbles, mistakes and procedural violations. 
Active failures have a direct and usually short lived impact on the integrity o f the 
defences " [Reason, 2000;p.769].
Latent
failures
Management
decision
Organisational
processes
Conditions of 
work (current) 
Background 
factors
• workload
• supervision
• communication
• equipment
• knowledge/ 
ability
Active
failures
Barriers/
defences
Unsafe acts
• omissions - >
• action slips/
failures
• cognitive failures
(memory lapses
and mistakes) - >
• violations
Accident
Figure 1.5 Organisational accident model based on work by Reason [as Vincent et 
al., 1998; p.778]
Learning from other safety critical industries such as aviation, oil and nuclear power has 
shown the importance o f a holistic understanding o f how an incident occurred; one that 
includes the organisational and environmental factors in place at that time. Knowledge that 
human actions and decisions play a major role in virtually all accidents through latent 
active failures has altered understanding [Taylor Adams et al., 1999]. This interest has 
shaped the way in which patient safety incidents are investigated, so that the systems 
factors in operation when an incident occurred form part o f the inquiry. The key questions 
that need identifying are how and why the defences failed [Reason, 2000]. A summary 
how patient safety incidents (equivalent to accident) arise, and should therefore be 
investigated is given in figure 1.5, with systems factors identified in table 1.1.
Another lesson from safety critical industries has been the importance o f design to improve 
safety where,
“design is a structured process for identifying problems and developing, testing 
and evaluating user-focused solutions ” [The Department o f Health and The Design 
Council, 2003;p.9].
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It has been suggested that the NHS has “not grasped the value and significance o f  design 
to patient safety” [The Department o f Health and The Design Council, 2003;p.l8].
Design could be applied across healthcare to create products, processes and environments 
that are intuitive, simple to understand, convenient and comfortable and therefore, reduce 
the likelihood o f accidental misuse and errors. Following a scoping study to identify areas 
where design could improve patient safety in the NHS, a number of projects were proposed 
that used a system design approach [The Department o f Health and The Design Council,
2003].
Table L I  Framework o f factors influencing clinical practice [from Vincent et al., 
2000;p.7781 _____________________________________________________
Factor types Influencing contributory factors Examples
Institutional context Economic and regulatory context; national health 
service executive; clinical negligence scheme for 
trusts
Inconsistent policies, funding 
problems
Organisational and 
management factors
Financial resources and constraints; organisational 
structure; policy standards and goals; safety culture 
and priorities
Lacking senior management 
procedure for risk reduction
Work environment 
factors
Staffing levels and skills mix; workload and shift 
patterns; design, availability, and maintenance of 
equipment; administrative and managerial support
High workload, inadequate 
staffing, or limited access to 
essential equipment
Team factors Verbal communication; written communication; 
supervision and seeking help; team structure 
(consistency, leadership, etc)
Poor communication between 
staff
Individual (staff) 
factors
Knowledge and skills; competence; physical and 
mental health
Lack of knowledge or 
experience of specific staff
Task factors Task design and clarity of structure; availability 
and use of protocols; availability and accuracy of 
test results
Non-availability of test results 
or protocols
Patient factors Condition (complexity and seriousness); language 
and communication; personality and social factors
Distressed patient or language 
problem
1.4.4 Background to research methods
Before looking at the findings o f medication error and adverse drug event or reaction 
studies, it is paramount to understand exactly how the research was conducted. Any 
associated methodological limitations need to be considered as this affects the usefulness 
and applicability o f a study’s findings [Allan & Barker 1990; Meyboom et al., 2000]. 
Studies have tended to either focus on outcomes from within a global scenario, such as a 
period of hospitalisation; or have addressed smaller process steps within this bigger 
picture, particularly in the non-research setting e.g. prescribing errors, and then examined 
potential outcome that could arise from errors in the process [Dean et al., 2002a].
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The first observational studies of the medication administration process were undertaken in 
the 1960s, with a great diversity o f results. A review of 18 observation based studies 
published between 1962 and 1987 found that the total opportunities for error (a statistical 
correction to prevent the reported error rate exceeding 100%) ranged from 1.7% to 59.1% 
[Allan & Barker, 1990]. Caution has been advised in interpretation or generalisation of 
these results due to variations in the clinical setting, methods employed and error category 
definitions. For example, Allan and Barker’s [1990] review illustrated that the 14 
observational studies had used between three to ten medication error categories from a 
possible 17 different categories. One of the early definitions o f a medication error was 
44deviation from the physician’s medication order as written on the patient’s chart” which 
therefore excluded prescribing errors [Allan & Barker, 1990;p.558]. This early research 
failed to include 'wrong time’ errors, or displayed the results with and without this 
category. With advances in therapeutics and pharmacokinetics the importance of timely 
administration has been realised. When Allan and Barker’s [1990] review is reported 
excluding ‘wrong time’ this reduces the error rate to 0.4 - 24.7%. The authors concluded 
that the lack of consistency made comparison of individual studies difficult, and that the 
data gathered might only be applicable to the establishment studied [Allan & Barker, 
1990].
A more recent review of 11 studies published between 1991 and 1999 found similar huge 
variations in reported findings. Total medication error rates varied from 0.04% with 
spontaneous reporting o f all medication error types to 26.9% with disguised observation of 
transcription, dispensing and administration errors, including ‘wrong time’ errors [van de 
Bemt et a l, 2000]. Again, there was a lack o f consistency in the way definitions were 
employed. For example, the term ADE has been used by some where injury was drug 
related, whilst others used this term when it is unknown whether medication is the cause 
[Ghandi et al., 2000; van den Bemt et a l, 2000]. Van den Bemt and colleagues 
[2000;p.323] summarise the situation,
“Drug-related problems are an important problem in hospitalised patients, 
although the exact magnitude o f  the problem is difficult to estimate from the studies 
presented in our review. ”
The recently published methodology for the identification and classification of patient 
safety incidents involving medication [Morimoto et al., 2004] provides opportunity for 
standardisation but it would take several years to become established.
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Having considered these limitations, it is useful to review the findings of some of the 
landmark studies o f adverse events and errors in the hospital inpatient setting.
1.4.5 Prevalence and consequences of hospital adverse events
1.4.5.1 Adverse healthcare events 
Incidence of adverse healthcare events
In 1984 the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) was undertaken, from a medical
injury, litigation and malpractice stance, in 51 non-psychiatric acute hospitals in New York
State, involving 30,121 patients. It reported adverse healthcare events, which therefore
included, but were not restricted to, medication related events, and employed very strict
inclusion criteria. Adverse events were defined as
“An injury that was caused by medical management (rather than underlying 
disease) and that prolonged the hospitalisation, produced a disability at the time o f  
discharge or both " [Brennan et a l, 1991 ;p.370].
This would therefore encompass both ADR and medication errors which resulted in patient 
harm. Adverse events occurred in 3.7% of hospitalisations. ‘Drug complications’ were the 
single most frequently reported type of adverse event, constituting 19.4% of adverse 
events, which translates into an overall 0.7% study incidence o f adverse drug events. Of 
these 14.1% were associated with severe disability and 17.7% were considered to a result 
of negligence [Leape et al., 1991].
The Quality in Australian Healthcare study (QAHCS), modelled on the HMPS 
methodology, was undertaken in 28 hospitals in two Australian states in 1992, screening 
14,179 admissions. Adverse events were reported in 16.6%, which after adjustment to 
mirror the HMPS criteria accounted for 13% of admissions [Wilson et al., 1995]. 
Temporary disability, fully resolved within 12 months, was associated with 12.52% of 
adverse events. These were responsible for nearly two thirds o f increased hospital stays.
The researchers found 51.2% of the adverse events had a high degree o f preventability and 
the preventable events were associated with greater disability. 4Injuries, poisonings and 
toxic effects o f  drugs ' [Wilson et al., 1995;p.467] comprised 30.9% o f the adverse events; 
which produced an overall 5.1% ADE rate. O f these 13.8% were associated with 
permanent disability and 46% judged highly preventable.
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A pilot study employing similar methods to both the HMPS and QAHCS was undertaken 
at two London hospitals using data from 1998. The case notes o f 1,014 patients from 
general medical, surgical, obstetrics and orthopaedics were retrospectively analysed for 
adverse events. An adverse event was experienced by 10.8% of patients; with an overall 
adverse event rate o f 11.7% including multiple adverse events. The researchers judged that 
48% of the adverse events were preventable. Adverse events produced impairment ranging 
from moderate severity to death in one third of patients [Vincent et al., 2001]. The authors 
have advised caution in interpreting or extrapolating the results due to the sample size, 
restriction to two study sites and non-generalisability o f the case mix to general hospital 
practice. In addition, concern has been raised about the subjectivity o f retrospective 
analysis:
“ What appeared to be clinically reasonable at the time may be second guessed i f  
an adverse event occurs " [Alberti, 2001;p.502].
A novel research methodology was employed by Andrews and co-workers [1997]. This
was a prospective observational study where the researchers observed practitioners’
discussion of adverse events that had occurred during the care o f 1,047 surgical and
intensive care patients. An adverse event was defined as
“An ‘inappropriate decision ’ was made, when at the time an appropriate 
alternative could have been chosen ” [Andrews et al., 1997;p.310].
They identified adverse events in 45.8% of patients, with an average 4.5 events per patient; 
9.3% of total adverse events were attributed to medication. At least one serious adverse 
event was reported in 17.7% of patients, ranging from temporary disability that increased 
the duration of hospitalisation to death, 5.8% of the errors were due to medication. Adverse 
events were associated with an increased average length of hospitalisation, 23.8 days vs. 
8.8 days [Andrews et al., 1997]. It has been suggested the use o f this observational
research method was inappropriate to determine prevalence for various reasons. For
example, ‘inappropriate decisions* were directly equated to adverse events and are 
subjective [Poses, 1997].
Costs of adverse healthcare events
The QAHCS reported that an adverse event was found to be responsible for an average 
additional 7.1 days hospitalisation [Wilson et al., 1995]. The UK pilot study found each 
adverse event caused an additional average 8.5 days hospitalisation, and cost £290,268. It 
was estimated that if  approximately 5% of the annual 8,500,000 England and Wales
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hospital admissions suffered a preventable adverse event this would require three million 
additional (bed days’ at an annual cost of £1 billion [Vincent et al., 2001].
1.4.5.2 Adverse drug events 
Incidence of adverse drug events
The USA ADE prevention study recruited 4,031 non-obstetric adults over six months from 
two tertiary hospitals incorporating medical and surgical units. Data were collected by 
chart review combined with prompted practitioner reporting. According to their 
definitions, an ADE was “An injury resulting from medical intervention related to a drug" 
[Bates et al., 1995a;p.30]. These were classed preventable if  they had arisen from an error. 
Drug errors intercepted before they were carried out were potential ADE, “incidents with 
potential fo r  injury related to a drug" [Bates et al., 1995a;p.30]. All potential ADEs were 
medication errors [Bates et al., 1995a]. They found ADEs in 6.5% o f patient admissions 
and potential ADEs in 5.5%. Twenty eight percent o f the ADEs were judged preventable, 
therefore arising from errors. If potential ADEs are combined with preventable ADEs a 
medication error rate o f 7.3% was calculated. ADEs associated with a severe level of 
disability were significantly more likely to be preventable than less severe events. Errors 
producing preventable ADEs (n=70) occurred early on in the medication process, 56% at 
the prescribing and 34% at the administration stage. Amongst preventable and potential 
ADEs (n=264) errors were less likely to be detected in the later stages o f the medication 
process. All administration errors reached the patient, but 48% o f prescribing errors were 
intercepted. O f the ADEs 7.7% fulfilled the HMPS criteria. This correlated with a total 
study ADE rate o f 0.5% [Bates et al.9 1995a].
Leape and colleagues [1995] performed a study in an identical setting and time frame to
Bates and co-workers [1995a]. Medication errors were investigated to identify defects in
the ’system’ that allowed the errors to occur. A system was defined as
“An interdependent group o f  items, people, or processes with a common purpose ” 
[Leape et al.y 1995;p.36].
Again, the focus was restricted to errors associated with ADE or judged potential ADE, so 
excluding the many errors not associated with harm [Leape et al., 1995]. An ADE or 
potential ADE was promptly investigated using a structured form to gather information on 
the circumstances and causes of the event.
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A total o f 334 errors were detected from 264 preventable events (194 potential ADE and 
70 [28%] o f the ADE were attributed to errors). Events were categorised according to the 
stage in the medication process at which they occurred. Errors were identified in more then 
one stage o f the prescribing process in 55 (21%) cases. Errors occurred most often at the 
prescribing (39%) and administration (38%) stage. Details o f the type o f error and when in 
the medication process they occurred is shown in figure 1.6.
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Figure 1.6 Types o f medication error according to the stage o f the medication process 
(n=334 errors) [Leape et al., 1995].
Amongst common errors those most likely to cause injury were wrong choice and wrong 
dose errors accounting for 42% of all ADEs. Frequency and administration errors were 
rarely associated with ADEs.
C osts o f  a d v erse  d ru g  ev en ts
Analyses o f the ADE prevention data for the effect an ADE had on healthcare resources 
demonstrated an increase in hospital stay and associated costs. Paired regression analysis, 
adjusted for multiple factors including severity, co-morbidity and length o f stay showed 
that an ADE created an additional 2.2 days o f hospitalisation and a preventable ADE 4.6 
days. After adjustment for the sampling method, Bates and colleagues [1997] estimated 
the post event costs due to the adverse event was $2,595 per ADE and $4,685 per 
preventable ADE.
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1.4.5.3 Adverse drug reactions 
Incidence of adverse drug reactions
A retrospective analysis o f coroner’s inquest reports over six years, from an UK district 
serving 1.19 million, attributed 36 fatalities from a total 3,277 inquests to ADRs. These 
occurred more frequently in the elderly and were associated with a limited number of drugs 
[Femer & Whittington, 1994].
Data were collected from a tertiary referral hospital between 1990-1993 using practitioner 
reports and computerised surveillance for ADEs cases, with matched controls. From the 
methodology it is clear these data in fact referred to adverse drug reactions, since the 
standard WHO definition of an ADR was employed. ADRs were found to complicate 
2.43% of admissions [Classen et a l, 1997].
A meta-analysis of 39 prospective USA studies published from 1966-1996 attempted to 
estimate the overall incidence of ADRs in hospital patients. The researchers adhered to the 
WHO definition o f an ADR and excluded medication errors and possible ADR in their 
analysis. The overall incidence of ADRs causing admission to hospital and occurring 
during hospitalisation was 15.1%. They found the incidence o f serious ADR to be 6.7% 
(2.1% experienced during hospitalisation, 4.7% the reason for admission) and fatal ADRs 
were 0.32% (0.19% during hospitalisation and 0.13% causing hospital admission). They 
reported a stable incidence of ADRs over the 30 years analysed. Accepting the 
heterogeneity o f the sample, and potential bias, this still illustrates the importance of ADRs 
as a key health care issue [Lazarou et a l, 1998].
A large systematic review o f global ADR studies published prior to 1999 [Wiffen et al.,
2002] found the incidence o f ADRs was lower since 1985 than before this date. There was 
little UK data, but that which was available suggested UK and European data were 
comparable, where ADRs affected 7% patients or hospital admissions. It is of interest that 
the rates reported were twice those o f North America.
UK researchers prospectively studied 18,820 adult hospital admissions to two hospitals and 
found ADRs in 6.5%. In 80% of these the ADR was the causal reason for admission 
[Pirmohamed et a l, 2004]. It is concerning that 72% of ADRs were either definitely or 
possibly avoidable. Comparing their findings with the published literature, the authors state
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“many o f  the studies included in recent systematic reviews, however, are more than 
20 years old, and it is disappointing that the burden o f  ADRs has not decreased”
Further they suggest that
“many may be preventable through simple improvements in prescribing” 
[Pirmohamed et al., 2004;pp.l7-18].
Costs of adverse drug reactions
The study by Classen and co-workers [1997] study showed ADRs were associated with 
increased mortality, longer hospitalisation and greater hospital bills. The average length of 
stay was 4.46 days for control patients compared with 7.69 days for ADR case patients, 
with the crude mortality rate 1.05% and 3.5% respectively. This translated into an 
increased risk o f death of 1.88 (odds ratio) for those experiencing an ADR. After linear 
regression analysis for duration o f hospitalisation and cost control of matching variables, 
an ADR was found to be associated with an additional 1.91 days hospitalisation and 
$2,262 in hospital fees.
The Pirmohamed and colleagues study found that ADRs were associated with a median 
bed stay o f 8 days, equivalent to 4% of hospital bed capacity. They estimated that the NHS 
spent £466 million per annum on such admissions [Pirmohamed et al., 2004].
1.4.5.4 The link between adverse drug events and medication errors
Data on medication errors, and their contribution to actual or potential ADEs were 
gathered for 1,704 patient days over a 51 day period at a tertiary care hospital on medical 
Intensive Care Unit and ward areas. From 10,070 new medication orders (prescriptions) 
had a 5.3% medication error rate. This equated to a mean of 0.3 errors per patient per day, 
or 1.4 errors per admission. During the study period 25 ADEs were identified, of which 
five were judged preventable as they were due to errors. Overall, 0.9% of medication 
errors resulting in an ADE, and 6.7% a potential ADE [Bates et al., 1995b]. Medication 
errors also cost numerous hours repeating work previously done, and 92% of errors needed 
direct practitioner communication to resolve them [Bates et al., 1995b].
26
Chapter I: Introduction
1.5 The medicines-use process
This complex process covers all stages surrounding medicines use, from the initial decision 
to prescribe a medicine through its administration to monitoring its effects on an individual 
patient. It can be split into innumerable small steps, and involves a continuum of 
communication between the various parties involved [Femer & Upton, 1999; Andersen et 
al, 2001]. When such multifaceted and interdependent processes are performed, it remains 
inevitable that this will incorporate an element of error. Each stage contributing to the 
medicines process is prone to error [Department of Health, 2000a]. An outline of this 
process is given in figure 1.7.
Decision as to whether drug treatment is 
the most appropriate course of action.
Individual patient prescription is generated (hand­
written or computerised) which includes instructions 
of the drug, form, dose, route, frequency and any 
special precautions.
T
Supply of medication 
potential sources ( 
intravenous additive sc 
dispensed for an indivi 
form with advice fc 
r
is obtained from a variety of 
e.g. stock on ward, sterile 
jrvice, patient’s own supply or 
dual patient) in the appropriate 
>r its administration, where 
elevant.
Medication is administered to the patient in 
an appropriate and timely manner.
Patient is monitored to ensure the 
medication achieved its desired effect and 
 to detect any untoward effects.______
Figure 1.7 An  overview of the medicines-use process [adapted from Femer & Upton, 
1999]
The outline is skeletal in nature, as many different routes can to be taken through the 
pathway; advice or additional input may be needed before proceeding to the next step 
[Hepler & Strand, 1990; Davies et a l, 1994; Femer & Upton, 1999]. For example, the 
patient may need counselling on the use of an inhaler.
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Traditionally, the medicines-use process (MUP) is subdivided and described as a series of 
repetitive and non-repetitive steps; the component stages of the inpatient medication 
process have been described as:
a) Prescribing (or ordering in American literature [Bates, 1996]),
b) Transcription,
c) Dispensing (may be referred to as filling in American literature [Bates, 1996]),
d) Administration to the patient,
e) Monitoring [Ghandi et al., 2000; Andersen et a l, 2001].
However, medication use is not divorced from other healthcare interventions and processes 
that run in parallel or are often combined [Andersen et a l, 2001]. A sound understanding 
of the system is necessary to examine how errors can arise, and what can be done to 
minimise their occurrence. Although the definition of a medication error includes all stages 
in this process, research has often focused on a single stage [Bates, 1996].
1.5.1 Medication errors
Medication errors hit the headlines in the 1960s when it became apparent the problem was 
rife in hospitals [Vere, 1965]. Research from the UK and USA revealed that on average, a 
nurse made approximately one error for every 6 medicines given [Barker & McConnell, 
1962; Hill & Wigmore, 1967]. Attention was focused on the unsatisfactory systems that 
existed for drug supply and control, and from this starting point ward pharmacy was bom. 
Two different approaches were adapted in the UK: the combined patient prescription and 
drug administration record was established [Crooks et a l, 1965], and pharmacists began 
leaving a centralised pharmacy to review patients’ treatment at ward level [Calder & 
Barnett, 1967]. In the USA unit dose dispensing and decentralised pharmacy workstations 
in close proximity to patient areas were established. The wheel has turned full circle since 
the late 1960s, and medication errors are in the limelight once again [Department of 
Health, 2000a]. Much has since been learned, however it is accepted that the measures 
introduced to control the errors have been only partially successful and there is no research 
base detailing the current state o f play in the UK [Cousins & Luscombe, 1995; Department 
of Health, 2000a].
Errors can arise at any stage within the medicines-use process, each step following an error 
provides an opportunity for detecting the error and correcting it e.g. a prescribing error
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may be noticed by a pharmacist supplying a medicine, or a nurse administering one. The 
administration stage provides fewest opportunities for error interception. Different stages 
in the MUP generate different errors.
The Bates and colleagues [1995a] and Leape and colleagues [1995] studies o f preventable 
and potential ADE, highlighted that medication errors most often occurred in the 
prescribing stage (39% when error is the denominator). Forty eight percent (n=63) of these 
errors were intercepted, most by nurses (55 cases) and the remainder by pharmacists (8 
cases) [Leape et al., 1995]. The most common errors were wrong dose, wrong drug choice, 
wrong frequency, and prescribing a drug to which the patient was known to be allergic. 
The second most error prone stage was administration (38% when error is the denominator 
used). The majority o f errors were due to wrong medicine, wrong dose, wrong technique, 
missed doses and wrong time. However, by contrast, only two percent o f these errors were 
intercepted. The authors reported that errors were significantly more likely to be 
intercepted the earlier they occurred within the MUP. The research methodology used did 
not include observational techniques, yet these are considered the optimum method to 
detect administration errors [Dean & Barber, 2001]. Therefore, it is likely that many 
administration errors went undetected, and that administration is the most error prone stage 
of the MUP.
There are currently no corresponding large scale studies available for the UK; most 
researchers have focused on a single stage in the MUP. In 2001 it was estimated that half a 
million prescriptions were generated each day in English hospitals [Department o f Health, 
2001b] but the prevalence of injury caused by medication errors in the NHS was not 
known [Smith, 2004].
As there are fundamental differences between the USA and UK MUPs, an overview of 
medication errors in the UK adult inpatient setting is described below. Dean Franklin and 
colleagues [2005] reminded readers of the need for a clear understanding of the 
terminology, denominator and methodology used when evaluating a study’s findings.
1.5.1.1 Prescribing errors
Dean and colleagues [2002a] undertook a large UK pilot study to determine the incidence 
of hospital prescribing errors. Pharmacists prospectively detected prescribing errors over
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four weeks from non-obstetric patients in a large teaching hospital. The results revealed a 
1.5% error rate in all the 36,168 prescriptions written, with 0.4% potentially serious errors 
[Dean et al., 2002a]. The majority were dosing errors (54%) and arose at prescription 
writing (61%) rather than cognitive decision to prescribe stage [Dean et al., 2002a].
Two key factors contributing to prescribing errors have been identified [Leape et al., 1995; 
Lesar et al., 1997]. These were:
a. Inadequate or poorly applied knowledge of drug therapy. Prescribing errors 
attributed to deficits in doctors’ knowledge included wrong dose, form, frequency, 
route and choice o f drug.
b. Failure to tailor treatment according to individual patient characteristics, such as 
renal impairment or documented allergies.
Semi-structured interviews of 41 prescribers who made 44 potentially serious errors 
revealed that most were slips in attention, and prescribers were unable to explain why. 
Contributory risk factors identified included work environment, workload, team 
communication, prescribing for another team's patient, physical and mental well being, 
lack o f knowledge, inadequate training, team hierarchy, low perceived importance of 
prescribing, and lack o f error awareness [Dean et al., 2002b].
1.5.1.2 Dispensing errors
There are few large scale UK hospital dispensing error studies. Beso and colleagues [2005] 
investigated the frequency o f inpatient, outpatient and discharge items errors detected at 
the final check stage within the pharmacy. One or more errors were found in 2.1% of 
items. This compared with 0.02% items reported as errors to pharmacy from dispensed 
items that had left the pharmacy department.
Similarly, an average error rate o f 0.018% of dispensed items from 19 hospital dispensaries 
has been reported [Spencer & Smith, 1993]. A total o f 7,158 dispensing errors were 
reported as part o f an unofficial scheme between 1991-2001 from 89 UK hospitals 
[Roberts et al., 2002]. No denominator was given, so the percentage error rate cannot be 
determined. The most frequently reported errors were wrong medicine and wrong strength 
of the correct medicine (both 23%). Several contributory factors were identified, these 
were: look-alike and sound-alike medicines (33%), high workload and, or low staffing 
(23%), inexperienced staff (20%) and transcriptions errors (14%) [Roberts et a l, 2002].
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1.5.1 J  Administration errors
Anaesthetics, paediatrics, critical care and intravenous medicines carry a high risk of 
administration errors, and were critically dependent on the previous MUP stages [Smith, 
2004]. With oral doses, a 5.5% error rate has been reported [Barber & Dean, 1998]. Studies 
investigating parenteral, primarily intravenous, error rates have detected between 25-49% 
errors with 1% potentially serious errors [Bruce & Wong, 2001; Taxis & Barber, 2003a]. 
The error rate for injectable medicine administration is much higher than for enteral routes. 
Further work is required to elucidate the reasons why and propose ways to minimise or 
eradicate these errors [Cousins, 2005a].
Causes of administration errors include verbal orders, illegible prescriptions, transcription 
errors, inadequate labelling, lack of knowledge, fatigue, illness, stress and distractions 
[Smith, 2004].
1.6 Research methodology
Research into medication errors is vital for quality improvement because of the unique
interplay o f contributory factors. However, any generalisability beyond the study setting
has been questioned [NCC MERP, 2002].
“Interorganisational comparisons o f  rates are not likely to be meaningful and may 
be counterproductive” [van Leeuwen, 1994;p.l93].
Cousins [2005b] elaborated further, stressing the importance of understanding the context 
of the health care system, medicines used, MUP, pharmacy duties and staffing when 
interpreting studies from other countries. One example he cited from national survey data 
was that nurses prepare intravenous (IV) medicines in 19% of hospitals in the USA 
compared with Europe where pharmacies prepared only 9% of IVs (excluding parenteral 
nutrition and chemotherapy). Yet it was not until recently that stringent standards for 
pharmacy preparation and quality control have become widespread in the USA and 
compliance with these was still not universal in 2002 [Hunt & Rapp, 1996; Morris et al.,
2003].
In this field, combining more than one research method for detecting patient safety incident 
involving medication has been advocated [Allan & Barker, 1990; Ghandi et al., 2000; 
Morimoto et a l, 2004]. Further, the research methodologies for adverse drug event 
detection have been considered so resource intensive that they may not be generally
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applicable for adaptation into routine practice [Ghandi et a l, 2000]. The advantages and 
disadvantages of the main research methods employed are summarised in table 1.2. Some 
methods are more applicable to one research setting than another. Depending on the aims 
of the study any of the methods described could be used in combination to identify patient 
safety incidents. There are ongoing developments seeking to refine these methodologies, or 
move to more prospective methods [MurfF et a l, 2003; Neale & Woloshynowych, 2003; 
Woloshynowych et a l, 2003; Morimoto et a l, 2004; Phillipe et a l, 2004; Dean Fanklin 
et a l t 2005; Lisby et a l, 2005].
Table 1.2 Methods for detecting medication errors and adverse drug reactions [adapted 
from Allan & Barker, 1990; Jha et a l , 1998; Gandhi et a l, 2000; Barker et al., 2002a; 
Morimoto et a l,  2004].______________________ ___________________________________
Method Advantages Disadvantages
Spontaneous
voluntary
reporting
(includes both 
anonymous and 
incident reports)
• Inexpensive.
• Ongoing process (not confined 
to snapshot review).
• Least time consuming
• If anonymous, removes 
disciplinary concerns.
• Strategies can be employed to 
enhance response rate e.g. 
prompting.
• Useful for inpatient settings
• Awareness an error occurred needed to 
submit an error report.
• Poor reporting rate, especially if concerned 
about disciplinary consequences.
• Less likely to be reported if no harm to 
patient, or doctor advises against reporting.
• Not representative.
• Under reporting may lead to a false sense 
of security.
• Less sensitive for omission or wrong time 
medication errors.
• Safety culture needed to maximise data 
collection.
• Likely to underestimate true incidence as 
reliant on documentation to identify 
potential incidents.
Pharmacy
Intervention
records
• High data yield.
• Inconsistent recording due to 
part time nature of pharmacy 
contact time.
• Process rather than outcome 
measure.
• Immensely practical.
• Inexpensive.
• Doesn’t pick up administration errors.
• Dependant upon pharmacist’s skills and 
subsequent documentation.
• Sensitive for both ADE and potential ADE.
• Process rather than outcome measure.
Critical
incident
technique
(by participant 
observation or 
interview)
• Useful to identify cause of 
errors.
• Facilitates targeting of major 
issues.
• Very large sample required.
• Large volume of data generated.
• Data interpretation difficult.
• Problems eliminating many sources of bias.
• Operationalising into a practical solution is 
hard.
• Interview techniques rely on memory.
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Table 1.2 continued... Methods for detecting medication errors and adverse drug reactions 
[adapted from Allan & Barker, 1990; Jha et al., 1998; Gandhi et al., 2000; Barker et al., 
2002a; Morimoto et al., 2004].___________________________________________________
Method Advantages Disadvantages
Direct
observation of
subject by 
trained observer
• Most sensitive and reliable for 
administration errors.
• Moderately sensitive for ADE.
• Observer gains insight into 
possible causes.
• Objectivity preserved as subject 
not involved in reporting.
• High yield of results.
• Highly accurate, especially for 
dispensing and administration 
errors.
• Useful in inpatient setting
• Disguised method limits effect 
of interference from the 
researcher.
• Expensive, especially if ADE detecting as 
larger data set is required.
• Time consuming.
• Only feasible to do for short periods.
• Requires skilled staff or extensive training.
• Observer fatigue.
• Care must be taken to minimise the 
observer’s presence affecting results.
• Risk the observer could misconstrue 
observations.
• Useful for detecting administration errors, 
but these have a low chance of patient 
harm.
• Administration studies are only valid if 
observer actually sees dose consumed, 
cannot rely on prescription record.
• Observer must be unfamiliar with 
prescription to protect against liability.
Case data 
review (of
prescriptions, 
laboratory tests, 
multi­
disciplinary 
notes etc.)
• Best detection rate for inpatient 
setting.
• Moderate detection rate for 
outpatient setting.
• Been modified for prospective 
use.
• Only suitable for areas with good 
prescription records e.g. unsuitable for 
outpatients.
• Not very sensitive for administration 
errors.
• Subjective
• Expensive method for collecting ADEs.
• Time consuming.
• Reliant on appropriate documentation of 
events.
• Process rather than outcome measure.
• Data collectors require careful training; 
despite this result still affected by 
reviewers skills.
Computerised
surveillance
• Reasonably sensitive.
• Inexpensive.
• Can create a ‘rules-based’ 
computer programme to gather 
data e.g. identify ‘triggers’
• Good at identifying ADEs, 
especially numerical ones.
• Can be used routinely where 
computerised physician order 
entry or electronic medication 
records are the norm.
• Less resource intensive and 
more focused than manual data 
review
• Poor at detecting potential ADEs
• Requires an electronic based system 
prescribing or patient data system to be in 
use.
• Dependent upon technology in use.
• Further refinement required as current 
methods create too many false positives 
(ADEs and errors).
Patient
Surveys
• Detects incidents not recorded 
in the notes.
• Important for outpatient settings
• Sensitive and effective for 
outpatient ADE detection.
• Interviews and phone surveys are resource 
intensive.
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Another method that has been employed is searching legal claims data, but this should 
generally be disregarded, as it is insensitive and expensive with independent verification of  
the report required [Ghandi et al., 2000]. Focus groups are considered a useful tool for 
gathering data on key issues [Ghandi et al., 2000]. Other workers have used unannounced 
visits for quality control purposes to determine the true incidence o f dispensing errors 
reaching the ward [Lisby et al., 2005].
Over the last decade Bates and colleagues have developed a comprehensive methodology 
for identifying and classifying medication safety research. This has been published for 
other researchers to adopt [Morimoto et al., 2004]. Their data collection has focused on a 
combination o f three methods:
1. Retrospective data review
2. Stimulated reporting from healthcare professionals
3. Patient surveys
Each incident identified is the classified, and an assessment o f reliability performed. This 
methodology remains valid for classifying all types o f patient safety incidents involving 
medicines. This process for classifying a verified incident is summarised in figure 1.8 
below.
Severity
Disability
Stage in MUP 
Responsible person
ADE without 
medicat on error
Potential ADE
Medication error
Patient safety incident
Severity 
Stage in MUP 
Responsible person
ADE with medication 
error
Medication error without 
potential harm
Severity 
Disability 
Preventability 
Ameliorability 
Stage in MUP 
Responsible person
Figure 1.8 Overview o f the process for the classification o f medication errors and ADEs 
[from Morimoto et al., 2004;p.312.]
The main limitation o f this approach is the lack o f observation to detect incidents. Key 
workers in the field o f patient safety have validated the robustness o f observational
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methods, especially for patient safety incidents occurring during administration [Dean & 
Barber, 2001].
1.7 Conclusions
Medicines use is an increasingly complex process. Along with other processes, such as 
aviation and the nuclear industry, the risks are high and any service failure is highly 
undesirable. The Government has commissioned a review to inspect the lessons learned 
from prior misadventures to minimise patient harm. The findings were that rare but 
exceedingly serious incidents occur repeatedly. For example, there have been 13 reported 
cases o f inadvertent spinal drug administration since 1985, some with fatal consequences. 
A key Government recommendation was to reduce this number to zero by the end of 2001 
[Department o f Health, 2000a, 2001b]. Despite this target another case of spinal 
maladministration o f vincristine occurred in 2001 [Harris, 2001].
The Government described:
■ The lack of an UK research base from which to start addressing medical and 
medication incidents,
■ Poor organisational culture,
■ Inadequate reporting systems for both actual incidents and 'near-misses*,
■ No central collation and distribution of information on incidents.
It recognised that in very complex, high throughput, technologically advanced areas it may
not be feasible to completely eliminate errors, but that efforts to minimise them are vital
[Department o f Health, 2000a]:
“...to a great extent high-risk medicine is bound to be eventful” and “serious 
errors and complications will never be eradicated, simply because there is a level o f  risk 
for which no system can fully compensate” [Department o f Health, 2000a;pp.27-28].
ADEs are of concern because of their prevalence and the human and fiscal consequences 
associated with them. However as not all ADEs are preventable, initial efforts have 
focused on those medication errors causing harm. This is because they are preventable and 
investigation and analysis o f errors provide means to prevent future occurrences. Amongst 
a pharmacist's main duties, is the promotion of safe, effective medication use, and 
therefore this becomes a key concern.
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Chapter 2
Intravenous medication administration errors
2.1 Background
Within Europe intravenous medicines are routinely manipulated from their constituent 
ingredients into a form ready to administer to the patient in clinical areas [Tilleul, 2003; 
Turner et al., 2003; Cousins et al., 2005]. Intravenous medication administration errors are 
of particular concern as they are more complex than simple oral administration, and the 
result of an error is often more serious, with immediate consequences [Cadman & Park, 
1999]. Many fatal medication errors in hospital patients have been attributed to hypertonic 
solutions or injectable medicines with narrow therapeutic ranges [Argo et al., 2000]. In 
addition the NPSAs first patient safety alert concerned a hypertonic injectable medicine 
[NPSA, 2002].
Numerous case reports in the literature have highlighted problems that have arisen during 
IV medicines preparation and administration, some with fatal results [Anon., 1994; Vissers 
& Purssell, 1996; Cousins & Upton 1997, 1998, 1999; Cohen & Milo, 2000]. Examples are 
described in figure 2.1.
■ Hydrocortisone omitted postoperatively in a patient who had been on long­
term steroid therapy for Crohn’s disease.
Insulin 0.5ml was added to sodium chloride 0.9% and not mixed before 
administration.
. A heparin infusion was prepared using the entire contents of a 125,000 unit 
vial, an 8-fold overdose.
Cidomycin® 600mg (brand of gentamicin) administered unchecked to a 
patient instead of the intended 600mg clindamycin.
Phenytoin syrup drawn up in an IV syringe was administered IV rather than 
orally.______________________________________________ ________
Figure 2.1 Some examples of errors reported in the literature [Cousins & Upton 1997, 
1998; Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Bruce & Wong, 2001; Taxis, 2001].
Recent studies have shown that mistakes during IV medicines preparation are common, 
preventable, and pose a substantial risk to patients [see section 2.6 and O’Hare et al., 1995; 
Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Hoppe-Tichy et al., 2002; Taxis & Barber, 2003a; Wirtz et al., 
2003; Cousins et al., 2005].
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2.2 The intravenous medicines administration process
The intravenous medicines administration process can be subdivided into several stages. 
These can be classified as:
i. Interpretation o f  the prescription (the administrator, usually a nurse, must identify that a 
dose of intravenous medicine is due, mentally process the details, and act).
ii. Intravenous medicines selection and preparation (the product, or components required 
to prepare the product must be located and transformed into a ready to administer form). 
This process may be one or more stages leading to wide variation. This range is shown in 
figure 2.2:
Selecting the correctly supplied ready to administer product with integral 
giving set and filter in situ e.g. parenteral nutrition.
Complex manipulations involving buffering a diluent, removing excess 
fluid from this volume for a fluid restricted patient, reconstituting a 
medicine and adding the required dose to the diluent e.g. conventional
amphotericin B.
Figure 2.2 Illustration of variance in manipulation required to prepare an IV medicine
Taxis [2001] overcame this by dividing preparation into five mutually exclusive categories, 
described below:
. Ready to administer.
Medicine solution.
Dilution of medicine.
Reconstitution.
Reconstitution and dilution.
Specific product information from the manufacturers is contained within many intravenous 
products. In addition, most hospitals also have intravenous guidelines which outline how the 
medicine should be prepared, often called IV monographs or IV guidelines. These contain 
instructions for all general IV medicines in the formulary. Specialist areas with differing 
needs or practices for their patients care, e.g. fluid restriction, neonates also have guidance
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for their specific setting. This may be restricted to the clinical area or contained within the 
general guidelines. Operationalisation varies between hospitals, with some producing in- 
house guidelines, whilst others adopt published guidelines. Some employ a combination of 
these [Schulman et a l, 1998; Anon., 2002]. Published guidelines are also commonly 
available for the neonatal and paediatric settings.
iii. Patient identification (locating the patient, and performing the safety checks to 
determine the patient prescribed the IV medicine has been correctly identified).
iv. IV  administration (administering the medicine to the patient by bolus, intermittent or 
continuous infusion. This may include the need to insert, a giving set, in line filter, 
piggyback or select and correctly programme a pump).
However, these five subdivisions of IV preparation have limited use in practice as they do 
not take into account more than a two-step task. For example, to administer the medicine 
Pabrinex™ requires two solutions to be mixed together in a syringe. The mixture can either 
then be administered directly, or subsequently diluted. If the mixture is diluted it becomes 
a two-stage process.
2.3 Aseptic preparation: a historical perspective
In the late 1970s the situation with respect to IV therapy and additions to IV fluids differed 
greatly from today. It has been said that there was:
■ Scare data on IV fluid stability and compatibility.
• Little pharmacist involvement in fluid additions.
■ A lack of nurse training.
■ An expansion in the use of continuous infusions.
■ A lack of awareness of technical issues by prescribing doctors.
■ No definition of nursing responsibilities surrounding IV addition and administration.
• Inadequate information on the ward.
■ No possibility of assuring asepsis in clinical areas [Anon., 2005a; Zavery et a l, 2005].
Following an NHS IV fluid catastrophe, a report was commissioned to review IV medicines 
additions practice. Key recommendations from this ‘Breckenridge Report’ were that:
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- IV medicines additions were aseptic procedures and ideally should be prepared in 
pharmacy-run facilities.
• Where this was impossible, pharmacists should be available in clinical areas to advise 
about IV additions, and should be heavily involved in medical and nurse training on 
these issues.
• Additions should be made only when supported by compatibility and stability data.
• Maximum use should be made of ready to administer preparations [Anon., 2005a; 
Beaney, 2001].
When the Medicines Act (1968) was written it had little applicability to hospital practice, 
focusing mainly on community and industrial practice. At this time the NHS was protected 
from prosecution by Crown Immunity. Decades later, Crown Immunity was lifted and NHS 
hospitals were required to comply with the provisions of the Medicines Act (1968). By the 
1990s there had been a growth in pharmacy controlled aseptic medicines preparation which 
took place in near-patient areas and within the pharmacy department. Reductions in 
preparation of other hospital items meant hospital pharmacy manufacturing units were 
increasingly involved solely in aseptic preparation [Farwell, 1995].
The range of commercially produced licensed medicines is inadequate to provide essential 
patient care. Therefore, to overcome this problem unlicensed injectable products were 
available from two hospital pharmacy sources. These were: MHRA inspected and licensed 
NHS manufacturing units in compliance with the Medicines Act (1968), or through non­
licensed units run exclusively under the control of a pharmacist. Where,
“the supply or issue o f  a finished product to the patient or to the person responsible 
for administering it is dispensing. The manipulation o f  the product leading to this final 
presentation is preparation ” [Farwell, 1995;p.4].
Non-licensed units provided aseptically dispensed items under section 10 of the Medicines 
Act (1968) according to defined NHS guidelines [Zavery et al., 2005]. Products are 
prepared for individual patients, often with short shelf lives. The supervising pharmacist is 
responsible for the quality of these products. Unlicensed facilities should meet the same 
standards as licensed facilities, although not MHRA assessed are subject to 12-18 monthly 
audits including Quality Assurance Pharmacists. Regular internal audits are required, and 
the external audit findings are shared with commissioning bodies and the NHS Chief 
Executive, so ensuring standards are maintained [NHSE, 1999b].
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The NHS Pharmaceutical Quality Control Committee published standards for aseptic 
preparation in 1993. However, these were superceded by the ‘Farwell Report* in 1995. 
Concerns about monitoring, availability of services, consistency and application of practice 
standards led to the production of ‘Guidance fo r  aseptic dispensing fo r NHS patients’ 
[Farwell, 1994]. These applied to aseptic dispensing, parenteral nutrition preparation, 
central IV additive services, dispensed cytotoxics and radiopharmaceuticals. Aseptic 
preparation provides the least assurance of sterility of the injectable product, and is only 
used when more robust sterilisation methods are not possible [Farwell, 1995]. Assurance of 
the product quality relies on robust, clearly defined policies, facilities, design, equipment, 
process validation, training, capacity planning, competency and service audit. Consequently, 
pharmacy aseptic preparation is rigorously controlled, with explicit national guidance to 
ensure the quality o f the product [Beaney, 2001].
This contrasts sharply with IV medicines prepared by healthcare staff in clinical areas where 
no preparation standards exist and local guidelines are rare [Audit Commission, 2001; 
Clinical Resource and Audit Group, NHS Scotland, 2002]. Although IV medicines 
preparation is generally undertaken by qualified nurses and midwives with competency in 
IV administration, and they subsequently administer the medication, the Chief Pharmacist 
remains responsible for all aspects of medicines management [NHS Executive, 1999b]. In 
specialist settings, other healthcare groups such as operating department assistants, 
perfusionists and junior medical staff may undertake IV preparation but training and 
competency assessment for such staff performing this task is uncertain [Marriott et al., 
2000; Teahon & Bateman, 1993]. Currently there is no consensus on what is appropriate 
aseptic technique in the ward environment [Taxis, 2001]. Nursing guidelines have been 
published in ‘The Royal Marsden Hospital Manual of Clinical Nursing Procedures’ [Mallet 
& Dougherty, 2000] but these differ from pharmacy practice.
2.3.1 Controls assurance for unlicensed aseptic dispensing in the NHS
Introduced in 1999, Controls Assurance was
44a process designed to provide evidence that NHS organisations are doing their 
44reasonable best” to manage themselves so as to meet their objectives and protect 
patients, staff, the public and other stakeholders against the risks o f  all kinds. ” [NHSE, 
1999c, p.2].
The pharmacy profession has retained its responsibility for ward based aseptic preparation 
[NHS Executive, 1999b], a view re-enforced by the Audit Commission Report [2001]. The
40
Chapter 2: Intravenous medication administration errors
Chief Pharmacist’s responsibility was highlighted under Controls Assurance Standards and 
is not expected to change with the forthcoming NHS healthcare standards [Department of 
Health, 2004]. The Controls Assurance medicines management standards for unlicensed 
aseptic dispensing required that pharmacy should risk assess ward based preparation 
activities. This aimed to ensure that the preparation of high risk products was transferred to 
pharmacy facilities, to avoid the additional risk of microbial contamination and medication 
error that may be associated with ward based preparation, and to ensure that appropriate 
controls were in place where ward based preparation continued. It has been suggested that 
the key requirements are that:
• Aseptic preparation is assembly under the provisions o f the Medicines Act (1968).
■ There should be appropriate training, authorisation, documentation and competency 
of staff undertaking IV medicines preparation.
■ A designated area for aseptic preparation.
■ Prepared medicines should be labelled in accordance with Trust policy and the
Medicines Act (1968)
• Doses are prepared immediately prior to use.
■ Staff are aware of their responsibilities under the Medicines Act (1968), Health and 
Safety at Work Act and Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 
[Hospital Pharmacists Group, 2002].
Risk assessment of ward based preparation was limited to a handful of NHS hospitals 
[Beaney & Goode, 2003; Clinical Resource and Audit Group, NHS Scotland, 2002; Joshi
et al., 2001; Munro et al., 2003; Tunstell, 2004; Zavery et a l, 2005].
Zavery and colleagues [2005] surveyed parenteral medicine preparation on 71 out of 82 
wards across two large UK teaching hospitals. The facilities for IV preparation in clinical 
areas contrasted sharply with the standards required for aseptic dispensing in pharmacies. 
At least one third of wards had no designated preparation area, whilst most had cluttered 
work surfaces and a sink in the preparation area. Other issues they identified included food 
or drink present, and damaged or unlaminated work surfaces in the preparation area. The 
researchers identified deficiencies in documentation and accessible information sources 
and concluded that
"wide variation in practice was evident in different clinical areas and overall 
standards ofpractice were very poor” [Zavery et a l, 2005;p.l5].
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There are scarce controls on the environment in which IV medicines are prepared in clinical 
areas. This contrasts sharply with pharmacy managed facilities where strict controls are 
mandated e.g. air quality, bio-burden [Beaney, 2003]. It could be argued that such stringent 
controls are unnecessary because doses prepared in clinical areas will be administered 
immediately. However, inadvertent contamination during preparation of continuous 
infusions could produce a potential reservoir for proliferation of micro-organisms and 
subsequent patient infection.
The importance of design and the environment has been recognised in the draft consultation
of the hospital Health Building Note (HBN) on ‘Facilities for medicines management’.
Where clinical areas require
“a designated easily-cleanable area, away from thoroughfares, windows and sinks 
should be provided fo r  the preparation o f iv products ” [Architects for Health, 2006;p.25].
There has been progress with all the recommendation from the ‘Breckenridge Report’ 
except the transfer of all aseptic additions to pharmacy controlled facilities [Anon., 2005a]. 
Although the abolition of all ward-based preparation may be the ideal situation, it has not 
been realised because of shortages in pharmacy manpower and funding [Crowley et al.,
2004]. Today, IV medicines, including those considered “high risk,” continue to be 
routinely prepared in clinical areas [Anon., 2005a; Audit Commission, 2001]. This has 
caused concern as IV medication has become more complex and more common [Root, 
2006]. This is a multiprofessional issue and requires input from all the disciplines involved.
2.4 Clinical audit
Audit has been defined as
“The process o f  reviewing the delivery o f health care to identify deficiencies so that 
they may be remedied” [Crombie et al., 1993;p.27].
Audit is usually described as a cyclical process, consisting of numerous steps; these are 
illustrated in figure 2.3
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Audit design 
(planning stage)
Set design criteria 
and agree 
standards (what 
should be 
l happening)
Collect data (what 
is actually 
happening)
Monitor progress Analyse audit
(was the change data (compare
successful?) results)
Implement 
changes (making 
the change)
Identify causes on  
non-achievement 
(decide to change)
Figure 2.3 The audit cycle [Anon., 2005b;p.203]
Clinical audit is a key component o f clinical governance, with all clinical staff required to
participate. It has been defined as
“A quality improvement process that seeks to improve the patient care and 
outcomes through systematic review o f care against explicit criteria and the 
implementation o f change. Aspects o f  the structures, processes and outcomes o f  care are 
selected and systematically evaluated against explicit criteria. Where indicated, changes 
are implemented at an individual team, or service level and further monitoring is used to 
confirm improvement in healthcare delivery” [Copeland, 2005;p.3].
It is a tool that enables organisations to determine whether agreed or recognised standards 
of care are achieved, and identify areas in need of improvement. It is an ongoing process 
that drives quality improvements, and may be initiated locally or nationally. National 
audits are increasingly being used for inter-organisational comparison [Lugon, 2005].
2.5  C o m p eten cy  to p ractice
The NHS has adopted a new strategy to ensure that the workforce possess the knowledge 
and skills required to deliver improved patient care. Since June 2004 ‘Skills for Health’, a
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skills council for health, was licensed by the Government to develop sets of national 
occupational standards for staff in all healthcare areas [Edwards, 2005b]. Its key role was 
to prepare and disseminate national workforce competence frameworks. Where “standards 
o f competence describe what is required o f an individual to achieve what is expected o f  
them in their work” [Edwards, 2005b;p.6]. Their aims have been summarised as:
■ Ensuring the workforce is trained to allow patients rapid access to those with the 
right mix of skills to suit their needs.
■ Providing staff with the opportunity to fulfil their potential.
■ Skills and competencies developed in a setting are transferable and recognised with 
the UK [Edwards, 2005b].
An alternative description is “a competence framework is a structured mechanism for  
outlining competencies and fo r  linking individual performance to organisational 
performance” [McGuire, 2005;p. 144]. These competency frameworks will map out how 
healthcare training should be provided in the future. Initially fifty areas were identified 
which needed development of a competency framework, with a long term goal that 
competency statements will be produced for approximately 95% of the workforce 
[Edwards, 2005b]. An integral part of the NHS re-structuring process is the competency 
framework called the Knowledge and Skills Framework.
Competency frameworks can be used by individuals and managers as a tool against which 
to assess performance. It is envisaged that this will provide a mutual and transparent 
understanding of the performance required to undertake tasks [McGuire, 2005].
Competency issues have been firmly embedded within nursing practice since the 
profession expanded its scope of practice. In order for nurses and midwives to administer 
IV medicines, their regulatory body, The Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), requires 
competency in all aspects of IV therapy, validated competency in clinical judgement, and 
practice within their professional code of conduct. Integral to this is a personal requirement 
to maintain up to date knowledge and skills [Dougherty & Lister, 2005; Royal College of 
Nursing, 2005].
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2.6 Research methods for detecting and quantifying medicines administration errors
Since medication error research began in the 1960s, researchers have come to understand 
that there is no single research method that is universally suitable for all situations, or 
stages within the MUP [Barker et al., 2002b]. Four main research methods have been used 
to study medication administration errors. IVMPE are one stage o f the IV medicines 
administration process, therefore similar methods have also been used in their 
investigation.
These methods are:
1. Observation.
2. Self reporting, such as incident forms, interviews or questionnaires.
3. Testing, such as concentration assay of the active medicine.
4. Physical evidence, such as prescription chart review [Barker et al., 2002b].
Flynn and colleagues [2002] studied medication administration errors at 36 USA 'hospital 
and skilled-nursing facilities' comparing three methods: incidents reports, chart review and 
observation. In the seven month study period, 2,557 medication doses were observed. 
During this time, a single incident report was generated, compared with 34 errors detected 
by chart review and 456 through observation. The error described in the incident report 
was also detected by observation.
It has been suggested that observation is valid, efficient, sensitive and accurate at 
identifying administration errors. Self reports and physical evidence are not sufficiently 
sensitive. In addition discrepancies have been reported between observations o f medication 
administration and that recorded on the prescription chart, thus providing inaccurate data 
for prescription charts review [Barker et al., 2002b; Flynn et al., 2002]. Dean and Barber 
[2001] investigated the reliability and validity o f observational methods to detect 
medication administration errors in a UK hospital. High observer reliability was reported 
and the presence of the observer did not significantly affect the error rate. It was also 
established that where the observer was aware a significant error may occur, tactful 
intervention to prevent this error harming the patient did not alter future behaviour and thus 
affect error rate [Dean & Barber, 2001].
Chemical assays have been used in situations where preparation forms part of the 
administration process [Allen et al., 1995; Femer et al., 2001; Parshuram et al., 2003].
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These provide valuable information from a different aspect, and have been used either as a 
sole method or in combination with observation during simulation [Kozer et al., 2004]. All 
of the studies detected discrepancies between prescribed medication and that prepared, 
allowing quantification of the discrepancy. Parshuram and colleagues [2003] reported that 
over two thirds of morphine syringes prepared for use within neonatal and paediatric 
critical care deviated more than 10% from that prescribed. The findings from simulated 
scenarios may differ from ‘real-life’ and this raises issues of generalisation [Kozer et al.,
2004].
2.6.1 Intravenous medication administration error studies
Research in this area is still in its infancy, information is constantly emerging on hospital 
intravenous medications administration errors. The earliest originated from the USA [Thur 
et a l, 1972], but more than two decades later the Europeans have begun researching this 
area [O’Hare et al., 1995; Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Wirtz, 2000; Bruce & Wong, 2001; 
Mansfield, 2001; Taxis, 2001;Hoppe-Tichy et al., 2002].
In UK hospitals, most administration data has been gathered on oral administration, with a 
median error rate reported as 5.5% [Barber & Dean, 1998]. IV medicines administration 
has been excluded from the majority of studies, possibly due to practical observation 
difficulties and time and resource allocations required to collect such data, especially when 
compared with those needed to follow a drug trolley on a routine scheduled medicines 
round.
Given the potential risks inherent with IV medicines use it is surprising that relatively few 
studies have been published in this area. This is especially so since the landmark error 
studies excluded observation, known to be the most sensitive method of collecting this 
information [Allan & Barker, 1990; Ghandi et al., 2000].
2.6.2 Frequency of UK IV medication preparation and administration error studies
An extensive literature review was undertaken. It identified seven studies reporting results 
of IV preparation and/or administration errors, wholly or partially from UK hospitals 
[O’Hare et al., 1995; Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Femer et al., 2001; Mansfield, 2001; 
Munro et al., 2003; Taxis & Barber 2003a; Wirtz et al., 2003]. In addition, one study
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reported parenteral error rates, which included all injectable errors, though almost all arose 
from the IV route [Bruce & Wong, 2001].
All seven studies used direct observation of practitioners to identify errors. Details of 
study settings, research methods and study findings, where provided in the original 
publication (for six studies), are summarised in table 2.1. All of the studies aims included 
quantification of the error rate. However the sample size, context and study settings varied 
e.g. from a single site specialist paediatric hospital to four district general hospitals. The 
combined number of preparation and administration errors reported ranged between 23.8 
and 93.9% of doses. However, these must be interpreted in conjunction with each study’s 
error definition (see section 2.6.3). The more recent studies have reported error rates for 
preparation and administration separately [Mansfield, 2001; Taxis & Barber, 2003a; Wirtz 
et al., 2003]. The seventh study, at a single site district general hospital took a holistic 
approach, using questionnaires to assess the risk to staff and patients, and combined this 
with the direct observation of eight staff in a range of clinical areas [Munro et al., 2003].
An eighth study used quantitative assays to determine the content o f acetylcysteine in 
infusion bags employed for the management o f paracetamol overdose. This study was 
valuable, as it did not rely on observation, but indicated what dose the patient actually 
received. From several large discrepancies identified, the authors reported errors in 
calculation, dose measurement, and mixing [Femer et al., 2001].
An observational study o f 430 IV medication doses across ten wards in two UK hospitals 
found a combined preparation and administration error rate of 46% [Taxis & Barber, 
2003a]. Their study identified preparation errors alone in 32 doses with both preparation 
and administration errors observed in 25 doses. The majority of preparation errors arose 
from medication requiring multiple-step preparation; with three potentially severe errors 
detected [Taxis & Barber, 2003a]. Problems with IV medication preparation were caused 
by a lack of staff knowledge and, or, technological difficulties associated with uncommon 
procedures and usual drug vial presentation, preparation process or equipment [Taxis & 
Barber, 2003b]. A risk rating incorporating the number and nature of manipulations, 
medications and doses has been developed and tested in an UK observational study. 
Results reveal that two thirds of IV preparations were classified as high-risk [Joshi et al.,
2001].
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Table 2,1 UK studies of IV medicines preparation and administration errors in clinical areas
Publication
reference
O’Hare et al,
1995
A
Hartley & 
Dhillon, 1998 
B
Mansfield,
2001
C
Bruce & 
Wong, 2001 
D
Study brief Research 
method used
Number of IV 
doses 
observed
Study setting Overall preparation and 
administration error 
rate
Preparation error 
rate
Administration 
error rate
IV drug
administration errors 
(type, rate, potential 
severity)
Disguised
observation
179 Single site:
paediatric
hospital
168 doses with 291 
errors.
93.9% doses
Not stated Not stated
IV drug prescribing 
and administration 
errors (rate, type, 
cause, potential 
harm) Implication to 
MUP
Disguised
observation
323 Single site: 3
wards, district 
general hospital, 
drug rounds 
observed
79.3%
morphine PCA, insulin & 
heparin infusions were 
excluded
Not stated Not stated
Audit of the risks and 
resources used in 
ward based IV 
preparation and 
administration
Direct
observation
299 Multicentre: 
wards from 4 
district general 
hospitals
Not stated 0-2.35% 48.68-104.4% 
(exceeds 100% 
due to 2 extra 
doses)
Error rate during 
preparation and 
administration of 
parenteral medicines.
Disguised
observation
107 parenteral Single site:
doses, 105 of 
which were 
IV.*
admissions ward, 
continual daytime 
observation excl 
PFS, med 
emergencies
25.2% overall 
(95% Cl 17-33.5%), 
equivalent to 23.8% for 
solely IV doses.*
Not stated Not stated
Table 2,1 continued,.. UK studies of IV medicines preparation and administration errors in clinical areas
Publication
reference
Taxis & 
Barber, 
2003a 
E
Wirtz et al., 
2003.
F
Study brief Research 
method used
Number of IV 
doses 
observed
Study setting Overall preparation and 
administration error 
rate
Preparation error 
rate
Administration 
error rate
Incidence & severity 
of IV preparation and 
administration errors. 
When errors occur.
Disguised 
observation 
& informal 
discussion 
with staff
430 Dual site study: 49% doses had errors
10 wards from a 
teaching and 
district general 
hospital, attended 
drug rounds
(95%CI 45-54%)
Both preparation and 
administration error 57.9 
errors per 100 doses.
7% alone, plus 
6% both 
preparation & 
administration 
errors
36% alone, plus 
6% both 
preparation & 
administration
errors
Incidence and 
severity IV drug 
preparation and 
administration errors
77
preparations,
63
administration
Single UK site: 2 
wards in a 
teaching hospital 
(German data 
excluded), 
attended drug 
rounds, 24hr 
infusion & PRN 
excluded
Not stated 22% (95% Cl 13- 
31%)
27% (95% Cl 16- 
38%)
* Confirmed with author (Bruce J. Personal communication, 2003)
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2.6.3 Criteria used for defining IV errors employed in UK studies
The definition of errors employed has varied between studies. There appears to be no
consistency in the application of the definition. One example of a comprehensive IV
preparation and administration error definition is
“A deviation in preparation or administration o f a drug from a doctor’s 
prescription, the hospital’s intravenous policy, or the manufacturer’s instructions” [Taxis 
& Barber, 2003a;p.684].
The criteria against which errors were determined have also varied, with up to 22 different 
error categories described. These details are displayed in table 2.2. Use of unclear, 
inconsistent or poorly described definition and error categories has prohibited comparisons 
between studies or extrapolation of the findings [Crowley et al., 2004a]. It also raises 
concern about the reliability and reproducibility o f studies.
Two main areas of contention have been raised. These are whether to include timing errors 
and poor aseptic practice within an error definition. Historically timing errors have been 
excluded. However the importance of timing with respect to pharmacokinetics, particularly 
medicines with narrow therapeutic ranges has sparked interest in these errors. It has 
therefore been suggested that for some medicines e.g. aminoglycosides, timing errors 
should be included [Allan & Barker, 1990]. In addition it is difficult to measure poor 
aseptic practice as there is no agreed best aseptic practice in clinical areas. However, it is 
likely that blatant disregard of acceptable practice in certain cases, such as the malaria 
transmission by contamination of a flush solution, would be considered by the majority of 
practitioners to be an error [Cousins & Upton, 1999; Anon., 2000].
A shift in patient safety research has emerged, from studying medication errors to a focus 
on those errors that cause actual harm to the patient [Resar et al., 2003]. Contaminated 
parenteral nutrition and propofol have been reported to cause adverse events to patients 
[Anon., 1994; Bennett et al.y 1995; Kuehnert et al., 1997, Langford, 1999]. It is timely to 
question whether a breach of asepsis should be considered an error, when patients may be 
harmed.
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Table 2,2 Comparison of the IV error definitions employed.
Error category Description Study referencet
A n c 1) E F
Dose omission Dose not given before it’s 
next due
X X X X X
Extra dose Dose administered after its 
discontinuation or 
duplicated
X X
Unauthorised An unprescribed drug is X X X X
drug administered
Wrong drug Preparation of drug which 
was not the prescribed one
( X  ) X X
Wrong dose Incorrect dose given X x ±>10% X X
Wrong dosage Drug formulation differed X X X
form from that prescribed e.g. 
given po ordered IV.
Wrong route Formulation intended for a 
specific route given by the 
wrong route, route differs 
from prescription
X X X X
Wrong time x>30min x ±>30min x ±>1hr x ±>1hr
Wrong Dose made up incorrectly X X X
preparation e.g. not all powder
technique dissolved, not mixed
Wrong rate Incorrect rate of 
administration
X X X X X X
Deteriorated Appropriate precautions not X (>X X
drug taken e.g. light protection,
expired
Wrong diluent Incorrect diluent X X X 4X X x 1
Wrong diluent Incorrect volume of diluent X x ' X x 1
volume
Wrong X X 1X
infusion
volume
Wrong patient X
No second Failure to double check X
check preparation or 
administration process
No label Product not given 
immediately that was 
inadequately or not labelled
X X
7
X
Inappropriate Products not used X x “
storage immediately after 
preparation
Pump used but X
not needed
Pump error Pump not used when needed 
or of insufficient 
specification
X
s
X
Drug Co-administration of two or X X X
incompatible more incompatible drugs
Aseptic X X
technique
Other X X
t  Refers to study codes described in table 2.1; x = data collected but reported separately from error rate; 
x = data collected but reported under a different error category where: x '  = wrong preparation technique, x" = 
deteriorated drug, x 4 = wrong dose preparation, x 4 = wrong base solution, x" = wrong rate, x 6 = inappropriate 
storage, x 7 = other, ( x 8) = May be in unprescribed drug category
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2.7 NPSA National Learning and Reporting System data set
A standard data set was developed by the NPSA for coding all reported patient safety 
incidents [NPSA* 2003b]. This enabled national sharing from consistent coding at 
organisational level. This common taxonomy allowed incidents to be collated and analysed 
centrally by the NPSA [Cousins, 2003]. The advantage of pooling information was that 
learning from rare serious incidents could be shared throughout the NHS, allowing 
preventative strategies to be implemented.
One section of the NLRS related to medicines and required data in four fields. These were:
1. Stage of the MUP where the PSI involving medication occurred.
2. Details of the medicine involved.
3. In-process description of error.
4. Important factors contributing to the incident.
The NPSA Patient Safety Observatory (PSO) collects data from a variety of sources, 
including the NLRS and research studies [NPSA, 2005]. To maximise patient safety 
learning, it would be beneficial if data from medication safety research studies were 
collected in the NLRS format, to allow mapping onto the NLRS dataset.
2.8 Conclusions
IV medicines preparation is a multiprofessional task; therefore it requires multiprofessional 
agreement on what is considered acceptable practice and when this could be considered an 
error. In the absence of published guidance it would be useful to develop a framework 
which describes this. Once developed, this could be used to compare practice against the 
framework. This would allow a baseline assessment of practice and development of a 
prioritised action plan, similar to that required for quality assurance in unlicensed aseptic 
dispensing within pharmacies.
There is a need for prospective research to gain a deeper understanding of the issues 
surrounding IV medicines preparation in clinical areas and how patient safety incidents 
arise. It is only through elucidation of these issues that practical solutions can be developed 
to improve patient safety.
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2.9 Summary of Aims
1. To evaluate the nature of patient safety incidents involving medication which arise 
within clinical areas where nurses prepare IV medicines.
Objectives:
■ To describe explicitly, the composite stages involved in IV medicines preparation in 
'clinical areas’.
■ To develop a practical agreed international definition of an intravenous medications 
preparation error in hospital clinical areas, suitable for multiprofessional use
■ To identify objective descriptors of situations which are considered errors and those 
which are not.
2. To develop and test a data collection tool to record the number and type of IV 
medication assembly and preparation errors in hospital clinical settings.
Objectives:
■ To establish the training required to ensure observers have the necessary skills and 
experience for data collection.
■ To assess the feasibility of using the form in clinical areas.
■ To amalgamate error categories for compatibility with the NPSA medication data set 
of the NLRS.
■ To determine what is required to develop a training pack for use o f the audit tool.
3. To explore nurses’ views and opinions on the practical problems they have experienced 
during IV medication assembly and preparation in clinical areas, and to describe the 
solutions they used to resolve these issues.
Objectives:
■ To describe the steps in assembling and preparing IV medicines in clinical areas.
■ To establish nurses’ perceptions of why these problems arise and how they are 
resolved.
■ To establish whether there are links between intravenous training, competency and 
experience with regards to problem identification and resolution.
■ To suggest how and where Pharmacy should prioritise its resources to improve IV 
medicines safety.
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Chapter 3
An investigation into what constitutes an intravenous medication preparation error
3.1 Introduction
An extensive literature search and informal key informant discussion failed to either locate 
a clear definition of an IV medicines preparation error (IVMPE) or identify such research 
in progress. A concurrent search for multi-disciplinary standards for IV medicines 
preparation in wards or departments for use as a basis for generating a definition, also 
failed to locate such guidance. Opportunistic questioning of key pharmacy personnel in 
clinical, aseptic or manufacturing practice confirmed that no guidance or standards exist in 
this area.
Therefore, in the UK there were no nationally agreed guidelines on how preparation should 
be conducted in clinical areas, no agreed training curriculum and no minimum competency 
required before undertaking these tasks. Small scale UK studies had shown unacceptable 
error rates during IV medicine preparation in clinical areas that warranted further 
investigation. However, the pharmacy services provided to these areas, study methodology 
and error definitions used have varied or not been explicitly described. This has also 
hindered comparison between findings. It would be useful if clear definitions of errors and 
good practice criteria were agreed and data collection standardised. In order to produce a 
universally agreed definition that would allow future study comparison and wider 
generalisation, international views need to be considered. It has been suggested that to 
development of a consensus definition would be useful and would allow researchers to use 
this for subsequent work. This definition must be suitable for use with direct or disguised 
observation methods. Such a definition could be subdivided into a preparation stage and 
administration stage. This study addressed the development and agreement o f an IVMPE.
3.2 Study aims
To develop a practical international definition of an intravenous medications preparation 
error in hospital clinical areas, suitable for multiprofessional use.
Objectives
To describe explicitly, the composite stages involved in IV medicines preparation in 
the ‘clinical area’ where clinical areas are defined as any health-care setting where 
direct patient care is delivered, such as wards and departments.
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. To identify objective descriptors of errors which occur in the IV medication 
preparation process.
. To derive a definition for an IV medication preparation error.
3.3 Study methodology
3.3.1 Research strategy
The study was descriptive, as it explored people’s thoughts and opinions, necessitating a 
qualitative research method [Smith, 2002]. This approach was used to generate data to 
ensure all relevant concepts were included. Development from this stage to a definition 
required quantification of data. Therefore, a combined technique employing both 
qualitative and quantitative methods was required. This can be referred to as 'multi­
strategy research’ by 'facilitation’:
“This approach arises when one research strategy is employed in order to aid 
research using the other strategy ” [Bryman, 2001 ;p.447].
Qualitative methods generated the data for the subsequent application of quantitative 
methods.
There were a number o f qualitative techniques which could have been used to generate 
discussion and elucidate the issues. These included focus groups, semi- or unstructured 
interviews, surveys, brainstorming or committee meetings. These could yield details of the 
issues discussed. However to arrive at a single definition minority views would, by 
necessity, be disregarded. Also, the extent to which the group agreed with the emergent 
definition would be unknown. However, there are research methods employing multiple 
stages that allow the development of these ideas. Focus groups, semi- or unstructured 
interviews, surveys, brainstorming or committee meetings could be used to generate 
suggestions for inclusion in the initial stage of a consensus method [Hasson et al., 2000].
3.3.2 Consensus research methods
Consensus methods are used where there is inadequate robust data and unanimity of 
opinion; arising from a lack of, or contradictory, evidence [Jones & Hunter, 1995; Mead & 
Moseley, 2001]. These methods are designed to maximise the benefits of an informed 
panel exploring an issue, whilst minimising the disadvantages o f collective decision­
making [Jones & Hunter, 1995,1999; Bowling, 2002].
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The technique allows evaluation of two types of agreement [Jones & Hunter, 1999]:
1. The extent to which participants agree with the issue being reviewed, by self-rating 
on a numerical or categorical scale.
2. The extent to which participants agree with each other; described in statistical terms 
as an average and measure of dispersion e.g. standard deviation. Where agreement 
is obtained, this is the consensus view.
A consensus research method was best suited to derive the definition, as it incorporated 
qualitative techniques, but also quantified the extent of agreement [Pope & Mays, 1999]. 
There are several types of consensus methods, which can be subdivided into those 
requiring face-to-face participant contact, and those which do not. Face to face methods 
include nominal group techniques or ‘expert panel’ and consensus development 
conferences [Mead & Moseley, 2001]. These methods have several limitations which 
preclude their effective use in this setting. These disadvantages include a limited group 
size. Nominal groups are usually limited to nine to twelve participants. Such groups also 
require expert facilitation, organisation and have financial and geographical limitations 
[Mead & Moseley, 2001; Bowling, 2002]. Most importantly the dynamics of direct 
participant interaction can influence the data obtained [Mead & Moseley, 2001]
3.3.2.1 The Delphi technique
The Delphi technique, method or process, is the only consensus method which does not 
require participants to meet face-to-face. As international views were required and it was 
impossible for participants to meet in a single location, this method was employed. A 
Delphi technique would allow elucidation of each respondent’s views, whilst avoiding the 
disadvantages of direct group interaction. Participants are consulted using a mailed self­
administered questionnaire. Traditionally, this had has been a postal questionnaire although 
widespread uptake of electronic mail has introduced other options [Beretta, 1996; Hassom 
et al, 2000]. The traditional Delphi technique is carried out by completing a number of 
stages, or ‘rounds’ and can be defined as
“A method fo r the systematic collection and aggregation o f  informed judgements 
from a group o f experts on specific questions or issues.” [Beech, 2001;p.39].
This process continues until agreement has been reached [Hasson et al., 2000]. Commonly 
two or three rounds are used. The process is outlined in figure 3.1.
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Components of Delphi technique (in sequence) Round
1. Selection of panel of ‘experts’ (respondents).
2. Allocation of coding numbers to each ‘expert’.
3. Construction and distribution of first questionnaire (round 1). Experts are 
asked to provide suggestions for possible alternative development/outcomes 
in a field related to their expertise or experience. Contextual information is 
provided introducing the study before requesting an unlimited number of 
comments.
> i
4. Completion and return of first questionnaire. J
5. Collate, order and categorise suggestions. Use to design second questionnaire 
(round 2). > 2
6. Distribution of second questionnaire.
7. Completion and return of second questionnaire.
8. Collation of score for each suggestion. Calculation of group (median) scores 
for each suggestion »  3
9. Construction of third questionnaire (similar to second questionnaire, but also 
including individual and group score for each suggestion). -J
10. Distribution of third questionnaire (round 3).
11. Completion and return of third questionnaire. Etc...
12. Recollation of score for each suggestion. Recalculation of group (median) 
scores for each suggestion.
13. Possible further rounds of voting. May request explanation and comments of 
extreme scores.
14. Achievement of group consensus. Calculation of summary statistics: 
minimum, maximum and range of scores for each suggestion.
15. Distribution and use.
Figure 3.1 Typical stages in the procedure for administering the Delphi technique [adapted 
from Beech, 1999; Jones & Hunter, 1999].
Advantages of the Delphi technique
The advantages of this method are summarised below:
■ Participants give their real opinion without concern for public scrutiny.
■ Avoids hijacking o f the process by dominant parties.
■ Conducive to large sample sizes (10 to over 1,000).
■ No geographical limitations for sample selected.
■ Relatively inexpensive, although potentially time consuming.
■ Iterative process of controlled anonymous feedback sharpens respondent’s
awareness and provides them with an opportunity for reflection.
■ Good face, concurrent and content validity.
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■ The participants, not the researcher, decide final criteria included.
■ Allows researchers to facilitate communication between previously unknown 
participants [Jones & Hunter, 1995; Beretta, 1996; Beech 1999, 2001; Bowles, 
1999].
Therefore Delphi technique was the only method that used open-ended questioning, 
controlled anonymised feedback and attitudinal measurement.
Disadvantages of the Delphi technique
Concerns have been raised regarding the rigour and validity of the Delphi technique. 
[Beretta, 1996]. However this may originate from poor design employed in the studies, 
rather than the method [Jones & Hunter, 1995]. Hasson and colleagues [2000, p. 1009] state 
“Appropriate use o f  this technique requires a high degree o f  methodological precision 
and research rigour. "
It is important to address these concerns throughout the study. Those areas requiring 
particular attention are:
. Variable attrition rates 
. Variable definition of experts.
. Sample selection and comprehensive description of the participants’ characteristics. 
. Poor questionnaire design.
. Inconsistent definition of consensus.
. Imprecise measures of consensus.
. The potential to modify and adapt the originally verified Delphi technique.
. Deriving consensus does not mean the ‘correct’ answer has been reached 
. The lack of opportunity to critically question the rationale for participants with 
potentially valid atypical views.
. Researcher bias.
. Poor response rate [Jones & Hunter, 1995; Crisp et al., 1997; Bowles, 1999; 
Hasson et al., 2000; Beech, 2001; Mead & Moseley, 2001].
The technique has been widely used in health services research, especially where more 
rigorous techniques are unsuitable [Jones & Hunter, 1995]. A Delphi technique was 
considered the most appropriate research method for this study.
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3.3.2.2 Method of distribution
Electronic communication (via email) has been employed with the Delphi technique [Jones 
& Hunter, 1995; Hasson et al., 2000]. It was anticipated that all participants would be 
familiar with this technology. Electronic distribution can occur rapidly, as it does not rely 
on a postal delivery. A delivery receipt can be requested for each message issued which is 
analogous to registered mail and increases reliability. Therefore, distribution via electronic 
mail was selected. A computer expert was approached for advice on format. A Microsoft 
Word file was recommended as this would be accessible to the vast majority of computer 
users worldwide [Tugwell, 2002].
3.4 Delphi round one -  data generation stage
3.4.1 Aim
To comprehensively identify all issues involved in the IV medicines preparation process. 
These would then be considered in subsequent rounds.
3.4.2 Methodology
3.4.2.1 Sample recruitment
The medicine preparation process is a highly specialised field and those involved with this
process would be in the best position to achieve the study objectives. A purposive
sampling strategy was selected. This is defined as:
“The identification and selection o f particular individuals who share 
characteristics relevant to the study, and whom the researcher therefore believes will be 
most informative in achieving their objectives ” [Smith, 2002 p.l 19].
An opportunistic sample would be unlikely to provide a wide enough range of expertise 
because, for example, patient safety researchers are unlikely to attend a conference on 
advances in sterile production. However, by selecting representation from all the different 
perspectives of those involved in the constituent stages in IV medications preparation the 
definition content should be valid. Also, by approaching a range of international experts, to 
incorporate their views, it is hoped findings should be suitable for extrapolation to other 
countries. This does introduce selection bias, where the individual expert’s views differ 
from the wider healthcare population. This was accepted as a study limitation. The expert 
sample selected, information on relevant expertise or experience is detailed in appendix 1.
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As there is no agreement on the minimum sample required for Delphi studies, the sample 
size was therefore dictated by the number of subjects with relevant experience or expertise 
known to the researcher and two colleagues in the research team. These were referred to as 
the ‘expert’ sample. In order to avoid introducing bias by omitting key people who could 
help in the development of this definition a ‘snowball* sample technique was also 
employed. Snowball sampling is used where there is no sampling frame, or other easy 
method of identifying participants e.g. professional groups, society memberships. The 
researcher contacts a small initial group of relevant participants and uses this as the basis 
of recruiting others potential participants from the target population [Bowling, 2002; 
Bryman, 2001]. Each expert approached was asked to nominate up to five others whom 
they felt could contribute to the study. These nominees were contacted and, if  willing to 
participate, similarly asked to recruit others; the process continued in this fashion. This 
helped to minimise selection bias, although there is a tendency that one professional group 
can become over-represented.
Criteria for inclusion:
A wide range of healthcare professionals were considered suitable for potential selection. 
These included patient safety researchers, quality control and quality assurance 
pharmacists, manufacturing and production personnel, clinical pharmacists, representatives 
from the pharmaceutical industry, microbiology, nurses, nurse trainers, physicians, 
infection control, IV specialists and those involved in developing pharmacy practice. 
These people were identified collectively by the researcher and two members of the 
research team from publications, textbooks, strategy documents and by personal 
recommendation. To be considered an expert they had to meet one o f the selection criteria 
based on a previous study [Mead & Moseley, 2001]. These criteria were: to have published 
papers, conducted research or presented at a conference on medications error, or be 
regarded by peers as an expert in the field. Therefore, healthcare staff involved in IV 
medicines preparation in clinical areas would be included only if  their peers regarded them 
as experts.
Criteria for exclusion:
Co-workers and those involved in piloting the Delphi questionnaire were excluded from 
entry into the study to prevent ‘reactive effects’ [Bowling, 2002].
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3.4.2.2 Developing the data collection instrument 
Preliminary work
An extensive literature search of bibliographic databases and the Internet was undertaken 
to identify key texts on IV medicines preparation and administration. Hand searching of 
textbooks on intravenous therapy and professional practice in nursing, academic pharmacy 
and hospital libraries were also performed. Key informants from pharmacy, nursing 
practice, academia and those involved in delivering IV therapy teaching were also asked to 
identify key texts or materials.
Design of the survey material
Four documents were prepared.
A. Template
A template that contained all the composite stages in IV medicines preparation was 
prepared. If this definition were used as the basis for data collection, it was important to 
enable the composite stages involved in preparing the IV medicine to be recorded. It was 
envisaged that each manipulation undertaken could be recorded by ticking the relevant box 
on each occasion the activity was performed. This would document all the steps used for 
preparing a single medicine, shown in figure 3.2.
B. Definition
A proposed definition, which included an introduction to IV medicines preparation, the 
proposed definition of an IVMPE and a list of descriptors considered to be an IVMPE was 
produced, displayed in figure 3.3. This strategy was used by Dean and colleagues [2000] to 
develop a prescribing error definition. The descriptors were categorised and arranged under 
the following headings: issues arising from the prescription, contamination, health and 
safety issues, dose selection and preparation. The template and descriptors were developed 
from previous audit, with additional scenarios derived from the literature and, where 
lacking, generally accepted pharmacy practice [Schulman et a l, 1998; Springhouse 
Corporation, 1998; Dougherty & Lamb, 1999; Cousins, 2000; Mallet & Dougherty, 2000; 
Nicol et al, 2000; Barker et a l, 2002a; Weinstein, 2001; Nursing and Midwifery Council,
2002].
An intentionally mis-worded scenario was included as a validity check.
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Figure 3.2 Template B a rts  an<J T h e  L ondon  NHS J ru s t
Academic Department of Pharmacy
Template of the different stages that may be involved with intravenous dose 
preparation in a clinical or ward setting.
The aim of this template is to describe all stages involved in the preparation of intravenous (i.v.) dose 
administration with one or more of the activities in the table below. The table will then become a data collection 
tool where the stages in preparing an i.v. product can be documented; a tick would be placed in each box that 
applied, where each box could contain more than one tick. Examples are given in italics.
Method of 
administration
intravenous Bolus
(direct injection)
Intermittent Infusion
(short infusion)
Continuous Infusion
(long infusion)
Explanation of method 
of administration
Administration of a small 
volume of medication, usually 
up to 10ml, directly into a 
vascular access device of 
injection site of an 
administration set. Unless 
directed otherwise, this is 
administered over 3-5 
minutes.
Administration of a small 
volume infusion, usually 
25-250ml, over a period 
of 10 minutes to several 
hours. This could be a 
one-off dose or repeated 
at specific time intervals.
Administration of a 
medication or fluid at a 
constant rate over a 
prolonged time period (often 
24 hours or more). This can 
involve large (250-1000ml) 
or small volumes.
Preparation stages
Undiluted liquid drawn into 
syringe
adenosine phenytoin midazolam, 
glyceryl trinitrate
Undiluted liquid drawn into 
syringe, then further 
diluted
ranitidine furosemide soluble insulin
Liquid added to infusion 
bag, glass bottle, device 
or volume control chamber 
(i.e. burette)
Not applicable phytomenadione amiodarone,
aminophylline
Powder reconstituted used 
in original container
dantrolene ceftriaxone
Powder reconstituted and 
drawn into syringe
ampicillin high dose benzylpenicillin hydrocortisone (continuous 
infusion)
Powder reconstituted and 
drawn into syringe, then 
further diluted
hydralazine (bolus) hydralazine (infusion) hydrocortisone (continuous 
infusion)
Reconstituted powder 
added to infusion bag, 
glass bottle, device or 
volume control chamber
Not applicable cefuroxime vancomycin (continuous
infusion),
thiopentone
Liquid added to infusion 
bag or bottle via transfer 
device
Not applicable AbelceP
Powder added to infusion 
bag using reconstitution 
device
Not applicable metronidazole minibag 
plus,
imipenem,
vancomycin continuous 
infusion
Manufacturer or pharmacy 
prepared ready to 
administer product (no 
additional or minimal 
manipulation required).
adrenaline minijet ciprofloxacin,
fluconazole,
mannitol
dopamine, propofol 
total parentral nutrition 
supplied in 2 or 3 chambers 
for actitivation immediately 
before use
Other, please 
specify.....................
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Figure 3.3 IV medicines preparation error and list of descriptors
Barts and The London NHS Trust 
Academic Department of Pharmacy
1.0 Introduction
Intravenous medication administration can been subdivided into two stages. Preparation will cover 
the actions from the time it is identified that a dose of intravenous medication is due from the 
prescription, through to the end of dose assembly. The subsequent stage of administration to the 
patient is not addressed by this work.
1.1 Proposed definition
The proposed definition of an 'intravenous preparation error in the clinical or ward setting' is a 
situation or act by a healthcare professional in the preparation of an intravenous medication 
dose that deviates from a written, verbal or computer generated prescription for an 
individual patient, or contravenes hospital protocol, professional or regulatory guidance.
The ‘prescription’ would be considered to contain all the information that the administrator had 
before them. Any clarification or annotation to the prescription would be considered an integral part 
of the prescription.
1.2 Situations that could be considered for inclusion as an 'intravenous preparation 
error in the clinical or ward setting'
The texts that have been used to gather the scenarios beneath are referenced at the end of 
the document.
issues arising from the prescription
■ Dose omission, not preparing a dose of intravenous (i.v.) medication that is prescribed 
(patient refusal and compliance with hospital protocols e.g. ‘nil by mouth' would not be 
included as an error, not would omission pending clarification of the prescription).
■ Preparing a dose of medication which the patient has a documented allergy or sensitivity 
(this would include preparing a dose when the allergy statement is not completed on the 
medication chart but patient is able to communicate or is documented elsewhere; class 
effects e.g. penicillin allergic prescribed any penicillin; an awareness of cross reactions e.g. 
if anaphylaxis with penicillin or unknown reaction and prescribed a 
cephalosporin/carbapenem without confirmation).
■ Preparing a dose of medication for a latex allergic patient without avoiding latex exposure 
and not adhering to hospital guidelines, where available, on the management of latex 
allergic patients.
■ Preparing any dose of i.v. medication that is not prescribed for an individual patient (verbal 
orders would not be considered an error as long as the verbal instructions and 
documentation comply with hospital guidelines).
■ Preparing a dose of i.v. medication without complying with medical guidance, or local 
policies that dictate how or whether the dose is administered (e.g. instructions to omit if 
heart rate less than 60 beats per minute, but heart rate is not known).
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Figure 3,3 TV medicines preparation error and list of descriptors continued...
■ Wrong time medication preparation (iv dose is prepared with the intention to immediately 
administer the dose more than 1 hour either side of when the dose is prescribed, or 1 hour 
before a new continuous infusion is commenced e.g. when changing an inotrope syringe 
for infusion. This would also include preparing the dose without intending to administer it 
immediately after assembly).
■ Preparing a dose of i.v. medication from an invalid prescription (e.g. does not meet legal 
prescription requirements, discontinued prescription, incomplete or ambiguous prescription 
without first seeking clarification).
■ Preparing a dose of i.v. medication for the wrong patient.
Contamination, health and safety issues
■ Not wearing any protective clothing, such as gloves or mask, as described in the product
monographs or by hospital guidelines (e.g. no goggles, gloves and apron when preparing 
chemotherapy).
■ Not using a 23-25 gauge needle or filter needle/straw when medication is withdrawn from a 
glass ampoule.
■ Not filtering a product when the manufacturers monograph or hospital policy state the 
product must be filtered (such as epoprostenol).
■ Not washing hands with bactericidal soap and water and thoroughly drying, or a 
bactericidal alcohol hand rub and allow this to dry before preparing an i.v. dose.
■ Preparation surface not cleaned before i.v. dose preparation.
■ Breach of ‘no touch’ technique, where the operator handles critical areas such as the 
syringe tip or needle hub.
■ Not swabbing the septum on a vial, additive port or outside of ampoule with suitable 
alcohol-based antiseptic, and allowing to dry before breaching or opening.
■ Open windows in the vicinity of where the i.v. dose is prepared.
■ Not inserting the needle through a rubber bung, with the bevel edge of the needle upwards, 
at a 45-60° angle to minimise coring.
■ Not changing the needle on a syringe after medication withdrawal, before addition to an 
infusion bag, bottle, device or burette.
■ Re-use of an intravenous medication dose that is intended for single use on a subsequent 
occasion, or another patient, unless there is a written hospital policy authorising this.
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Figure 3.3 IV medicines preparation error and list of descriptors continued...
■ Not discarding glass ampoules, needles etc. into an appropriate sharps container.
■ Preparing a product in an unsuitable location such as the nurses’ station, ward reception or 
patient bedside (patient beside would be accepted for doses administered via a burette).
Dose selection and preparation
■ Reconstitution errors. This would include failure to fully dissolve a powder during the 
reconstitution phase (includes reconstitution by transfer devices); or not complying with 
mixing instructions stated in the product monograph or hospital guidelines e.g. vigorously 
shaking teicoplanin causing foaming.
■ Diluent errors: using either a diluent or diluent volume unspecified in the hospital 
guidelines, or product monograph (also applies to infusion bags, bottles and burettes).
■ Preparing a dose of i.v. medication for another practitioner, who did not witness its 
preparation to administer, unless there is a local guideline in place that sanctions this.
■ Drug additive label either not attached to product, or one or more of the details has been 
incorrectly competed. The details that must be completed will be stipulated by hospital 
policy (does not apply to bolus doses or where delivered labelled for an individual patient 
e.g. Total Parentral Nutrition [TPN]).
■ Expiry date error, either failure to check the expiry date of a medication, or diluent, or using 
a product beyond its expiry date.
■ Final volume errors, this would include failing to withdraw from an infusion bag before 
adding a dose when concentration was important e.g. aminophylline 1 mg/ml solution.
■ Wrong drug selection (the substitution of a generic for branded product would not be 
included as an error).
■ Wrong dose form (e.g. wrong form selected depot formulation; prescription or selection of a 
product not labelled as suitable for i.v. administration without local guidance, pharmacist or 
medical annotation or confirm this).
■ Exclusion of displacement values in paediatrics or neonatal i.v. dose preparation, or in 
other situations where the product monograph or hospital policy instruct its use.
■ Wrong dose or strength (where the dose due is in discrete units any deviation would be 
considered an error, where doses are measured any discrepancy ±10% from the 
prescribed dose would be considered an error).
■ No second check on a manufactured item where it is required by legislation or hospital 
policy e.g. controlled drugs.
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Figure 3.3 IV medicines preparation error and list of descriptors continued...
■ Preparation by a practitioner who is not authorised to do this task according to local 
hospital policy (e.g. student nurses, healthcare support workers).
■ Pharmaceutical, formulation and packaging problems, to include not rejecting a cracked 
emulsion or solution with obvious particles, cloudiness, discolouration; container that is 
damaged cracked or leaking.
■ Use of products stored inappropriately for dose preparation e.g. using items that should be 
refrigerated but we stored at room temperature and vice versa.
■ Inappropriate addition to an infusion bag, to include not mixing with inversion after 
additions or adding to a rigid or flexible bag hanging on an i.v. infusion stand.
■ Attempting to measure accurately a dose volume to more than 1 decimal place (i.e. not 
using serial dilution to ensure accurate dose).
■ Using a short needle, or other than 23-25 gauge needle for adding a drug to an infusion 
bag or burette.
■ Not preparing a suitable volume of a compatible flush solution with an i.v. product where a 
flush is required, as guided by the hospital policy.
■ Addition of medication to a blood product.
■ Preparing an infusion where there is a commercially available equivalent available and this 
is stocked in the hospital (e.g. potassium chloride 40mmol in 1000ml glucose 5%; if there 
were manufacturing problems and the pharmacy had issued guidance to instruct on this, it 
would not be included as an error).
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C. Covering letter
An introductory covering letter was prepared, outlining the study rationale and requesting 
participation [appendix 2]. Participants were asked to suggest how the template, proposed 
definition or descriptors could be improved; and to determine if any descriptors should be 
removed, or added. Guidance on good questionnaire design, and particularly the total 
design method (TDM) advocated by Dillman, was employed throughout the survey design 
[Dillman, 1978; Oppenheim, 1992; Bryman, 2001; Bowling, 2002; Smith, 2002]. 
Language was used which was understood in a similar manner by different professions in 
other cultures and countries [Litwin, 1995]. Previous work employing Email had 
highlighted subjects concern about how their Email addresses had been obtained, so an 
explanation was included [Whittlesea, 2002]. The importance of participants’ views was 
stressed, and they were encouraged to improve the material by any means. Explicit 
instructions on the method o f reply were incorporated.
D. Introductory email
Due to concern about the risk of falling response rates with the iterative process, the first 
contact with participants was to request inclusion in the study. A brief introductory email 
was prepared encouraging participants to open the attachments. The covering letter, 
template, definition and list of other experts approached were sent as Microsoft Word 
attachments within the email, along with a request to contact the researcher if they had any 
problems with the documents [appendix 3].
Strategies to maximise the response rate were adopted [Dillman, 1978; Oppenheim, 1992; 
Bryman, 2001; Bowling, 2002; Smith, 2002]. These included:
A covering letter explaining the rationale for the research, its importance, how 
participants were selected and a guarantee of confidentiality or anonymity.
Avoiding a lengthy introduction, the letter was on a single side of A4 without 
appearing squashed.
Clear instructions.
An attractive layout. The design, text and the sequence of sentences complied with 
the TDM wherever possible.
The concept of follow up of non-responders.
A personalised greeting.
Using a highly motivated sample with an interest in this area.
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To minimise researcher bias, the researcher avoided all unnecessary contact with the 
participants, including those previously known to the researcher. If contact was made, the 
study was not discussed [Beratta, 1996]. Further information or guidance on how to 
complete the study would be provided verbally or in writing, but replies were only eligible 
for inclusion if written.
3.4.2.3 Pilot study
The covering letter and material for review was read by a lay person, to confirm face 
validity, and a few typographical errors detected. The self-administered questionnaire was 
then piloted on an opportunistic sample of eight people (5th December 2002), composed of 
pharmacists, nurses and academics. These were carefully selected to include a wide range 
of expertise and interest in patient safety, but excluded those subjects already selected for 
inclusion in the expert sample. As the electronic mail technique of survey distribution was 
a relatively new method, pilot subjects both within and outside the Trust were selected. 
They were also asked to indicate the time taken to review the material. Two of these 
participants were questioned about their understanding of the survey material and 
questions to ensure they were interpreted as the researcher intended. Information from the 
pilot indicated this method of surveying was practical, easy to complete and well accepted.
Modification of the pilot survey
Piloting revealed a problem employing Email for distribution. The hospital logo used on 
the electronic mail was in a font not available on computers outside the Trust and showed 
as Greek characters instead. Discussions with the Information Management and 
Technology department generated an acceptable alternative.
The wording on the covering letter was slightly amended to include instructions about the 
reply format participants should use and to remove any ambiguity in the text. These 
amendments were incorporated in the covering letter, along with an estimate of the time 
required to review the material based on pilot information received [appendix 4].
Two additional scenarios were suggested for inclusion and added as examples of errors. 
The amended definition and list of descriptors that could be considered an error is shown 
in figure 3.4. The face and content validity of the survey were confirmed.
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Figure 3.4 Amended IV medicines preparation error definition and descriptors
Barts and The London NHS Trust 
Academic Department of Pharmacy
1.0 Introduction
Intravenous medication administration can been subdivided into two stages. Preparation will 
cover the actions from the time it is identified that a dose of intravenous medication is due from 
the prescription, through to the end of dose assembly. The subsequent stage of administration to 
the patient is not addressed by this work.
1.1 Proposed definition
The proposed definition of an ‘intravenous preparation error in the clinical or ward setting’ is a 
situation or act by a healthcare professional In the preparation of an intravenous 
medication dose that deviates from a written, verbal or computer generated prescription 
for an individual patient, or contravenes hospital protocol, professional or regulatory 
guidance.
The ‘prescription’ would be considered to contain all the information that the administrator had 
before them. Any clarification or annotation to the prescription would be considered an integral 
part of the prescription.
1.2 Situations that could be considered for inclusion as an 'intravenous 
preparation error in the clinical or ward setting'
The texts that have been used to gather the scenarios beneath are referenced at the end of 
the document.
Issues arising from the prescription
■ Dose omission, not preparing a dose of intravenous (i.v.) medication that is prescribed 
(patient refusal and compliance with hospital protocols e.g. ‘nil by mouth’ would not be 
included as an error, nor would omission pending clarification of the prescription).
" Preparing a dose of medication which the patient has a documented allergy or sensitivity
(this would include preparing a dose when the allergy statement is not completed on the 
medication chart but patient is able to communicate or is documented elsewhere; class 
effects e.g. penicillin allergic prescribed any penicillin; an awareness of cross reactions e.g. 
if anaphylaxis with penicillin or unknown reaction and prescribed a 
cephalosporin/carbapenem without confirmation).
■ Preparing a dose of medication for a latex allergic patient without avoiding latex exposure 
and not adhering to hospital guidelines, where available, on the management of latex 
allergic patients.
" Preparing any dose of i.v. medication that is not prescribed for an individual patient (verbal
orders would not be considered an error as long as the verbal instructions and 
documentation comply with hospital guidelines).
" Preparing a dose of i.v. medication without complying with medical guidance, or local
policies that dictate how or whether the dose is administered (e.g. instructions to omit if 
heart rate less than 60 beats per minute, but heart rate is not known).
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Figure 3.4 Amended IV medicines preparation error definition and descriptors continued...
■ Wrong time medication preparation (iv dose is prepared with the intention to immediately 
administer the dose more than 1 hour either side of when the dose is prescribed, or 1 hour 
before a new continuous infusion is commenced e.g. when changing an inotrope syringe 
for infusion. This would also include preparing the dose without intending to administer it 
immediately after assembly).
■ Preparing a dose of i.v. medication for the wrong patient.
■ Preparing a dose of i.v. medication from an invalid prescription (e.g. does not meet legal 
prescription requirements, discontinued prescription, incomplete or ambiguous prescription 
without first seeking clarification).
■ Preparing a dose for administration intravenously when it is prescribed by another route (to 
include prescription where route is not stated).
Contamination, health and safety issues
■ Not wearing any protective clothing, such as gloves or mask, as described in the product
monographs or by hospital guidelines (e.g. no goggles, gloves and apron when preparing 
chemotherapy).
■ Not using a 23-25 gauge needle or filter needle/straw when medication is withdrawn from a 
glass ampoule.
■ Not filtering a product when the manufacturers monograph or hospital policy state the 
product must be filtered (such as epoprostenol).
■ Not washing hands with bactericidal soap and water and thoroughly drying, or a 
bactericidal alcohol hand rub and allow this to dry before preparing an i.v. dose.
■ Preparation surface not cleaned before i.v. dose preparation.
■ Breach of ‘no touch’ technique, where the operator handles critical areas such as the 
syringe tip or needle hub.
■ Not swabbing the septum on a vial, additive port or outside of ampoule with suitable 
alcohol-based antiseptic, and allowing to dry before breaching or opening.
■ Open windows in the vicinity of where the i.v. dose is prepared.
■ Not inserting the needle through a rubber bung, with the bevel edge of the needle upwards,
at a 45-60° angle to minimise coring.
■ Not changing the needle on a syringe after medication withdrawal, before addition to an
infusion bag, bottle, device or burette.
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Figure 3.4 Amended IV medicines preparation error definition and descriptors continued...
■ Re-use of an intravenous medication dose that is intended for single use on a subsequent 
occasion, or another patient, unless there is a written hospital policy authorising this.
■ Not discarding glass ampoules, needles etc. into an appropriate sharps container.
■ Preparing a product in an unsuitable location such as the nurses’ station, ward reception or 
patient bedside (patient bedside would be accepted for doses administered via a burette).
Dose selection and preparation
■ Reconstitution errors. This would include failure to fully dissolve a powder during the 
reconstitution phase (includes reconstitution by transfer devices); or not complying with 
mixing instructions stated in the product monograph or hospital guidelines e.g. vigorously 
shaking teicoplanin causing foaming.
■ Diluent errors: using either a diluent or diluent volume unspecified in the hospital 
guidelines, or product monograph (also applies to infusion bags, bottles and burettes).
■ Preparing a dose of i.v. medication for another practitioner, who did not witness its 
preparation to administer, unless there is a local guideline in place that sanctions this.
" Drug additive label either not attached to product, or one or more of the details has been
incorrectly completed. The details that must be completed will be stipulated by hospital 
policy (does not apply to bolus doses or where delivered labelled for an individual patient 
e.g. Total Parentral Nutrition [TPN]).
■ Expiry date error, either failure to check the expiry date of a medication, or diluent, or using 
a product beyond its expiry date.
■ Final volume errors, this would include failing to withdraw from an infusion bag before 
adding a dose when concentration was important e.g. aminophylline 1 mg/ml solution.
■ Wrong drug selection (the substitution of a generic for branded product would not be 
included as an error).
■ Wrong dose form (e.g. wrong form selected depot formulation; prescription or selection of a 
product not labelled as suitable for i.v. administration without local guidance, pharmacist or 
medical annotation or confirm this).
■ Exclusion of displacement values in paediatrics or neonatal i.v. dose preparation, or in 
other situations where the product monograph or hospital policy instruct its use.
■ Wrong dose or strength (where the dose due is in discrete units any deviation would be 
considered an error, where doses are measured any discrepancy ±10% from the 
prescribed dose would be considered an error).
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Figure 3.4 Amended IV medicines preparation error definition and descriptors continued...
■ No second check on a manufactured item where it is required by legislation or hospital 
policy e.g. controlled drugs.
■ Preparation by a practitioner who is not authorised to do this task according to local 
hospital policy (e.g. student nurses, healthcare support workers).
■ Pharmaceutical, formulation and packaging problems, to include not rejecting a cracked 
emulsion or solution with obvious particles, cloudiness, discolouration; container that is 
damaged, cracked or leaking.
■ Use of products stored inappropriately for dose preparation e.g. using items that should be 
refrigerated but were stored at room temperature and vice versa.
■ Inappropriate addition to an infusion bag, to include not mixing with inversion after 
additions or adding to a rigid or flexible bag hanging on an i.v. infusion stand.
■ Attempting to measure accurately a dose volume to more than 1 decimal place (i.e. not 
using serial dilution to ensure accurate dose).
■ Using a short needle, or other than 23-25 gauge needle for adding a drug to an infusion 
bag or burette.
• Not preparing a suitable volume of a compatible flush solution with an i.v. product where a 
flush is required, as guided by the hospital policy.
■ Addition of medication to a blood product.
■ Preparing an infusion where there is a commercially available equivalent available and this 
is stocked in the hospital (e.g. potassium chloride 40mmol in 1000ml glucose 5%; if there 
were manufacturing problems and the pharmacy had issued guidance to instruct on this, it 
would not be included as an error).
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3.4.2.4 Administration of the survey
The email addresses of participants were obtained from research publications, strategy 
documents, personal contact or by Internet search, via ABS On-line, ‘Google®’ (academic 
or general search engine for international subjects). The workplace of any UK subjects 
whose email address was still outstanding was telephoned and their email address 
requested, together with a brief explanation of why this was required. It is impossible for 
questionnaires to be anonymous with email technique as respondents’ details are included 
on all electronic mail. However, as the subject material was not contentious, or asking for 
personal information, this was considered unlikely to affect the response rate. Respondents 
might nominate subjects who have already been approached and, to prevent this, a list of 
those contacted, and their work establishment, was attached to the survey. Respondents 
were assured their replies would be treated anonymously. This has been termed ‘quasi­
anonymity’, where the respondents are known to the researcher, even each other, but their 
judgements and opinions remain strictly anonymous [McKenna, 1994].
Each respondent was contacted following receipt of their reply, to thank them for 
participating. An individualised reply was sent to participants where relevant, for example 
those who had supplied a reference. Those who replied but declined to be included in the 
study were acknowledged and asked if they wished to be included in subsequent Delphi 
rounds. This strategy was adopted for all subsequent rounds.
Distribution of the survey to the ‘expert’ sample
After the successful pilot, survey distribution was commenced. Respondents were 
contacted on the 12th December and asked to reply by the 24th December. Some 
difficulties were experienced in sending several emails; the addresses were checked, then 
resent on Monday 16th December with a reply requested by 31st December. In one case it 
proved impossible to send the email, despite verifying the address, and so the email was 
sent to the subject’s secretary who agreed to forward it.
Surveyors usually avoid December due to the festive season. However, time constraints 
meant that the survey had to be sent. In addition many of the research experts travel 
internationally or attend conferences during the year, but might be more easily reached at 
this time.
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Modification of the survey from the ‘expert’ sample
Several participants were unable to meet the proposed deadline, but indicated they wished 
to respond. One respondent wanted to comment by fax. Therefore all subsequent study 
correspondence included a fax number. A number of respondents stated that it has taken 
them longer to review the material than suggested in the covering letter. This information 
was amended in subsequent emails. This list of participants included in the Delphi was also 
updated to include all those that had been approached for inclusion in the study [appendix 
5a & 5b].
Follow up of the expert sample
Non-responders from the ‘expert* sample were sent a follow up email on 8th January 2003, 
with a requested reply date of 31st January. Comments from initial replies were included 
into a modified covering email [appendix 6] and letter [appendix 7]. The template and 
definition were unchanged. The covering letter followed TDM recommendations with a 
more assertive style to engage participants and re-enforce why their assistance was 
required [Dillman, 1978]. Those who had indicated an alternative date for reply were not 
followed up until this date had passed, after which they were sent this material, if relevant.
Distribution of the survey to the snowball sample
The rationale for these participants’ selection was amended in the covering letter [appendix 
8], because many participants had been identified from the snowball sample and a suitable 
sample size and range of professionals were already included. These participants were 
asked to nominate individuals only if they felt their expertise was invaluable. These 
participants were mailed the survey in the first fortnight in February 2003 (3rd to 14th), and 
given 14-21 days to respond. The dates varied as nominations for inclusion were followed 
up on receipt, rather than waiting until the end of the collection period.
Subsequent follow up
Participants of both the purposive and snowball sample who had not replied were sent a 
final follow up letter on 7th February [appendix 9]. Those who had given a date for their 
comments were sent a follow up immediately after their deadline had elapsed. A follow-up 
email was sent before categorising participants as non-responders explaining why this was 
important and asked participants to reply, so the researcher was aware it had been received, 
as this influenced the study’s validity.
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3.4.2.5 Data processing
A code was generated for each participant approached, so that replies were labelled to 
preserve anonymity during analysis. The code incorporated the type of the healthcare 
professional [D=doctor, N=nurse; P=pharmacist, T=pharmacy technician], an indication of 
where the reply originated from [U=UK, I=Intemational] and an identifying number.
Any replies received in writing or by fax were converted into an electronic format to 
facilitate analysis. Each response was coded with a reply number and stored as a separate 
file, in text format, for qualitative analysis.
3.4.2.6 Data analysis
Replies were analysed for content using a computer-assisted programme [QSR N6]. Each 
reply was imported and reviewed to identify common themes. Content analysis was 
undertaken following the principles described by Tesch [1990], Fink [1995a] and Bryman 
[2001]. Emergent themes were identified and confirmed by iterative re-evaluation of the 
data. Independent review of the data confirmed the emergent themes, and facilitated 
collapsing of sub themes to create the key emergent variables. The template and any 
references provided were analysed separately.
3.4.3 Results of Delphi round one -  data generation stage
3.4.3.1 Response rate
A total o f 102 subjects were approached for participation in the study. A schematic 
representation of this is displayed in figure 3.5.
3.4.3.2 Demographics
Subjects were recruited from four professional backgrounds both in the UK and 
internationally. Replies were received from England, Wales, Scotland, Australia, USA, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. Details of the respondents’ background are detailed 
in table 3.1. The majority of respondents (74%) were from the UK. The profession most 
sampled were pharmacists (81% of subjects).
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Figure 3.5 Schematic representation of sample from the Delphi round one- data generation stage (n=72 study replies, n=40 excluded from round )
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Doctor Pharmacist Pharmacy
technician
Nurse Total
UK Replied 2 41 1 6 50
Referred to a 1 7 0 1 9
colleague
Declined 0 4 0 0 4
No reply 0 19 0 2 21
International Replied 3 8 0 1 12
Referred to a 0 0 0 0 0
colleague
Declined 2 2 0 0 4
No reply 1 1 0 0 2
Total 9 82 1 10 102
Details of the replies received are described in table 3.2. Sixty-two replies (78%) were 
suitable for analysis. Those not analysed consisted of eight where participants declined to 
participate in the study and six that indicated they planned a reply but this was not received 
within the study deadline. A further three respondents suggested another colleague within 
their organisation who would be more appropriate for inclusion.
Table 3.2 Details of the study replies received (n=79 replies)
Types o f reply Doctor Pharmacist Pharmacy
Technician
Nurse Total % o f  total 
replies
Suitable for analysis 5 49 1 7 62 78
Referral to a 
colleague
1 2 0 0 3 4
Declined 2 6 0 0 8 10
Planned to reply but 
not received
0 5 0 1 6 8
Total replies 8 62 1 8 79 100
The details of the respondents’ professions, and whether this was an individual or joint 
response, are shown in table 3.3. The majority of replies were from single respondents. 
However four pharmacists each submitted a joint reply.
Table 3.3 Analysis of study replies suitable for analysis by authorship (n=57 replies from 
62 respondents)_______________________________________________________
Author(s) profession UK International Total
Doctor 2 3 5
Pharmacist 35 5 40
Pharmacy Technician 1 0 1
Nurse 6 0 6
Pharmacist & pharmacist 3 1 4
Pharmacist & nurse 0 1 1
Total 47 10 57
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3.4.3.3 Validity check
Only nine of the 57 replies (16%), commented on the scenario used as a validity check. 
These included...
“I  don't think 1nil by mouth' is a good example o f  a valid reason fo r  omitting a dose 
o f an IV. ” [Reply 43].
“Dose omission is not a preparation error. Why would an IV  dose be withheld 
when a patient was "nil by mouth"? ” [Reply 50].
3.4.3.4 Survey administration
The time when the survey was distributed was not ideal as 12 study replies from 54
questionnaires had been received from by the initial 24th December deadline which was
then extended until 31st December. The timing was problematic for participants employed
within the NHS, shown by
“This is too short a notice to comment constructively on these papers... it may only 
take 20 minutes to read through but the thinking around the approach being taken here 
would be considerably longer and the last two weeks o f  December are not the quietest for  
the NHS.” [Reply 45].
Nine of the 15 replies received came from those involved in NHS service delivery. This 
was resolved by lengthening the time between survey distribution and reply deadline. The 
response rate for round one, including both expert and snowball participants was 70.6% 
(n=72) from 102 participants contacted.
3.4.3.5 Content analysis -  key emergent themes
Four key themes were identified from the replies. These were:
. Perspective. To whom the definition was directed e.g. patient, staff etc.
. Scope. This included comments on where IV medicines preparation fitted within the 
medicines use process.
. Operationalisation. This concerned practical aspects of how the review material would 
be translated into a data collection tool.
- Classification. This encompassed issues regarding error definitions.
3.4.3.5.1 Perspective.
Comments received suggested that the definition should be explicit with respect to the 
population benefiting from error prevention. Several respondents considered the definition 
should be restricted to a patient safety perspective only.
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“I  think in error work it is essential to only call a drug error an action that has the 
potential to harm the patient, e.g. the administration o f the wrong dose or the wrong 
drug.” [Reply04].
This was particularly apparent from replies to the scenario within the contamination, health 
and safety section concerning the operator’s failure to place glass ampoules in the sharps 
container.
"... is this a preparation error? It is certainly highly desirable, even mandatory for  
the safety o f operators, but not doing so is unlikely to compromise the patient, so I  don't 
see this as an error o f  "preparation". ” [Reply 05].
Should the definition be expanded to include operator safety, then there were additional
issues that needed to be incorporated into the definition. An example was:
“What about using certain closed systems to avoid staff contamination e.g. minibag 
plus fo r penicillins to protect the staff from hazardous powders. This should be a Health 
and safety issue for the hospital ” [Reply 08].
3.4.3.5.2 Scope
Issues pertaining to the scope of the definition were raised from a number of different 
aspects. These were
i. The context of ‘preparation’ within the medicines use process. Further clarification 
was required on which activities constituted solely preparation, rather than 
prescribing or administration.
ii. Respondents questioning the inclusion of preparation activities beyond those 
proposed. This ranged from expanding the definition beyond the clinical setting, or 
inclusion of other “ready-to-administer” IV medicines.
iii. The audience to whom the definition was targeted.
The preparation stage within the medicines use process 
Erroneous prescription issues
Respondents considered the definition was lacking because it failed to address issues
regarding ‘an inappropriate prescription’. They raised concerns regarding deviation from
this ‘inappropriate prescription’ constituting an error, despite it being in the patient’s best
interest. Examples are given below:
“Some reference should be made to the quality o f prescribing in your proposed 
definition o f an error. An error occurred here after a prescription fo r 'IV Vancomycin lg  
bolus’ was written. The nurse followed the prescription and gave it over 5 mins.” [Reply 
01].
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“The definition could be ambiguous in so much as it refers to a deviation from  
what is written on the prescription only, following the prescription blindly when it is wrong 
can also cause an error. ...this is an important point as the responsibility in law does not 
just lie with the prescriber, but the person who administers it. ” [Reply 38]
Prescription evaluation
Respondents suggested that there was an interim step in the IV MUP between prescribing
and preparation, namely prescription evaluation. This consisted of those actions taken
once the prescription has been interpreted by the individual who was going to prepare the
IV dose, but before physically starting the preparation.
"... the definition is lacking in so much that it does not really address the 
interpretation and checking o f  the prescription. ” ... “It is the responsibility o f  the nurse 
who is preparing and administering an i.v. drug, to ensure that the prescription is correct 
and that is complies with the stated dosage, route and method o f  preparation in either the 
BNF or local formulary or an authorised trial protocol. " [Reply 38].
Respondents enquired whether prescription evaluation issues formed part o f the
preparation process, e.g.
“ ... is evaluating the prescription part o f  the preparation process? I f  so is a 
prescribing error, which is missed by the nurse and subsequently an incorrect dose 
prepared and administered included as a preparation error (i.e. a dose prepared by 
adhering to incorrect instructions) ”. [Reply 54].
“I  do fee l that verification o f  the prescription is a major part o f  preparation. ” 
[Reply 38].
Respondents commented that prescription evaluation was not really part o f the preparation
stage. They suggested this occurred prior to preparation. Also, if  it were included in the
definition there were other prescription aspects to be included.
“The list o f  situations included in section 1.2 is quite comprehensive but 
inconsistent. For example I  would suggest that preparing a dose fo r  a patient with an 
allergy to the drug as part o f  the prescription evaluation, yet other aspects o f  the 
prescription evaluation are not included. ” [Reply 54].
Other prescribing issues
One respondent interpreted both the definition and the scenario ‘preparing a dose of 
medicine from an incomplete or ambiguous prescription’ to mean that all the instructions 
for IV preparation should be explicit from the prescription against which a dose was 
prepared. They also considered this information would not routinely be available from 
other documentation kept in clinical areas.
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”... does not recognise that very few  prescriptions fo r  IV  therapy are ever 
complete. That is they seldom provide details o f  the diluent, final volume. ” “...a 
prescription fo r  Erythromycin lg  IV qds is written this means reconstituted in 10ml Water 
for Injection and added to 500ml Sodium Chloride 0.9% and infused over 4 hours. These 
conventions are not formally recognised or written as procedures in a Trust. Your 
definition does not recognise this and would categorise the majority o f  IV  dose 
preparations as an *error ' . . . ” [Reply 20].
Boundaries of the preparation stage
Some respondents considered the definition to be ambiguous with respect to where in the 
MUP the preparation stage started and finished.
”Where does preparation end and administration finish?  ” [Reply 55].
Others felt that it would be impossible to clearly delineate preparation errors from errors at
other stages in the medicines use process.
“The scope o f  this definition EXCLUDES (or overlaps with) other points in the 
medication use system that can result in errors - prescribing and monitoring. I  assume 
that since you are EXCLUDING drug administration errors, that the scope o f  your work is 
limited to the preparation and dispensing steps (or "nodes"). Given the current work in 
this area, explaining the scope and rational fo r  limiting it will be important to readers. 
There is nothing wrong with this - it just needs to be clear. ” [Reply 41].
Some scenarios were thought to be broader than the preparation stage and therefore fell 
beyond the boundary o f a preparation error. For example, this error may belong to the 
prescribing stage:
"... I'd prefer this scenario to be a "medication error", not a "Preparation" error. 
It is not an error in the preparation, but is an error in the interpretation o f the 
prescription.
...the preparation might be perfect” [Reply 05].
Certain circumstances included in the questionnaire were considered to be part of the
administration, rather than the preparation stage:
”Preparing a dose o f  digoxin when the patient has a low heart rate. Clinical 
monitoring is often undertaken prior to drug administration and so preparing the dose 
would not be an error, but administering the dose would. ” [Reply 20]
Clarification of the preparation stage
Replies indicated that more information was required to re-enforce the aim of the study 
focusing on the preparation stage.
”... /  hope that it is clear that preparation is separate from administration. ” 
[Reply 05].
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Some respondents suggested that the preparation process could be subdivided in different
ways. These included:
“ ... three possible stages are: prescription evaluation, assembly o f  ingredients, 
preparation o f  the dose. ” [Reply 54]
"Administration o f  medication does not include preparation. This section should be 
reworded to make it clear that the paper refers specifically to preparation and not 
administration. [Reply 28].
*7 accept your separation into preparation and administration stages, fo r  ease o f  
analysis. I  would however suggest that you consider 'preparation fo r  administration' as 
part o f  the preparation o f  doses. " . . .  ‘7  feel these \preparation fo r  administration ’ errors 
should be dealt with in the preparation analysis stage o f  your work because most o f  these 
must be sorted before preparation is started i f  patient care is not to be compromised later 
in the same process.” [Reply 44].
Additional features of the preparation stage
It was suggested that some activities were required before the preparation process began. 
Examples included:
"Not having suitable instructions fo r  preparation before beginning”. “Not
gathering all equipment required before beginning. ” [Reply 35].
Several respondents considered that issues related to IV administration equipment needed
to be incorporated into the preparation stage.
“Are they using the right piece o f  electrical equipment? This refers back to the 
Brian Auty report on classification o f  infusion pumps. High risk pump fo r  a high risk 
drug”. [Reply 08].
A reason for this inclusion was that availability of infusion equipment might influence
product preparation. This is exemplified by the following comments:
"Critical medication e.g. inotropes should be prepared so that they can be used on 
the most appropriate piece o f  IV  equipment and to allow the service to be given efficiently. 
I f  a dose is prepared fo r  use on a syringe driver it may mean the syringe has to be changed 
several times per day. Each time there is a change the patient receives no treatment fo r  the 
period o f  the change. This break is unacceptable with inotropes, therefore, better to make 
in an infusion bag to maintain continuity o f  this critical treatment. ” [Reply 08].
Participants also questioned whether pharmaceutical issues relevant to the preparation
should be included. These issues encompassed a variety o f areas, described below.
*7 couldn V find  something that covered the situation where there should have been 
a filter and it was omitted. ” [Reply 19].
“Could drug-container and drug-giving set interactions be given here? I'm thinking 
o f drugs such as nitrates, paclitaxel, and ergocalciferol. ” [Reply 25].
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Other respondents advised that other equipment would be required before administration 
should commence. For example:
.. availability o f  spill kits prior to administering chemotherapy? " [Reply 29]
Examples were also supplied regarding additional error-prone tasks performed by the 
operator.
“I f  operator injures themselves (needlestick or opening vial) ” [Reply 19].
" I f  operator creates opportunity fo r  subsequent error (puts vial back in wrong box 
or in a loose ampoule bin). ” [Reply 19].
It was recommended that compliance with regulations should also be included. For 
example
“Failure to keep required records e.g.CDs, KCl etc ” [Reply 48].
Settings outside the clinical area
Respondents requested clarification of how errors in IV preparation originating in settings 
other than the clinical or ward area would be viewed.
This ranged from products prepared in the pharmacy department to errors outside hospital 
care.
“What i f  the product is CIVAS'd and there is an error in the pharmacy? ” [Reply
19].
“Are you just covering IV  medication prepared in hospital? A number o f  IV  
medications are given in the community setting and the issues related to IV  medication 
preparation are just as relevant in that setting. ” [Reply 09].
Queries were also raised relating to the scope of settings. For example:
“Why not replace "IV" with "Parenteral"? that would mean that ALL parenteral 
drug medication preparation errors could be counted. " [Reply 26].
“The proposed definition was good but does this definition cover IV  medication 
prescribed under a PGD [patient group direction]? " [Reply 09].
“Emergency administration at cardiac arrest, or fo r  anaphylaxis etc (Medicines 
Act permits this fo r  saving life.) ” [Reply 56].
Respondents also wanted clarification of healthcare personnel included in the definition. 
For example:
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“The definition seems confined to healthcare professionals. Can we completely 
rule out any circumstances when a patient may s e lf  administer? ” [Reply 07].
“I  have known patients/relatives administer. " [Reply 56].
"... we are unclear whether this is aimed at pharmacy, nursing or medical staff -  
or all! " [Reply 12].
Issues related to the definition
Numerous comments were received about the use o f reference material in addition to the 
prescription during medicines preparation. Participants explained that deviation from the 
manufacturers' instructions should be included.
“I  was also wondering whether or not 'regulatory guidance' would include 
deviation from a package insert? " [Reply 14].
“You need to include deviation from the manufacturers' instructions for  
preparation as defined in the specific product characteristics (SPC). " [Reply 50].
In addition to the prescription respondents suggested referring to other documentation used 
at most hospitals.
“In our hospital, as in many others there is info specified in the hospital’s ‘Control 
o f Medicines * policy etc. as being our standard texts that are made available by the 
hospital in all wards and clinical areas. I  would, fo r  example, expect anyone preparing an 
IV medication to consult the BNF and the manufacturers* package inserts as a matter o f  
routine. I  would further expect them to consult any other hospital-approved guidance on 
prep and admin o f  IV  drugs . .." [Reply 44].
“Where do texts such as Trissel and Medicines fo r  Children f i t  within this 
definition ? " [Reply 07].
Respondents highlighted that information might vary between reference sources, and that 
consideration should be given to how this would be resolved. These included:
“What would happen in practice i f  guidance from different sources is not fully  
consistent, because o f  the long time scales required to change some documents e.g. 
guidance from UKCC/NMC on Administration o f  Medicines vs. recent guidance from DoH  
on intrathecal administration o f  vinca alkaloids, or guidance in the Duthie Report on The 
Safe and Secure Handling o f  Medicines (1988 and still not superseded) vs. NPSA guidance 
on concentrated potassium solutions ' management. " [Reply 44].
“What is the position i f  a situation deviates from an SPC with good reason? One 
example might be intravenous administration fo r  injections to children. Many o f these 
would deviate from regulatory guidance (at least in the form o f  the SPC) and yet not be 
covered by hospital protocols, professional or regulatory guidance. " [Reply 07].
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3.4.3.5.3 Operationalisation
Respondents debated how the definition would be applied in practice, and also questioned
the practicality o f some scenarios:
“I'm used to using definitions specifically fo r  measuring numbers o f  errors, so I  
tend to avoid including anything you can't measure ” [Reply 14].
“ ...in "issues arising from the p re sc r ip tio n co u ld  be difficult to measure/detect 
all these since details may not be documented/reported.... Depends, I  suppose, on how you 
plan to collect data. " [Reply 02].
“/  would not include this, since nurses may draw up a flush just by the bedside. I f  
they do not prepare one may not mean they do not use one later on. " [Reply 04].
“Preparing an IV  dose not prescribed: how often is WFI/saline 'prescribed'?" 
[Reply 40].
It was noted by some participants that much current ward IV preparation would be 
considered erroneous according to the proposed definition. Therefore this should be 
reviewed.
“I f  ALL the definitions listed are accepted as criteria aginst (sic) any one o f which 
failure would be classified as an error, I  suspect that the overall error rate fo r  a typical 
prescription sample could be uncomfortably close to 100%. Are you prepared fo r  this? 
Would it undermine the credibility/perceived relevance o f  your work? Perhaps there's 
room to use a points or weighting system? [Reply 02].
Some respondents gave practical advice on the potential use o f the definition as an audit or
research tool. This included.
“As fa r  as I  am aware there is no standard validated fo r  the safe preparation o f  
medicines fo r  parenteral use at ward level. There will, therefore, be much local variation. 
It will be impossible to achieve a wide consensus fo r  this in the absence o f such a 
standard. ” [Reply 50].
“What you have is pretty complete, but it may be either too unwieldy to use as a 
research tool, or need to be categorised to delineate errors from causes o f  errors. ” [Reply 
41].
3.4.3.5.4 Classification of erro r
Several replies focused on the concept to be classified as an error. It was suggested that the 
incident must incorporate the potential for patient harm. Therefore, if  such a stance was 
adopted the definition and scenarios currently addressed a broader scope than just errors. 
Some refinement to focus on errors was proposed.
“I  think your definition is o f  an 'IV preparation INCIDENT' (not error) ". [Reply
40].
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“Ultimately in terms o f  patient safety the terms inappropriate medication and 
patient harm needs to be incorporated. ” [Reply 32].
Respondents proposed a number of different classification methods, some of which are 
described below:
“I  would separate out the different issues around IV  drug preparation and 
recommend to use the following categories:
Drug errors
Actions that are deviations from recommended practice/guidelines or good quality 
practice.
Deviations from recommended aseptic technique. There is hardly any evidence what 
constitutes safe aseptic techniques and which techniques have the potential to harm 
patients. ” [Reply 04].
“This leads to an issue o f  taxonomy - are you interested in the error itself or the 
root cause o f  the error (or, perhaps both). Some o f  the "errors" fa ll into one category 
(wrong dose) and some the other (attempting to measure a dose to more than one decimal 
place...) Perhaps the list needs to define the actual errors and another list needs to assess 
the root cause o f  the error. ” [Reply 41].
The respondents were most concerned about the statements in the section, contamination
and health and safety. These included aseptic technique issues.
“I  thought overall these were very comprehensive but under Contamination, health 
and safety issues, I  did wonder whether the scenarios number 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, could really be 
considered an 'intravenous preparation error'. ” [Reply 09].
“You may be accused o f  being rather (impractically) purist in your definitions in the 
section, Contamination, health and safety issues. I  would suggest that you stick with it, but 
ensure that you acknowledge this view in your discussion. ” [Reply 51].
3.4.3.S.5 Content analysis -  other themes
Three additional supporting themes were identified. These were:
Supportive statements regarding the utility of the study, despite its complex nature.
Concern that the respondent possessed suitable expertise to contribute to the study.
Comments on the comprehensiveness of the documentation.
These are illustrated by the following comments.
'7  commend your choices -  I  think pharmacy has a key role in this area both in 
terms o f technical advice and the ethos o f  error management. ” [Reply 26].
“It is difficult fo r  me to really make any informed comments as these are all about 
giving the service without pharmacy’s CIV A service. ” [Reply 08].
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3.4.3.6 Template
The introductory paragraph to the template appeared to confuse several respondents. Some
experienced difficulty understanding how the template related to the range o f scenarios
proposed as erroneous.
‘7'iw not entirely sure how you will use this, it currently does not allow you to 
document all the potential errors in preparation you have listed, purely the method o f  
preparation -  is that all you need to use it for? ” [Reply 43].
Comments received indicated the template needed to incorporate issues relating to IV 
paediatric practice. Additional minor revisions to improve its clarity were proposed. For 
example
“I  would add graphic to help people understand the process ” [Reply 46].
Generally, it was well received:
‘7  have considered this closely, but cannot add or comment further, this seems fine  
to me. " [Reply 05].
3.4.3.7 Reference material
Respondents supplied numerous reference sources, and references. The investigator was 
already familiar with some of these but others were new and included an IV guide chapter, 
thesis reference, draft audit guidelines and publications. In addition three respondents sent 
‘The Good Practice Statement for the Preparation of Injections in near-patient areas’, 
including clinical and home environments [Clinical Resource and Audit Group, NHS 
Scotland, 2002].
3.4.3.8 Language issues
A number o f comments were received concerning grammar, typographical errors and 
rephrasing statements to improve clarity.
Some replies indicated that some wording was unfamiliar to a specific professional group 
(e.g. vial septum), or was not internationally transferable. Clarification was required for the 
US medicines use process to distinguish between activities undertaken by pharmacy and 
those performed in clinical areas.
Nomenclatures used for the preparation process required clarification to ensure 
respondents were clear that the administration stage was not considered part o f the 
preparation process.
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3.4.4 Discussion
3.4.4.1 Response rate
A good response rate was obtained, 78% (n=62). Mail surveys traditionally have a lower 
response rate than investigator-administered techniques [Bryman, 2004]. Several 
respondents commented that the questions posed, and review material supplied was both 
complex and time-consuming. The high response rate therefore indicated the suitability of 
puxposive sampling to target subjects particularly motivated in the study area. Attention 
was paid in the survey design to maximise response rate through careful construction, 
following the TDM method [Dillman, 1978] and this was justified by the response rate 
achieved. Reported response rates from similar Delphi studies were consistent with these. 
Dean and colleagues [2000] approached 43 potential respondents before round one to 
request participation in the study, and from the 34 that agreed to participate received 
replies from 30, equivalent to a 70% response rate.
An additional method o f increasing response rate in this study would have been to contact 
potential participants in advance to request their participation. This is appropriate for 
surveys administered on a single occasion. However, one of the disadvantages of the 
Delphi technique is falling response rate with the iterative process. Therefore no advance 
warning was considered best for this study and was accepted as a study limitation.
No problems were experienced with the electronic distribution of the survey material. This 
also facilitated data analysis, and reduced potential researcher transcription errors. As the 
majority o f responses were received electronically, texts could be downloaded in QSR N6 
without the need for transcription. This confirmed the electronic method of administration 
as a convenient and suitable method for use throughout this study.
The study recruited a predominantly UK based sample, with a majority o f pharmacists. 
Pharmacists were intentionally over-sampled because of their experience in quality control 
and aseptic production. This bias was increased during snowball sampling as UK 
pharmacists were most likely to nominate other UK pharmacists. However, the range and 
scope of comments received suggested than this was not a problem. Replies were varied 
and many contained new material. Some of the pharmacists had niche expertise. The 
international sample was not fully representative; instead it contained comments from 
those countries where authors publish on patient safety. Representation from Europe,
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Australia and USA were included to ensure the study produced an internationally 
transferable definition.
3.4.4.2 Study limitations
No expert medical microbiologist or infection control nurse was identified. It was hoped 
these might be generated through nominations, but this did not occur. To ensure adequate 
representation from the pharmaceutical industry, Baxter and Macopharma could have been 
invited to participate. However, no industrial representatives were nominated. This would 
suggest that their contribution to IV medicines preparation safety in the clinical 
environment would be small. It was anticipated that other professionals with a deep tacit 
understanding of IV preparation in clinical practice would be identified by the snowballing 
technique e.g. theatres staff, midwives, practice development and nurse trainers. Initially 
selected ‘experts’ were asked to nominate individuals whom they felt could contribute to 
the definition. It is surprising that few nurses were nominated. As the initial expert sample 
did not include many nurses all opinions may not have been included. There is a lack of 
comments from nurses actively engaged in clinical practice. This was a limitation of the 
research methodology used and suggests the ‘expert’ sample inclusion criteria would 
benefit from refinement.
The timing of survey distribution could have been improved to avoid Christmas. As the 
survey was complex respondents also appeared to need at least four weeks to reply and by 
incorporating this time-scale respondent fatigue was minimised.
In some cases an administrative assistant had sent the response on respondent’s behalf. 
This was not a limitation in this initial round. However, it could be problematical in 
subsequent rounds as it would be uncertain who had completed the survey.
3.4.4.3 Validity check
The scenario mis-worded to suggest that ‘nil by mouth* was an acceptable reason for 
omitting an IV dose, was overlooked by most o f the respondents. Those who did comment 
on this appeared to have constructed their replies in systematic format, several o f whom 
commented on every scenario. With hindsight, this was probably a poor choice of validity 
scenario. Some respondents may have skimmed over the scenario as they thought it was a 
prescribing rather than preparation issue. A few respondents appeared to think that it was
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an error, or unintentional slip. However as the work required by respondents to comment 
on the definition was complex, it cannot be assumed that this validity check was not noted. 
Participants may have decided not to specifically comment on this issue.
3.4.4.4 General summary
The material generated for review was valuable. Many respondents had taken considerable 
time and effort in constructing their replies. However some participants may have been 
deterred by some of the subjects and therefore did not respond. The majority considered 
that this area o f inquiry was incredibly complex and hampered by the lack of agreed 
standards. Although the researcher was aware of many of these issues, additional insight 
was gained.
Replies indicated that the area was broader and more contentious than originally foreseen. 
Therefore this needed to be addressed in the next Delphi round, to ensure the topics 
selected were tightly focused, and to minimise the time required for completing the 
questionnaire. Some scenarios drew long and detailed answers from some respondents, 
whilst others accepted the same scenarios without comment. Therefore, the majority of 
decisions reached from interpreting the results were included in the second study round 
[Delphi-stage two], to ensure that group consensus was achieved, rather than the opinion of 
vocal subgroup.
3.4.4.5 Perspective
During the next stage it was important to explain to respondents which group of people 
would benefit from the study undertaken. The main focus was to improve patient safety, by 
minimising the likelihood or consequence of an error. Therefore, adopting a patient safety 
focused stance would be useful. This would allow refinement o f the scope o f the project, as 
all scenarios designed to protect solely the operator were removed from subsequent rounds. 
Agreement was sought from the respondents in round two about restricting the focus to 
solely patient safety. Those scenarios which addressed both patient and operator safety 
issues were not be excluded from the study until this agreement had been evaluated.
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3.4.4.6 Scope
Clarification of the preparation stage
Respondents held different views on the boundaries of the preparation stage within the 
medicines use process. Some acknowledged that there would be overlap between these 
constituent parts, whilst other felt it could be clearly delineated. Most respondents thought 
that the issues arising from the prescription section contained predominantly prescribing 
issues, which if  erroneous should be classified as prescribing errors. Those issues which 
were clearly prescribing errors were excluded from the item pool generated from this 
analysis. In addition, respondents' agreement that these should be classified as prescribing 
errors was sought.
Respondents considered the definition failed to address preparation from an erroneous 
prescription. Therefore for the purposes o f further Delphi rounds, it was assumed that the 
prescription was both valid and appropriate. A definition was added into the opening 
statement. This compares with other work where the appropriateness of the prescription 
was not assessed [Taxis & Barber, 2003a].
Comments explaining that hand-written prescriptions rarely contain all the instructions for 
preparation were addressed by altering the opening statement. Participants were informed 
that information available when preparing injections includes the prescription, and those 
texts recommended by the hospital (e.g. an IV guide and British National Formulary).
Many respondents appeared to have conflicting opinions about where the preparation stage
finished and administration began. This was exemplified by some suggesting scenarios be
excluded as they were administration errors, whilst other proposed the inclusion of
administration issues such as the availability of extravasation kits. The main areas
requiring clarification were: whether the addition of a giving set or extension set, and the
use of an infusion device fell into preparation or administration. This was highlighted by
two different definitions identified by respondents.
Gandy and colleagues [2002] proposed that preparation was,
“Preparation follows assembly. It is the procedure o f  using all o f  the assembled 
items in drawing up, mixing, combining or reconstituting the pharmaceutical agents, 
diluents and/or infusion fluids into the right form, combination and strength according to 
the patient’s prescription sheet, and via the correct delivery vehicle/administration device. 
Preparation includes following clinical guidelines fo r  the correct use o f  equipment 
[p.244].
This contrasted with the alternative definition:
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“The manipulation o f  ingredients and components to make the final product" 
[Clinical Resource and Audit Group/NHS Scotland, 2002;p.6].
The first definition incorporated the giving set within the preparation stage whereas the 
second did not.
Respondents highlighted that preparation is in fact a two or three component process. 
These were defined as prescription evaluation, assembly and preparation. Prescription 
evaluation was aligned with prescribing errors and therefore was not considered in this 
study. The subcomponent stages o f assembly and preparation were adopted for this study. 
Respondents were asked for their views on published definitions for these terms in round 
two. Rephrasing the review material would also improve clarity as * administration* could 
be removed from the definition.
Settings outside the clinical area
Several respondents commented on IV preparation issues that fell beyond the study area 
e.g. pharmacy dispensing and central intravenous additive service (CIVAS) errors. Studies 
had been undertaken in these areas; therefore no amendments were made to the study 
remit. Preparation in community hospitals would be included, but all areas outside the 
hospital clinical environment such as preparation in patients’ homes were beyond the scope 
of this study.
There was no reason to exclude patient group directions from the definition, as they are 
actioned following explicit hospital approved and documented guidelines. Although these 
are commonly used in the UK their incorporation for international use would need 
agreement in round two.
Literature review had revealed different preparation recommendations for different types 
o f parenteral injections (e.g. intrathecal, intramuscular injection) and showed the risk was 
greater with the IV compared to the intramuscular route. Therefore, it was decided to 
restrict the study to the IV route. All comments received outside the IV scope were 
disregarded. The intention was to focus on products that required manipulation in the 
clinical setting so fluid replacement without any ward based additions would also be 
excluded.
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One interesting point raised in the Delphi was whether the definition should include 
preparation o f medicines in an emergency setting, as this is often done by verbal order and 
documented retrospectively. The 1968 Medicines Act does make provision for 
administration without prescription in such settings. Therefore, respondents were asked for 
their views in round two.
Target groups for definition
The definition was intended to apply to healthcare professionals who prepared IV 
medicines. Several respondents indicated that on occasions, patients or relatives would 
administer IV medicines. If patients prepared and administered their own IV medicines at 
home and continued to do so in hospital it was considered they should be included. 
Therefore the definition would include any one who assembled and/or prepared IV 
medicines in the clinical setting.
3.4.4.7 Operationalisation
Some suggestions were made to ensure the emergent definition would be useful in the 
practical setting. Therefore, it was advised that issues which could not be measured should 
be excluded from the definition. It was anticipated that the definition needed to be suitable 
for observational research methods. This issue was clarified in round two.
There were concerns that the definition would be unwieldy for practice use or that the 
majority o f preparation would be considered erroneous if  the definition was applied. 
Therefore in round two respondents were explicitly informed about the scope of the 
definition.
3.4.4.8 Classification of error
Some respondents considered that potential for patient harm was a prerequisite for defining 
an incident as an error. This would be concordant with the emerging patient safety stance 
and would narrow the definition. Therefore, the respondents’ views were sought on this in 
round two. This mirrored other researchers stance where errors were required to have the 
potential to adversely affect the patient [Taxis & Barber, 2003a] or increase the risk of 
harm [Dean et al., 2000].
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Respondents raised most concern over the inclusion of aseptic techniques derived from 
standard nursing texts. These were often viewed as deviations from standard practice or 
poor quality practice and not errors. Respondents* views on this were explored further in 
round two.
Certain respondents cited error classification from other research publications or local 
policies [van den Bemt et al., 2002]. None of these were suitable for adoption verbatim as 
they were intended for general medicines error research, or failed to address specific 
preparation issues.
3.4.4.9 Template
It was apparent that, despite piloting, the introductory statement caused confusion and 
required clarification. The main issue was that respondents did not appear to understand 
the link between the template, error definition and scenarios. Many respondents realised 
that the template described the component stages of preparation and suggestions 
highlighted the wide variation in practice. The main omission identified by respondents 
was the lack of paediatric practice issues, where the delivery o f medicines may differ 
substantially from adults. The comments received suggested actions to rectify this point. 
Following minor modifications to improve clarity, the template was redrafted for use in a 
clinical setting.
3.4.4.10 Reference material
‘The Good Practice Statement fo r  the Preparation o f  Injections in Near-patient areas, 
including Clinical and Home Environments ’ [Clinical Resource and Audit Group, NHS 
Scotland, 2002], was published during this study and added to this research. However these 
guidelines do not contain explicit guidance on preparation, but instead promote a 
philosophy o f risk assessment and the production of local standard operating procedures. 
The document made some definite recommendations, including that parenteral nutrition 
and cytotoxics should only be issued from a pharmacy in a patient ready-to-administer 
form [Clinical Resource and Audit Group, NHS Scotland, 2002]. Therefore in round two 
respondents were asked whether this was routine practice in their clinical setting, to allow 
generation o f a precise definition.
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It appeared that terminology was understood in different ways by respondents. This 
problem had already been highlighted by other researchers who studied aseptic 
nomenclature issues with a multiprofessional group [Gandy et al., 2002]. Wherever 
possible, the current research employed the terminology proposed by Gandy and 
colleagues, and the glossary o f terms from the ‘Good practice statement on injection 
preparation* [Clinical Resource and Audit Group, NHS Scotland, 2002; Gandy et al., 
2002]. However there was still discrepancy between these recent publications on the 
definition of ‘preparation*. The disparity arose over the transition from preparation to the 
administration stage. The Gandy and co-worker [2002] definition included the use of the 
correct administration device, whereas that produced by the Clinical Resource and Audit 
Group and NHS Scotland [2002] indicated that preparation finished before connection to a 
needle or giving set. Therefore further work aimed to reach an agreement on this issue.
3.4.4.11 Language and study design
The comments about grammar and typographical errors were noted. Suggestions for 
rephrasing were adopted where the scenarios was transferred into the second round. In 
other cases these were incorporated, where feasible into reworded scenarios transferred 
into the second round. Comments where a potential for misunderstanding exists were also 
addressed.
The main area o f concern was confusion about what UK professionals* term ‘preparation’ 
and USA participants term ‘dispensing*. This may have occurred because virtually all IV 
doses in the USA are supplied to the ward in patient ready form from the central or satellite 
pharmacy [Cousins 2005b; Schneider, 2002a]. Although not commented on by all the USA 
respondents, it was addressed in round two by incorporating clear explanation of the 
study’s scope.
3.4.5 Conclusions
A high response rate (78%) from the motivated UK and international multiprofessional 
sample yielded valuable comments and debate about the proposed definition.
The key issues identified following analysis of the round one-data generation stage were:
1. The need for a precisely defined scope for the study. It was suggested that it should 
focus solely on the assembly and preparation of IV medicines requiring 
manipulation in clinical areas. Greater attention to terminology and restriction of
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this research to this area should minimise respondents commenting outside the 
study setting.
2. An explicit statement of to whom the definition was directed was required. It was 
proposed the focus would be patient safety. Any individual involved in the 
preparation of an injection was included.
3. The respondents advised that for practical application the definition should only 
include issues readily measured during preparation.
4. Error classification; some respondents suggested the work was broader than errors 
and addressed IV incidents. They suggested restricting errors to preventable actions 
with the potential for patient harm, enabling other deviations to be classed poor 
practice.
Application of these recommendations generated an item pool of statements for potential 
inclusion in round two. Allowing the respondents to be asked to agree and clarify the 
definition and its operationalisation.
3.5 Delphi round two -  working towards a consensus
3.5.1 Aim
To seek quantification and agreement of the definition o f an IV medication preparation 
error in clinical areas.
3.5.2 Methodology
3.5.2.1 Survey distribution
Survey distribution was performed in an identical manner to round one [see section 
3.4.2.4].
3.5.2.2 Sample recruitment
All respondents from the first round sample who had submitted a study reply (n=62), as 
well as those who had not participated in round one but had agreed to participate in 
subsequent study rounds (n=3). The five respondents who had expressed an interest in the 
study, but did not submit a valid reply in round one were approached to participate in this 
round. Four agreed to take part. Therefore, the sample contained 69 participants.
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3.S.2.3 Data collection instrument
Analysis o f round one replies had generated an item pool o f statements for potential 
inclusion in round two. These were incorporated into an electronic self-administered 
survey. The survey was constructed following guidance on appropriate question 
construction [Oppenheim, 1992; Fink 1995b] and the TDM format for design [Dillman, 
1978]. Specialist electronic design input was provided [Tugwell, 2003]. A draft survey was 
prepared consisting o f predominantly closed questions, employing a rank scale or 
categorical answers. Additional space, in the form of a free text box, was provided 
alongside each question to allow respondent to add comments as this had been cited as a 
limitation o f the Delphi method [Murphy et al., 1998].
Not all the scenarios generated were included, because of the amount o f respondents* time 
required for completion might result in a low response rate. Therefore, a draft o f statements 
for inclusion was circulated to two other researchers and agreed. This was important as it 
has been suggested that judgements made on scenarios which rarely occur in practice may 
be less reliable [Murphy et al., 1998]. The format for similar question types was amended 
to shorten the length of the questionnaire. Questions related to specialist issues were 
removed to avoid respondent fatigue. The covering letter included the key findings from 
the first stage o f the study, and provided a clear focus for the definition.
Attitudinal measurement
Use o f a categorical scale would have made it impossible to quantify the degree of 
consensus because without an underlying scale replies cannot be ranked [Oppenheim, 
1992]. Therefore, to facilitate statistical analysis, a numerical scale was used. As the 
variables studied required attitudinal measurement, Likert scales were used to rate 
agreement [Oppenheim, 1992]. Use o f Likert scales is established in survey research as 
they provide good reliability, and robustness [Oppenheim, 1992]. The choice of Likert 
scale mirrors that selected by Dean and colleagues [2000] for the consensus study of a 
prescribing error. However, Dean and colleagues used the RAND nine point Likert scale. 
This was not used in this study as it can be confusing and complex and therefore lead to 
item redundancy [Oppenheim, 1992].
The Likert scale required all the respondents to rank how much they agreed with a 
proposed statement on a five-point scale: strongly agree, agree, uncertain, disagree,
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strongly disagree. For questions where respondents were asked to rate potential errors, a 
simple three-point scale was selected.
Defining consensus
For each statement included in Delphi round two, all respondents’ attitudinal scores 
required evaluation to ascertain whether consensus has been gained for the each statement.
“‘There seems to be no firm rules fo r  establishing when consensus is reached ...” 
[Powell, 2003 p.379]. There is no unity on how agreement is defined when consensus is 
reached for Delphi studies in general [Murphy et al., 1998]. Agreement can be 
demonstrated in two different ways [Jones & Hunter, 2000]:
1. An individual participants agreement with a statement, usually described by the 
median of all replies.
2. Agreement consistent with the other study participants i.e. consensus, usually 
described by the interquartile range.
Powell [2003] cited failure to provide a suitable description o f consensus as a common 
failing of Delphi studies. In her commentary, she found that the percentage of participants 
agreeing with a statement was a common choice for group consensus but the rigour with 
which it was applied varied considerably, from 55-100%.
Therefore, prior to data analysis, consensus was defined by the researcher and three 
research experts following review of the RAND nine-point scale developed for nominal 
groups [Jones & Hunter, 2000]. Figure 3.6 describes the definitions employed.
Category D efin itiont
Consensus Widespread agreement, where 90% or more o f  the group’s replies fell within 
two adjacent attitudinal categories on the five-point scale, or one category on 
the three-point scale.
Equivocal Uncertain agreement, where between 80-89% o f  the group’s replies fell 
within two adjacent attitudinal categories on the five-point scale, or one 
category on the three-point scale.
No consensus Widespread or polarised views, less than 80% o f  the group’s replies fell 
within two adjacent attitudinal categories on the five-point scale, or one 
category on the three-point scale.
t  all values were rounded to the nearest whole number 
Figure 3.6 Consensus categories employed
If the data were distributed such that the group’s replies fell equally into two or more non 
adjacent attitudinal categories and this prevented clear assignment to one of the above
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consensus categories, then results were graded to the nearest agreement consensus 
category.
3.5.2.4 Study administration
An explanation was included in the covering letter about how to rate each variable on the 
Likert scales. The scale was added to the text, with an adjacent box for comments. Word 
descriptors were used, rather than a numerical scale because a common error occurs when 
a respondent is confused over which end of the scale is agreement and which is 
disagreement [DeVellis, 2003]. Respondents were requested to select the response which 
most reflected their opinion. It was stressed that the respondents needed to complete this 
stage individually rather than through discussion or formulation of a group response.
Pilot of survey
On the 28th May 2003 the covering letter [appendix 10] and electronic survey [appendix 
11] were piloted on an opportunistic sample of five people (pharmacists, nurses and a 
member of the public) with clear instructions given [appendix 12].
Modification of the pilot survey
Several minor problems required clarification were identified during piloting. The wording 
of questions 5, 8d and 22 were ambiguous and were rephrased through discussion with the 
respondents who had identified these issues. All negatively worded statements were 
revised to positive statements e.g. the double negative in question 19. Although the 
questioning style intentionally used aimed to avoid ‘yes’ bias in completing the 
questionnaire, piloting had revealed confusion. The ‘yes’ bias was therefore accepted as a 
study limitation.
After the modifications described to the survey, two lay persons reviewed the electronic 
survey to ensure face validity [appendix 13]. With the above revisions incorporated, it was 
deemed that face and content validity had been confirmed. Details o f the questions posed 
are shown in table 3.4.
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Table 3,4 Questions in the self-completion questionnaire to develop a practical definition of an 
intravenous medication preparation error in the clinical setting__________________________
No. Question posed Reply
type
Likert
scale
length
la. Medication assembly is the ‘gathering together on a cleaned tray, trolley or 
appropriate work surface, all the items of equipment and pharmaceutical 
agents required for the aseptic preparation and administration of a medicine 
to a patient, whatever the form, route and method/technique of 
administration* [Br J Clin Govern 2002;7: 2441.
agree, or 
disagree
5
lb. Medication preparation ‘is the procedure of using all the assembled items in 
drawing up, mixing, combining or reconstituting the pharmaceutical agents, 
diluents and/or infusion fluids into the right form, combination and strength 
according to the patient’s prescription sheet, and via the correct delivery 
vehicle/administration device. Preparation includes following clinical 
guidelines for the correct use o f equipment*. [Br J Clin Govern 2002; 7: 
244].
agree, or 
disagree
5
2a. An iv medication preparation error in the clinical setting is defined as:
‘The preparation of iv medication that deviates from either: a 
written/computer generated prescription, or instructions for its preparation*.
agree, or 
disagree
5
2b ‘Instructions’ for preparation include those provided by:
1. The manufacturer
2. A written/electronic policy, protocol, procedure, or guideline approved 
by the hospital
3. A hospital adopted reference source (e.g. Medicines for Children 
reference book)
4. Specific documented professional advice (e.g. pharmacist annotation of 
suggested preparation for an unlicensed route, or fluid restricted patient)
rank in 
order of 
import­
ance.
4
3. Events without the potential to cause patient harm should NOT be classed as 
errors.
agree, or 
disagree
5
4. For practical purposes, the error definition should exclude any actions that 
cannot be directly measured (e.g. verbal orders, preparation at emergencies 
like an arrest).
agree, or 
disagree
5
5. IV medication prepared from a hospital approved patient group directive 
should be included in an error definition (patient group directives provide 
explicit guidance for the administration and documentation of approved 
medication by staff, in the absence o f a doctor).
agree, or 
disagree
5
6. Deviations from recommended practice should not be classified as errors 
(e.g. not obtaining a second check where required, failure to attach a 
medicines additive label).
agree, or 
disagree
5
7a Parenteral nutrition should never be prepared in the clinical setting agree, or 
disagree
3
7b Chemotherapy preparation must never occur in general clinical areas, 
without additional specialist facilities (e.g. isolator)
agree, or 
disagree
3
7c The preparation of medication into rate controlled delivery devices does not 
occur in clinical areas (e.g. implantable infusions, intimate devices)
agree, or 
disagree
3
Id Errors should exclude measures to protect the operator from the product (e.g. 
health and safety issues)
agree, or 
disagree
3
8a Preparing for an individual patient, an iv medication that is not prescribed 
(excludes flushes)
Is this an 
error?
3
8b Preparing a medication dose for administration intravenously when it is 
prescribed by another route (i.e. wrong route)
Is this an 
error?
3
8c Deviation from the hospital or manufacturer’s instructions on either the 
selection, or volume used, of a diluent/solvent (applies to both initial 
reconstitution and/or dilution)
Is this an 
error?
3
8d The selection of the wrong medication. (The substitution o f a generic for a 
branded product where the manufacturers instructions for preparation and 
administration are the same is acceptable)
agree, or 
disagree
3
8e Where a recommended clinical environment is available, preparing a product 
in any other location (Preparation at the patient bedside would be accepted 
for doses administered via a burette)
agree, or 
disagree
3
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Table 3,4 Questions in the self-completion questionnaire to develop a practical definition of an 
intravenous medication preparation error in the clinical setting continued... _________ __
No. Question posed Reply
type
Likert
scale
length
9 Incorrectly labelling a product. (Labels are required for all infusions. Labels 
for bolus doses are needed when more than one dose is prepared, or the 
prepared dose is stored for more than 10 minutes, put down or passed to 
another practitioner).
agree, or 
disagree
3
10 Preparing an iv dose using the incorrect medicine formulation, (e.g. 
selecting a depot formulation, or using a product that does not state it is 
suitable for iv use without instruction to confirm appropriateness, e.g. where 
the product is not licensed for iv administration but is routinely given iv).
agree, or 
disagree
3
11 Preparing a wrong dose product or wrong strength infusion. (Where products 
are made from whole vials e.g. amoxicillin 250mg from a 250mg vial, no 
deviation from this dose would be allowed. Where a fraction of a dose unit is 
required, or any other measurement, any discrepancy greater than ±10% 
from the dose would be an error).
Is this an 
error?
3
12 Failing to fully reconstitute a product during preparation, or adhere to the 
mixing instructions. (This includes failure to dissolve the powder, failing to 
activate a minibag plus infusion device that has a vial o f powder attached, or 
vigorously shaking a medication that foams e.g. teicoplanin).
Is this an 
error?
3
13 If a product is appropriately labelled, it is acceptable to prepare it in advance 
of its intended use, as long it is used before the instructed expiry? 
a. In any clinical setting?
agree, or 
disagree 3
b. Where any interruption in medication delivery could affect patient care 
(e.g. inotrope infusion)?
agree, or 
disagree
3
c. What time frame, if  any, would be acceptable? free text n/a
14a Adding a medicine to a syringe/infusion already containing a drug with 
which the medicine is incompatible, or there is unknown compatibility
Is this an 
error?
3
14b Adding a medicine to a syringe/infusion already containing a medicine with 
which there is unknown compatibility
Is this an 
error?
3
14c Adding medication to a blood product or compounded (ready to administer) 
parenteral nutrition without first contacting pharmacy
Is this an 
error?
3
14d d. Preparing a medication, in an incompatible container (e.g. insulin, glyceryl 
trinitrate)
Is this an 
error?
3
14e Preparing multiple doses o f an iv medication for more than one patient on 
the same medication (e.g. bulk preparation)
Is this an 
error?
3
14f Preparing more than one dose o f an iv medication for more than one patient 
at the same time
Is this an 
error?
3
14g Not filtering a product when the manufacturer’s instructions or hospital 
policy state the product must be filtered (e.g. epoprostenol)
Is this an 
error?
3
14h Withdrawing medication into a syringe through a filter needle, and not 
changing the needle before the medication is added to a syringe or infusion
Is this an 
error?
3
14i Inappropriate addition to a syringe/infusion container (e.g. adding to a rigid 
or flexible bag hanging on an iv infusion stand, or not mixing thoroughly 
after addition)
Is this an 
error?
3
14j Any calculation mistake that produces a preparation (± 10% dose instructed) 
is an error
Is this an 
error?
3
15a Preparing a medication using an expired ingredient Is this an 
error?
3
15b Using a previously opened multidose container, where the date of first use is 
not indicated
Is this an 
error?
3
15c Preparing a medication using degraded or unsuitable ingredient (includes 
cracked emulsions; solutions with unintended particles or discolouration; 
damaged containers)
Is this an 
error?
3
15d Using an ingredient that has not been stored according to instructions, unless 
a risk assessment has been made to verify its suitability prior to preparation 
(e.g. using a product that should be refrigerated and was stored at room 
temperature)
Is this an 
error?
3
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Table 3,4 Questions in the self-completion questionnaire to develop a practical definition of an 
intravenous medication preparation error in the clinical setting continued... _________ __
No. Question posed Reply
type
Likert
scale
length
15e Using a single use ingredient whose tamper evident seal has been broken 
(e.g. use of an iv infusion previously removed from the outer wrapper)
Is this an 
error?
3
15f Preparing an iv medication for a latex-allergic patient without either 
avoiding latex exposure, or not following hospital guidelines, where 
available, on the care o f latex-allergic patients
Is this an 
error?
3
16 Deviation from appropriate aseptic technique is an error. agree, or 
disagree
5
17 Re-using an intravenous medication that is licensed for single use on a 
subsequent occasion, or another patient, unless there is a written hospital 
policy authorising this, is an error (e.g. using an infusion bag to withdraw 
flushes for more than one patient).
agree, or 
disagree
5
18a Not washing hands with a bactericidal soap and water and then thoroughly 
drying before an iv dose preparation session is an error.
agree, or 
disagree
5
18b Not using a bactericidal alcohol hand rub and allowing this to dry before an 
iv dose preparation session is an error.
agree, or 
disagree
5
19 Failing to wear gloves during preparation to prevent contamination o f the 
medication is NOT an error.
agree, or 
disagree
5
20a Failing to swab the septum (rubber top) on a vial, additive port or outside 
of an ampoule with a suitable alcohol-based antiseptic before breaching 
or opening is an error.
agree, or 
disagree
5
20b Failing to swab the septum (rubber top) on a vial, additive port or outside 
of an ampoule with a suitable alcohol-based antiseptic and not allowing it 
to dry before breaching or opening is an error.
agree, or 
disagree
5
21 Breach of ‘no touch’ technique, where the operator handles areas such as the 
syringe tip or needle hub, is NOT an error.
agree, or 
disagree
5
22 If the product or operator leaves the clean field they are working in this is an 
error.
agree, or 
disagree
5
23 Pouring the medication into unsterile cup to aid drawing up is NOT an error. agree, or 
disagree
5
24 Failing to use a 23-25 gauge needle, or a filter needle/straw, when 
withdrawing medication from a glass ampoule to remove glass shards is an 
error.
agree, or 
disagree
5
25 Failing to take appropriate infection control precautions after an injury 
during preparation is NOT an error (e.g. continuing preparation without 
changing the needle after a needle-stick injury).
agree, or 
disagree
5
Abbreviation: n/a=not applicable, No.=number
Distribution of the survey
Data collection was commenced, using a revised opening greeting [appendix 14], in an 
identical manner to round one. Surveys were issued on 7 and 8th July 2003, and requested 
date of the 18th August 2003. Non-responders were followed up on the 19 and 20th August 
2003 with another copy of the questionnaire and requested to reply by the 8th September 
2003. A second follow up of non-responders was issued 10th September 2003 requesting 
replies by 22nd September 2003. It was apparent from comments received to the follow up 
email that some respondents had not registered the requested reply date contained in the 
covering letter. Therefore, this was added to the email introductory statement.
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3.5.2.5 Data processing
Survey replies received electronically were downloaded and printed as a hard copy. These 
and the written replies were coded, as described in round one, to disguise the respondent’s 
identity and stored in a secure filing cabinet pending analysis.
3.5.2.6 Data analysis
The results were entered onto SPSS version 11.5, a statistical database for analysis. A 
coding frame was used where: strongly agree=4, agree=3, undecided=2, disagree=l, 
strongly disagree=0, error=5, not an error=6, manufacturer’s information=80, hospital 
policy=81, hospital adopted reference=82 and professional advice=83. Missing data was 
assigned to ‘99’ and duplicate entries to ‘98’. After data entry the accuracy of data 
transcription was checked manually as a quality control exercise.
The data were both categorical and ranked ordinal and, for a small sample, non-parametric 
statistics were most appropriate [Puri, 2002]. These were analysed quantitatively for a 
measure of central tendency and measures of dispersion. For each descriptor, the median, 
range, minimum value, maximum value, interquartile range and frequency distribution 
were calculated. The chi-squared test (X2) was used to determine independence between the 
responses and respondents. Where there were missing data points, analysis was based on 
valid replies alone. Comments received in the free text boxes were analysed qualitatively 
for common and recurrent themes.
3.5.3 Results
3.5.3.1 Response rate
A total o f 69 subjects were approached for participation in this second round of the study. 
One subject became a project advisor, thereby removing their eligibility for study 
inclusion. Therefore, all analysis was based a total o f 68 subjects entering round two of the 
study. A schematic representation of this is displayed in figure 3.7.
3.5.3.2 Demographics
Details of the respondents’ background are detailed in table 3.5. The majority of 
respondents (78%, n=48) were from the UK. The profession most sampled were 
pharmacists, with 78% (n=48) o f subjects.
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Table 3.5 Analysis of all replies received by individual respondent (n=68 subjects)
Doctor Pharmacist Pharmacy technician Nurse Total
UK Replied 1 38 1 6 46
Declined 0 1 0 0 1
Retired 0 1 0 0 1
No reply 1 4 0 1 6
International Replied 2 8 0 1 11
Declined 0 0 0 0 0
Retired 0 0 0 0 0
No reply 2 1 0 0 3
Total 6 53 1 8 68
Not all questionnaires were eligible for analysis; this is described in table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 Details of the study replies received (n=59 replies)
Types of reply Doctor Pharmacist Pharmacy
Technician
Nurse Total % of total 
replies
Suitable for analysis 3 42 1 7 53 90
Promised but not 
received
0 4 0 0 4 7*
Declined 0 1 0 0 1 2*
Retired 0 1 0 0 1 2*
Total replies 3 48 1 7 59 100*
(* may be more than 100% due to rounding)
3.5.3.3 Validity check
Question 8d was included as a validity check, within a table where, based on comments
from round one, it was anticipated most of the replies would be error. However, the
question was unreliable as a validity check because some respondents were confused over
the wording, for example:
“I  don’t quite understand Q8-d: does this apply to wrong drug or just to selecting 
the same generic form ” [IP34].
Clarification of this statement is discussed in section 3.5.3.5.
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Replied 
n=15
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n=9
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study 
n=13
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Subjects 
approached 
n=35
Follow up. 
Subjects 
approached 
n=24
Subjects 
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Declined, 
on maternity leave 
n=1
Change in subject’s 
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n=1
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questionnaire 
eligible for 
analysis n=11
Replied with 
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eligible for 
analysis 
n=11
Replied with 
completed 
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for analysis n=31
No reply, or 
replied but 
completed 
questionnaire 
not submitted 
n=24
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from study 
n=1
Informed that 
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No reply n=1
‘Busy’ but 
would ‘do 
best’ to reply. 
Completed 
questionnaire 
not received 
n=4
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questionnaire not 
submitted 
n=35
Figure 3.7 Schematic representation of sample from the Delphi round two -  establishing agreement and consensus (n=53 
study replies and n=16 exclusions)
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3 .5 .3 .4  Q u a n tita tiv e  resu lts  from  q u estio n s posed
A total o f 48 questions were included, three o f which contained subsections on a similar 
theme (questions 13, 18 and 20). Results were reported based on these 48 subject areas. 
Consensus was reached in 18 areas (37.5%), no consensus in 19 areas (39.6%) and an 
equivocal finding regarding 11 issues (22.9%).
3 .5 .3 .4 .1  C o n sen su s  ach iev ed
Table 3.7 describes those statements where consensus was achieved. Respondents agreed 
that chemotherapy should never be prepared in clinical areas. They agreed on the 
definitions provided for IV medicines assembly and preparation. Patient Group Directions 
(PGD) should also be included within the error definition.
An example o f the distribution o f replies received for a scenario that reached consensus is 
shown in figure 3.8.
100%  -
■ strongly agree
□ agree
□ undecided
■ disagree
■ strongly disagree
Figure 3.8 Histogram distribution o f the scenario: PGDs should be included within the 
error definition, question 5 (n=53 replies).
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Table 3.7  Analysis o f statements where consensus was reached, Delphi round two (n=53 
replies). ____________________________________________________________________
Question
number
Question topic Likert
scale
length
Valid response 
rate and 
attitude scale 
categories
Group 
distribution: 
25%, median, 
75%
No. of 
missing 
data 
values
Chi squared 
value
X? P
la Medication
assembly
definition
5 90.4% A/SA A,A,SA 1 34.6* <0.0005
lb Medication
preparation
definition
5 90.6% A/SA A,A,SA 0 39.3* <0.0005
5 Patient Group 
Directions should 
be included
5 90.6% A/SA A,SA,SA 0 20.9** <0.0005
7b Chemotherapy 
must never occur 
in general areas
3 92.3% A A,A,A 1 81.5 <0.0005
8b Wrong route error 3 96.2% Error n/a 0 94.3 <0.0005
11 Wrong dose or
infusion
concentration
3 92.5% A A,A,A 0 83.5 <0.0005
12 Faulty
reconstitution or 
mixing
3 96.2% A A,A,A 0 45.3* <0.0005
14a Known addition 
incompatibility
3 96.2% Error n/a 0 45.3* <0.0005
14d Incompatible
container
3 96.2% Error n/a 1 92.3 <0.0005
14g Failure to comply 
with directions to 
filter
3 100% Error n/a 0 # #
14i Inappropriate 
addition method
3 94.3% Error n/a 0 41.7* <0.0005
14j Calculation
mistake
3 94.3% Error n/a 0 41.7* <0.0005
15a Using expired 
ingredients
3 96.2% Error n/a 0 94.3 <0.0005
15c Use of degraded 
ingredients
3 100% Error n/a 2 # #
15f Latex exposure in 
latex allergic 
patient
3 96.2% Error n/a 1 44.3* <0.0005
17 Using a single use 
container more 
than once
5 94.1% A/SA A,A,SA 2 31.5** <0.0005
23 Pouring into an 
unsterile cup
5 94.2% A/SA SA,SA, SA 1 105.4* <0.0005
25 Lack of 
appropriate 
infection control 
follow-up
5 90.2% A/SA A,SA,SA 2 77.5 <0.0005
Abbreviations used: A=agree, SA=strongly agree, n/a=not applicable, no.=number.
# Chi-squared test not suitable as all observed data in one attitude category.
♦Chi-squared test excludes one variable as no datum was observed in a one of the attitude categories; ♦♦two 
variables excluded as no data observed in two categories.
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3.5.3.4.2 Consensus uncertain/equivocal
Table 3.8 contains those statements where there was uncertainty as to whether the issues 
should be included or disregarded. Both statements related to poor aseptic technique 
during IV preparation fell into this category. Respondents* scores showed that there was 
uncertainty as to whether practice deviations during IV preparation should be classed as 
errors.
Table 3.8 Analysis o f statements where it was uncertain whether consensus was reached, 
Delphi round two (n=53 replies)________________________________________________
Quest"
number
Question topic Likert
scale
length
Valid 
response 
rate and 
attitude 
scale
categories
Group
distribution:
25%,
median,
75%
No. of 
missing 
data 
values
Chi squared 
value
X? P
6 Practice deviations 
should not be errors
5 81.1% SD/D SD,D,D 0 38.2 <0.0005
8a Unprescribed
medication
3 88.7% Error n/a 0 73.1 <0.0005
8c Wrong diluent or 
solvent
3 83.0% Error n/a 0 59.6 <0.0005
9 Labelling error 3 86.8% A A,A,A 0 68.2 <0.0005
10 Incorrect medicines 
formulation
3 81.1% A A,A,A 0 54.9 <0.0005
14h Dose withdrawal via 
a filter needle which 
is not changed before 
addition
3 84.6% Error n/a 1 24.9* <0.0005
15b Re-use o f a multidose 
container with no 
opening date stated
3 86.5% Error n/a 1 67.0 <0.0005
15d Faulty storage 3 84.3% Error n/a 2 59.6 <0.0005
15e Use of single use 
medicines despite no 
intact tamper evident 
seal
3 80.4% Error n/a 2 51.9 <0.0005
16 Deviations from 
appropriate aseptic 
technique is an error
5 86.6% A/SA A,A,SA 1 29.1* <0.0005
21 Breach of no-touch 
technique is an error
5 84.6% A/SA A,A,SA 1 26.3* <0.0005
Abbreviations used: SD=strongly disagree, D=disagree, A=agree, SA=strongly agree, n/a=not applicable, 
no.=number.
* Chi-squared test excludes one variable as no datum was observed in a one of the attitude categories.
An example of the distribution of replies received for a scenario where it was equivocal 
whether consensus was reached is shown in figure 3.9.
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100% -  
90%  - 
80%  
70%  - 
60%  
50%  - 
40%  - 
30%  - 
20%  - 
10% -  
o % -
H strongly agree
□ agree
□ undecided
■ disagree
■ strongly disagree
Figure 3.9 Histogram distribution of the scenario: practice deviations should not be 
classed as errors, question 6 (n=53 replies)
3 .5 .3 .4 .3  C o n sen su s  n ot a ch iev ed
Table 3.9 contains those statements that respondents did not feel should be included as 
IVMPEs. Respondents did not agree on the IVMPE definition provided. There was no 
group agreement on the acceptability o f preparing an IV dose in advance of its need, even 
in those situations where interruption of the infusion would be important for the patient. 
Respondents’ opinions varied on whether it was acceptable to exclude unmeasurable 
actions when auditing against the definition. An example o f the distribution of replies 
received for a scenario where consensus was not reached is shown in figure 3.10.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
■ strongly agree
□ agree
□ undecided
■ disagree
■ strongly disagree
Figure 3.10 Histogram distribution o f the scenario: Errors should exclude operator safety 
measures within the error definition, question 7d (n=52 replies, l=missing data)
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Table 3.9 Analysis o f statements where consensus was not reached, Delphi round two 
(n=53 replies). _____________________________________________________________
Quest0
number
Question topic Likert
scale
length
Valid 
response 
rate and 
attitude 
scale
categories
Group
distribution:
25%,
m edian,
75%
No. o f  
missing 
data 
values
Chi squared 
value
*2 P
2a IVMPE in clinical 
setting definition
5 78.9% A/SA A,A,SA 1 39.3 <0.0005
3 Errors should be 
potentially harmful to 
the patient
5 75.4% SD/D SD,D,D 0 29.7 <0.0005
4 Unmeasurable actions 
can be excluded when 
auditing
5 71.7% SD/D D,D,U 0 39.9 <0.0005
7a Parenteral nutrition 
should never be 
prepared in clinical 
areas
3 79.2% A A,A,A 0 50.5 <0.0005
7c Filling o f rate 
controlled devices does 
not occur in clinical 
areas
3 54.7% A U,A,A 0 11.0 0.004
7d Definition should 
exclude measures to 
protect the operator
3 46.2% D D,U,A 1 4.3 0.116
8d Wrong medication 
brand
3 75.0% Not 
an error
n/a 1 42.0 <0.0005
8e Failure to use the 
recommended 
preparation area
3 51.9% Error n/a 1 8.8 0.012
13a Acceptable to prepare 
in advance
3 51.9% D D,D,A 1 8.3 0.015
13b Acceptable to prepare 
in advance where it is 
paramount medication 
delivery is 
uninterrupted
3 60.4% A U A A 0 18.2 <0.0005
14b Unknown addition 
compatibility
3 75.0% Error n/a 1 41.3 <0.0005
14c Addition to prepared 
parenteral nutrition or 
blood products
3 79.2% Error n/a 0 52.6 <0.0005
14e Preparing multiple 
doses o f the same 
medicine for multiple 
patients
3 37.3% U n/a 2 0.5 0.790
14f Preparing multiple 
doses for multiple 
patients at the same 
time
3 42.3% Error n/a 1 2.0 0.368
18a Failure to wash and dry 
hands before 
preparation
5 70.6% A/SA U,A,SA 2 10.1* 0.018
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Table 3.9 Analysis of statements where consensus was not reached, Delphi round two 
continued... (n=53 replies). ________________________________________________
Quest”
number
Question topic Likert
scale
length
Valid 
response 
rate and 
attitude 
scale
categories
Group
distribution:
25%,
median,
75%
No. of 
missing 
data 
values
Chi squared 
value
X2 P
18b Failure to
decontaminate hands 
with alcohol rub before 
preparation
5 75.0% A/SA A,A,SA 1 28.8 <0.0005
19 Failing to wear gloves 5 63.4% A/SA U,A,SA 1 18.0 0.001
20a Failure to swab a vial’s 
septum
5 78.8% A/SA A,A,SA 1 18.6* <0.0005
20b Failure to let any 
alcohol dry after 
swabbing
5 70.0% A/SA U,A,SA 3 12.2* 0.007
22 Leaving the cleaned 
area during preparation
5 67.3% D/U D,U,A 1 25.3 <0.0005
24 Failing to filter or use a 
narrow gauge needle 
when withdrawing from 
glass ampoules
5 73.0% A/SA U,A,SA 1 14.2* 0.003
Abbreviations used: SD=strongly disagree, D=disagree, U=undecided, A=agree, SA=strongly agree, n/a=not 
applicable, questn=question, no.=number.
* Chi-squared test excludes one variable as no datum was observed in a one o f the attitude categories.
Respondents were asked to provide the time frame within which they felt it was acceptable 
to prepare an IV dose in advance of its intended time of administration (question 13c). 
Replies varied greatly ranging from zero to 24 hours before expiry, whilst others were 
unsure e.g. one replied with question marks [UP20]. It was not possible to evaluate these 
replies for consensus; this is supported by the earlier sections o f this question also falling 
in the no consensus category.
Respondents were asked to rank, in priority order, the sources o f information that should 
be used for IV medicines preparation (question 2b). This information is described in figure 
3.11. Virtually all respondents used hospital approved guidance within the top three 
sources. Respondents were equivocal about the other sources.
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Figure 3.11 Cumulative bar chart showing priority o f information sources for IV 
preparation
3 .5 .3 .5  Q u a lita t iv e  a n a ly sis
Additional comments were received on all questions other than 14d, 14g and 14i. These 
comments can be categorised into the following common issues:
Rewording.
Rephrasing.
Question division.
Obscure or specialist area.
Unrealistic scenario.
Further clarifications o f the definitions were suggested; examples from each o f these 
categories are described below.
R ew o rd in g  or rep h ra sin g
Respondents made suggestions for improving the wording o f statements. Several o f which
focused on the clarity and scope o f the definition, examples included:
“Deviation from prescription, SPC, or national or local agreed protocol or 
procedure or generic standard fo r  aseptic preparation and mixing” [question lb, UP61].
“/  think that the wording is very vague as the medication could be prepared 
correctly according to the prescription but this could be an error” [question 2a, UN03].
“As fa r  as the patient is concerned they couldn V care less on whose authority the 
medicine is given, i f  it *s wrong i t ’s wrong” [question 5, UP51].
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“The terminology used by the Nursing & Midwifery Council is 'patient group 
direction [UN04].
A general comment received was that it was easy to stray from the study focus of IV 
preparation in clinical areas. Therefore it was recommended that preparation error be used 
throughout the questionnaire. An example was:
‘7  think you need to specify 'preparation error' throughout. I  have tried to answer 
the questionnaire assuming that this is what is meant but it is easy to forget and think o f  
drug administration errors ” [UN04].
Question division
Comments received from respondents identified several statements were complex and 
would benefit from being divided into multiple sections allowing each section to be dealt 
with as a single issue. Examples o f these were:
‘7  don't quite understand Q8-d: does this apply to wrong drug or just to selecting 
the same generic form (but with a different preparation instruction)? In the last case I  
would only judge it as an error when the preparation deviates from the manufacturer's 
instructions o f  the different brand” [question 8d, IP34].
“Should be asked separately. We have guidelines fo r  some drugs that can be added 
to blood products, but nothing to parenteral nutrition ” [question 14c, UP36].
“Never ever add to blood may be locally approved additions to TPN” [question 
14c, UP82].
Obscure or specialist area
Some statements concerned issues where no apparent evidence-base existed to guide 
respondents’ comments. Some of these issues were contentious and respondents’ 
comments identified potential problems with their inclusion in the error definition 
framework, shown by:
“Definition o f  appropriate aseptic technique is essential. Nurses e.g. are trained to 
a different standard to pharmacy sta ff in many areas -standard practice must be agreed 
and taught** [question 16, UP57].
“Sadly we currently don't train nurses well enough in aseptic technique! Not sure 
whether there is sufficient literature to support the notion that infection arises from poor 
aseptic technique when items prepared immediately before use” [question 16, UP82].
“Highly debated in the US. Some feel that gloves create a "reservoir" o f  micro 
organisms that are more dangerous i f  the glove is punctured than simple and periodic 
hand washing” [question 19, IP23].
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“Glass particles will generally be too big to pass through needle” [question 24,
UP39].
“Currently there is insufficient evidence to answer this question. There is not hard 
evidence how dangerous preparation in clinical areas is and after what time a product 
should be no longer used. Providing this evidence would be a whole project on its own. 
Currently I  would not call these deviations an error ” [question 13c, IP30].
Unrealistic scenario
Respondents had been briefed that the definition and framework was intended for use in
observational audit. Comments highlighted potential difficulties with some of the scenarios
included, examples included:
“I f  aseptic is defined as free from bacteria' then e.g. prep o f  oral drugs is rarely 
aseptic due to the nature o f  the original products to be used e.g. medicine spoon, stock 
bottle o f  liquid medicine - these are unlikely to be sterile. The best we can require is that 
they are clean and further contamination is not introduced during the 
assembly/preparation process” [question la, UP57].
“These may be difficult to measure but methods could be developed to do so, 
practice may change and also the need to measure these” [question 4, UP37].
“Manufacturers instructions are difficult to obtain at ward level. A well written 
policy and product monographs approved by the hospital will have included that 
information " [question 2b, UP77].
“This is sloppy practice not a drug error” [question 18a, UN05].
“depends on policy as some hosps have taken a pragmatic view as they consider 
that insisting on handwashing with soap & water is impractical ” [question 18a, UP11].
“Regarding parenteral nutrition: Does preparation not include breaking barriers 
o f two bag compartments and mixing the solutions o f  each segment without opening the 
bag? I  think this could be done in a clinical setting" [question 7a, UP37].
3.5.3.6 Survey administration
The main difficulty encountered receiving replies on time was partly due to distribution
over the summer vacation period. However, the double follow-up and extended time frame
gave most subjects an opportunity to participate. It appeared that some had pressing work
commitments, which precluded their replying, for example
‘7  will do my best. I  have been away recently and I  have an unprecedented 
workload at present -  all compounded by time lost due to computer virus/worm problems ” 
[UP55].
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3.5.4 Discussion
3.5.4.1 Response rate
A good response rate was obtained 84% (n=57). As with the first round of this study, 
participants were predominantly UK based (68%, n=46), with a majority of pharmacists 
from both the UK (n=38) and internationally (n=8). However, the proportion of non­
pharmacist and international replies had increased. This may have been because purposive 
sampling had identified those with a specialist interest in patient safety. These replies were 
important as they highlighted differences between UK and USA practice.
3.5.4.2 Study limitations
The timing o f survey distribution could have been improved to avoid the summer vacation 
period. It was apparent that the survey was time consuming to complete and this may have 
limited the number of replies received. This highlighted the need for the third round 
questions to be clear and succinct to prevent respondent fatigue.
Technical problems associated with the electronic method of communication were 
experienced. These included changes to respondents’ Email address within their 
organisation, changes in respondents’ circumstances e.g. on maternity leave, retired, and 
server failures and difficulties opening the email attachments. Some replies suggested that 
respondents were under the impression they had completed the questionnaire but had left 
missing answers, which may have been due to the electronic method o f completion.
3.5.4.3 Validity check
Question 8d failed as a validity check as the question required dividing into two sections. 
One section dealing with IV medicines where it was important the brand was specified, 
and one where the branded product and generic version could be interchanged and provide 
an identical clinical effect. This issue had been identified by respondents in the round one 
replies and was believed to be addressed by the statements provided. However, the 
statement was ambiguous. Therefore the lack of a validity check was accepted as a study 
limitation.
3.5.4.4 Error definition and framework 
Consensus achieved quantitatively
Consensus was achieved in 37.5% (n=18) of subject areas, mainly when a clear-cut 
decision of whether an error with potential to reach the patient, had occurred e.g. using
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expired ingredients. This finding was anticipated. However, it was apparent that although 
consensus was reached, the definitions o f IV medicines assembly and preparation would 
benefit from refinements, suggested by respondents. Therefore, these two statements were 
entered into round three and the 16 consensus statements retained.
Equivocal
There were eleven issues where consensus was neither agreed nor rejected. In several cases 
the respondents’ comments suggested this may have arisen from uncertainty or ambiguous 
statements. In such cases the statements were clarified, by purposive questioning of a range 
of health-care professionals not included in the study prior to inclusion in round three. 
Respondents rejected the notion that practice deviations could not be called errors (81.1% 
strongly disagree or disagree, [n=53]). Most of these issues were included within the other 
scenarios and therefore this statement was excluded from the study. Ten revised statements 
were entered into the next study questionnaire.
Scenarios had been carefully worded in an attempt to ensure a balance between over 
generalised and over specific situations. However this meant some scenarios was perceived 
as rather bland and respondents were reluctant to answer clearly and suggested exceptions 
to the statement. This was addressed through careful attention to wording where these 
statements were retained for round three, and rejection of too-specialist scenarios. For 
example, statement 7c concerning the filling of rate controlled devices in clinical areas was 
removed from the study as it was felt to be too specialist and misunderstood by some 
respondents.
No consensus
The largest number of statements fell into this category, 39.6% (n=19). This was seen as 
widespread responses across the attitudinal categories or a bimodal distribution. In the 
majority o f these statements respondents felt there was insufficient evidence to categorise 
as errors. None of these statements included key scenarios required for study robustness. 
Comments from respondents indicated many were areas where practice in clinical areas 
differed, consensus was unlikely to be achieved. Therefore statements (questions 7c, 7d, 
8e, 13, 14e, 14f, 20b and 22) were removed from the study. In addition, their inclusion 
would risk respondent fatigue.
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The remaining 11 statements and subsection 20a were rephrased, as described for the 
equivocal statements [section 3.5.4.4], and entered into round three.
3.5.5 Conclusions
At the end of this round the following issues had been clarified:
a. The focus of the definition and framework was patient safety issues.
b. The boundaries of the preparation stage. Prescription issues did not form part of the 
preparation stage, but could impact on this, therefore prescription problems should be 
identified and recorded separately. Where preparation was remote from the patient 
bedside this included all activities undertaken before the patient was approached, 
including inserting and priming the giving set.
c. The definition applied solely to hospital clinical areas. Therefore, non hospital settings 
and preparation within the pharmacy department were excluded.
d. It was difficult for respondents to remain focused on IV preparation. Therefore, 
reference to administration should be avoided, and IV route should be stated 
throughout.
e. To prevent the audit tool being too unwieldy priority for scenarios retained in round 
three was given to issues clinically important to the patient and amenable to detection 
through observation.
Consensus had been achieved for 16 statements. One statement required dividing into two 
questions. A further 23.5 statements were retained for entry into round three of the study.
3.6 Delphi round three - reaching a consensus
3.6.1 Aim
To seek quantification and agreement of the definition of an IV medication preparation 
error in clinical areas on those issues with the potential to gain consensus, and those issues 
rephrased from round two.
3.6.2 Methods
3.6.2.1 Sample recruitment
The sample consisted of all respondents from the second round sample who had submitted 
a study reply (n=53),
117
Chapter 3: An investigation into what constitutes an intravenous medication preparation error
3.6.2.2 Data collection instrument
Where there had been consensus in round two, variables that would not benefit from 
rewording were excluded from further participant rating. Those variables where consensus 
had been reached, but would benefit from re-wording, as well as those variables where it 
was possible consensus might be achieved, were resubmitted to the subjects. Subjects 
were supplied with their previous response to each statement and a description of how this 
had compared with the group responses. Group distribution was described by the median, 
25% and 75% quartile values. Subjects were asked to consider their previous reply, along 
with the group view and select their opinion. There was a potential risk of subject bias, 
where respondents might alter their view in line with majority view. So careful instructions 
in the covering letter attempted to guard against this phenomenon. Subjects were asked to 
select the most appropriate attitudinal response for all new statements.
A major concern was loss of subjects due to the iterative nature of this study. It was 
important that the questionnaire was both succinct and easy to complete. Therefore, for the 
third round the self-completion questionnaire format was revised to minimise respondent 
fatigue. Statements were tabulated and replies selected from a drop down menu.
3.6.2.3 Study administration
The opening statement on the electronic mail was similar to round two, but included the 
reply date, as comments from previous respondents suggested this would help. In order to 
motivate the sample a clear covering letter explaining the study findings to date and 
purpose of the final round was developed [appendix 15]. Clear guidance on how to 
complete the survey was included in the opening statement and at the top of each table.
Pilot of survey
The covering letter [appendix 15] and electronic survey [appendix 16] were piloted on a 
purposive sample of twelve people, incorporating pharmacists, pharmacy technicians, 
nurses and members of the public on 22nd December 2003. The pilot sample was amended 
to include those who had provided constructive comments in earlier rounds, as well as 
recruiting new members with specialist skills in IV therapy and aseptics to ensure validity 
and robustness. Clear instructions were given to the piloters as the revised survey format 
also required testing in practice.
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Modification of pilot survey
The electronic survey and format were well received. Minor grammar and layout 
amendments to the covering letter were accepted [appendix 17]. The following key 
revisions were incorporated into the survey:
Clarification o f the green colour for a 19-gauge needle to apply to UK practice, as it 
was uncertain whether this was an international standard.
Clarification in the "looking for agreement* section that all statements may be 
considered errors e.g. faulty labelling amended to faulty labelling is an error. 
Rewording of the instructions for participants on how to complete each of the tables. 
Substituting the word error for not acceptable in the ‘are these potential errors’ to 
ensure consistency.
The survey is displayed in figure 3.12 overleaf. Additional questions that were added are 
shown within figure 3.12 with a grey background.
Distribution of the survey
Data collection was commenced; in an identical manner to rounds one and two [see section 
3.4.2.4J. Surveys were issued on 12 and 13th January 2004, and participants requested to 
return these by 2nd February 2004. Non-responders were followed up on the 11th February 
2004 with responses required by 27th February 2004. A second follow up of non­
responders was issued 8th March 2004 requesting replies by 22nd March 2004.
3.6.2.4 Data processing
Data processing was performed in an identical manner to round two [see section 3.4.2.5J.
3.6.2.5 Data analysis
Data analysis was performed in an identical manner to round two [see section 3.4.2.6].
3.6.3 Results
3.6.3.1 Response rate
A total of 53 subjects were approached for participation in this round of the study. A 
schematic representation o f this is displayed in figure 3.13.
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Figure 3.12 Round three survey
Self-completion questionnaire to develop a practical audit 
tool fo r detecting potential medication errors arising 
during intravenous medication assembly and preparation 
in clinical settings
The audit tool will address only potential medication errors arising during intravenous
medication assembly and preparation in hospital clinical environments. T h erefo re  the
fo llo w in g  issu es fall o u tsid e  o f  the stu d y  rem it and sh ou ld  not be co n sid ered  w h ilst
rea ch in g  y o u r  op in ion:
Issues arising during the prescribing (ordering), or dispensing stage o f the 
medicines use process.
Issues arising after the preparation stage o f the medicines use process e.g. 
administration.
All non-intravenous routes o f administration.
Medication that requires no manipulation in clinical settings e.g. pre-filled 
syringes.
Those activities that occur outside o f the hospital areas providing direct patient 
care, e.g. in pharmacy.
This revised and shortened questionnaire is based on the group’s earlier responses and has 
been designed for electronic completion. There are no right or wrong answers, so please 
give your personal views.
Y our rep ly w ill be trea ted  con fiden tia lly . If you have any p rob lem s o r queries , p lease 
con tac t m e by e-m ail (c row levcv@ card iff.ac .uk). o r te lephone  on +44 (0 )2920 875535.
The questions are tabulated for ease o f completion. Your reply from the last questionnaire 
is displayed in the column titled ‘your previous reply’. The group’s reply is described by 
the lower limit o f the interquartile range, the median (in bold) and the upper limit o f the 
interquartile range.
For each statement, please consider the revised scenario and the group’s opinion, 
then choose the ONE answer that most represents your views by selecting the 
appropriate reply box. If you wish to alter your reply, click on the box and it will 
unselect that reply.
120
Chapter 3: An investigation into what constitutes an intravenous medication preparation error 
Figure 3.12 Round three survey continued...
D e f i n i t i o n  i s s u e s
The following statements have been revised in light o f the group’s comments. For each statement, 
please consider the revised definition and your previous reply in relation to that of the rest of the 
group. Then click on the word “select” to choose the statement that most closely represents your 
views and thus rank the extent to which you agree, or disagree.
Proposed definitions:
Your
previous
reply
GrouD reDlv: 
25%, 
median,
75%
Your
revised
opinion
In tra v e n o u s  m e d ica tio n  assem b ly  is 'the gathering 
together on a cleaned tray, trolley or appropriate work 
surface; the items o f equipment and pharmaceutical 
agents required for the preparation o f a medicinal 
product for a patient.'
agree Agree,
Agree,
Strongly
agree.
select
In tra v e n o u s  m e d ica tion  p re p a ra tio n  is 'the procedure 
for using the assembled items in drawing up, mixing, 
combining or reconstituting the pharmaceutical agents, 
diluents and/or infusion fluids into the right form, 
combination, and strength according to the patient's 
prescription sheet. Preparation includes using relevant 
documentation for preparing the medicinal product, 
calculations, and labelling.'
agree Agree,
Agree,
Strongly
agree.
select
The exc lus ion  o f ac tions  th a t can n o t be m easured  by 
d ire c t o b se rva tio n  w ou ld  be an accep tab le  s tu d y  
lim ita t io n  (e .g . ac tions  a t em ergenc ie s  like  a ca rd iac  
a rre s t.)
agree Disagree,
Disagree,
Undecided.
select
An in tra ve n o u s  m ed ica tion  assem b ly  o r p re p a ra tio n  
e rro r  in th e  c lin ica l s e ttin g  is de fined  as ' the preparation 
o f iv medication that deviates from the prescription, 
manufacturer's guidance, national or locally agreed 
policy, procedure or guidance, or generic standards for 
clean or aseptic preparation.'
agree Agree,
Agree,
Strongly
agree.
select
Bates e t a l. f (1 9 9 5 ) de fined  p o te n tia l adverse d rua  
e ve n ts  (ADEs) as 'incidents with the potential for injury 
related to a drug'. T h e re fo re  c lin ic a lly  re levan t 
m e d ica tio n  e rro rs  a ris ing  d u rin g  in tra ve n o u s  m ed ica tion  
assem b ly  and p re p a ra tio n  m ay be called po te n tia l 
ADEs.
select
P aren te ra l n u tr it io n  shou ld  no t be com pounded  in 
c lin ica l areas.
Un­
decided
Agree,
Agree,
Agree.
select
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Figure 3.12 Round three survey continued...
It has been suggested that each o f the following statements, represents an error. For each 
statement, please rank the extent to which you agree, or disagree.______________________
Statem ent:
Your
previous
reply
Group reply 
25%, 
median,
75%
Your
revised
opinion
Fau lty  labe lling  is an e rro r. (Labe ls  are requ ired  fo r a ll 
in fus ions . Labels fo r  bo lus doses are  needed w hen 
m ore  th a n  one dose is p repa red , o r th e  p repared  dose 
is p u t dow n o r passed to  a n o th e r p ra c tit io n e r, o r w here  
a d m in is tra tio n  is d e la ye d .)
Un­
decided
Agree,
Agree,
Agree.
select
P reparing  an iv  dose using th e  in co rre c t m ed ic ine  
fo rm u la tio n  is an e rro r, e .g . a d e p o t fo rm u la tio n  is 
g iven  iv . (W here  th e  p ro d u c t is un licensed fo r iv  use 
b u t is a docum en te d  accepted p rac tice , th is  is 
accep tab le .)
agree Agree,
Agree,
Agree.
select
Gross d is rega rd  fo r  c le a n /a se p tic  te chn iqu e  d u ring  iv 
m e d ica tio n  p re p a ra tio n  is an e rro r  e .g . d ropp ing  an 
uncapped sy rin g e  and need le  on th e  flo o r and 
co n tin u in g  p re p a ra tio n  w ith o u t any  co rre c tive  ac tion .
select
Failing to  sw ab th e  se p tu m  (ru b b e r to p ) on a v ia l o r 
a d d itiv e  p o rt w ith  a su ita b le  a lcoho l-based  a n tise p tic  
be fo re  b reach ing  th e  sep tum  is an e rro r.
Un­
decided
Agree,
Agree,
Strongly
agree.
select
Breach o f 'n o  to u c h ' te ch n iq u e , w here  th e  o p e ra to r 
touches a reas th a t m ig h t cause co n ta m in a tio n  such as 
th e  sy rin g e  t ip  o r need le  hub is an e rro r.
Un­
decided
Agree,
Agree,
Strongly
agree.
select
Failure to  do a t leas t one o f th e  fo llo w in q  before  an iv 
dose p re p a ra tio n  session is an e rro r
W ash hands w ith  soap and w a te r and d ry  
th o ro u g h ly ,
W ash hands w ith  bac te ric ida l soap and w a te r and 
d ry  th o ro u g h ly ,
Use a b a c te ric ida l a lcoho l hand rub and a llow  to  
d ry ,
W ear g loves.
select
W here i t  is im p e ra tiv e  a nam ed brand is used, use o f 
any  o th e r  b rand (e .g . co n ve n tio n a l a m p h o te ric in  B vs. 
lip id  based a m p h o te r ic in )  is an e rro r
select
W here m a n u fa c tu re rs ' in s tru c tio n s  fo r  p re p a ra tio n  o f a 
branded o r g e ne ric  p ro d u c t a re  id e n tica l, use o f e ith e r 
is accep tab le  ( i.e . n o t an e rro r) .
select
Fa ilu re  to  use a 19 gauge  (g re e n  in the  UK) needle o r 
na rro w e r, o r  a f i l te r  n e e d le /s tra w , to  p reven t 
p a rticu la te  c o n ta m in a tio n  w hen  d raw ing  m ed ica tion  
fro m  a g lass a m pou le  is an e rro r.
disagree Undecided,
Agree,
Strongly
agree.
select
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Figure 3,12 Round three survey continued...
For each statement, please rank whether you think the scenario is an error.
Scenario:
Your
previous
reply
Grp reDlv: 
25%, 
median,
75%.
Your
revised
opinion
P reparing fo r  an in d iv id u a l p a tie n t, an iv m ed ica tion  
th a t is n o t p rescribed  (exc ludes  flu shes .)
error Error,
Error,
Error.
select
D ev ia tion  fro m  th e  m a n u fa c tu re r a n d /o r  h osp ita l's  
in s tru c tio n s  on th e  cho ice , o r vo lu m e , o f a d ilu e n t, 
so lve n t o r  in fus ion  flu id , w ith o u t docum ented  p a tie n t-  
spec ific  in s tru c tio n s .
error Error,
Error,
Error.
select
A dd ing  an iv m ed ic ine  to  a s y r in g e /in fu s io n  a lready  
co n ta in in g  an iv  m ed ic ine  w he re  th e re  is no t 
docum en te d  c o m p a tib ility .
select
Add ing  an iv  m ed ic ine  to  a blood p ro d u c t o r 
com pounded  (re a d y  to  a d m in is te r)  pa ren te ra l n u tr it io n  
w here  th e re  is no t lo ca lly  docum en ted  acce p ta b ility .
select
Using a p re v io u s ly  opened iv  m u ltidose  con ta ine r, 
w he re  th e  da te  o f f ir s t  use is n o t docum en ted .
error Error,
Error,
Error.
select
Using a s ing le  use iv  in g re d ie n t w hose ta m p e r-e v id e n t 
seal has been b roken  (e .g . an iv  in fus ion  p rev ious ly  
rem oved  fro m  th e  o u te r  w ra p p e r.)
undecided Error,
Error,
Error.
select
Using an iv  in g re d ie n t th a t  has no t been sto red  
accord ing  to  in s tru c tio n s , w ith o u t ve r ify in g  its  
s u ita b ility  w ith  pha rm acy  be fo re  p repa ra tio n  (e .g . using 
a p ro d u c t need ing  re fr ig e ra tio n  th a t was le ft a t room  
te m p e ra tu re  o v e rn ig h t.)
error Error,
Error,
Error.
select
F ilte ring  a p ro d u c t w hose s ta b ility  m ay be adve rse ly  
a ffec ted  by th is  process (e .g . us ing a 0 .2 2 m ic ro n  f i l te r  
w ith  a lip id .)
select
D ecan ting  iv  m ed ica tion  in to  a s te r ile  co n ta in e r to  a id 
d ra w in g  up in c lin ica l areas.
select
Not chang ing  th e  f i l te r  need le  be fo re  add ing  to  a 
sy rin g e  o r  in fu s io n , hav ing  d raw n  up m ed ica tion  
th ro u g h  a f i l te r  need le  to  p re v e n t co n ta m in a tio n  o f th e  
p ro d u c t is an e rro r.
error Error,
Error,
Error.
select
If there are any other comments you wish to make I would be pleased to receive them
Thank you for your assistance, it is greatly appreciated. Now please review the document and 
check that you have answered all the questions. For each question the ‘select’ comment on the drop 
down menu should now contain your reply. If it still reads ‘select’, then re-enter your reply. Then 
SAVE the document under a different file name to save your responses and e-mail the newly saved 
file to crowlevcv@cardiff.ac.uk by M onday 2nd February 2004.
Alternatively, send the completed form to: Clare Crowley, Welsh School of Pharmacy, Cardiff 
University, Redwood Building, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3XF, UK.
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Figure 3.13 Schematic representation of sample from the Delphi round three 
consensus (n=49 study replies, n=4 exclusions).
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3.6.3.2 Demographics
Details o f the respondents’ background are detailed in table 3.10. The majority of 
respondents (81%) were from the UK. The profession most sampled were pharmacists 
(79%).
Table 3,10 Analysis of all replies received by individual respondent (n=53 subjects)
Doctor Pharmacist Pharmacy technician Nurse Total
UK Replied 1 32 1 6 40
Declined 0 0 0 0 0
No reply 0 3 0 0 3
International Replied 2 7 0 1 10
Declined 0 0 0 0 0
No reply 0 0 0 0 0
Total 3 42 1 7 53
Forty-none replies (98%) were suitable for analysis including two received after the study 
deadline. One pharmacist had agreed to reply, but this was not received by the deadline. 
The distribution of this is shown in table 3.11.
Table 3.11 Details o f the study replies received (n=50 replies)
Types of reply Doctor Pharmacist Pharmacy
Technician
Nurse Total % of total 
replies
Suitable for analysis 3 38 1 7 49 98
Promised but not 
received
0 1 0 0 1 2
Total replies 3 39 1 7 50 100
3.6.3.3 Quantitative results to questions posed
In this round, twenty five questions were posed. One question was combined (18a,b &19), 
two new subject areas were added to those already considered in round two, and ‘wrong 
medication brand’ was split into two subject areas, increasing the overall study total to 51 
subject areas.
Consensus was reached on 17 statements (68%), equivocal findings regarding six 
statements (24%) and no consensus on two statements (8%).
3.6.3.3.1 Consensus achieved
Consensus was reached on the definitions of IV medicines assembly, preparation and an 
error. It was agreed that parenteral nutrition should not be prepared in clinical areas, but 
that it was acceptable to manipulate multi-compartment formulations within a sealed
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system. Both statements on aseptic technique were agreed, including the more stringent 
version where breach of no touch technique was an error. Statements where consensus was 
not achieved are shown in table 3.12.
Table 3,12 Statements where consensus was reached, Delphi round three (n=49 replies).
Adapted 
from 2nd 
round 
quest" 
no.
Question topic Likert
scale
length
Valid 
response 
rate and 
attitude 
scale groups
Group 
distributio 
n 25%, 
median, 
75%
No. of 
missing 
data 
values
Chi squared value
X? P
la IV medication assembly 
definition
5 93.5% A/SA A,A,SA 3 59.2 <0.0005
lb IV medication preparation 
definition
5 97.8% A/SA A,A,SA 2 22.6** <0.0005
2a IV medication assembly 
or preparation error 
definition
5 95.8% A/SA A,A,SA 2 51.6* <0.0005
7a Parenteral nutrition 
should not be prepared in 
clinical areas
3 95.7% A A,A,A 3 38.3* <0.0005
8a Unprescribed medicines 3 100% Error n/a 3 # #
8c Diluent, solvent or 
infusion fluid error
3 93.3% Error n/a 4 33.8* <0.0005
8d Where imperative a 
named brand is used, 
deviation is an error
3 91.1% A A,A,A 4 67.7 <0.0005
9 Incorrect labelling 3 100% A A,A,A 2 # #
10 Incorrect medicines 
formulation
3 100% A A,A,A 2 # #
14c Addition to prepared 
parenteral nutrition or 
blood products
3 93.5% Error n/a 3 74.9 <0.0005
14h Dose withdrawn via a 
filter needle which is not 
changed before addition
3 97.8% Error n/a 4 41.1* <0.0005
15b Using multidose container 
where no date of opening 
is recorded
3 97.8% Error n/a 3 42.1* <0.0005
15d Faulty storage 3 95.6% Error n/a 4 37.4* <0.0005
15e Using of single use 
container where tamper 
evident seal is broken
3 95.6% Error n/a 4 37.3* <0.0005
16 Gross disregard for 
aseptic technique
5 97.9% A/SA A,SA,SA 2 21.1** <0.0005
21 Breach of no-touch 
technique
5 95.6% A/SA A,A,SA 3 18.6** <0.0005
new Filtering where this may 
adversely affect stability
3 100% Error n/a 3 # #
Abbreviations used: A=agree, SA=strongly agree, n/a=not applicable, no.=number.
# Chi-squared test not suitable as all observed data in one attitude category
* Chi-squared test excludes one variable as no datum was observed in a one o f the attitude categories; **two 
variables excluded as no data observed in two categories.
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3.6.3.3.2 Equivocal findings
There were two statements that fell on the boundary for inclusion in this equivocal 
category, question 8d and 24 (shown in italics in table 3.13). In question 8d most 
respondents considered interchange of generic and branded IV medicines acceptable. This 
was demonstrated by 89.1% of respondents who chose ‘agree’ and that all replies within 
the interquartile range were within the agree category. Therefore, with clear evidence that 
the majority o f participants agreed with this statement, this was construed as consensus 
achieved.
By contrast, in question 24 the replies are more widely dispersed across the strongly agree 
and agree categories with 80.9% of respondents in agreement. When this is combined with 
the smaller sample size retained to the third round this fall on the boundary between no 
consensuses and equivocal. Therefore, this category was reassigned to the no consensus 
group.
Table 3.13 Statements where it was uncertain whether consensus was reached, Delphi 
round three (n=49 replies). _______________ __________________ ______________
Adapted
from
2nd
round
question
no.
Question topic
Likert
scale
length
Valid
response
rate and
attitude
scale
groups
Group
distribution:
25%,
median,
75%
No. of  
missing 
data 
values
Chi squared value
X2 P
3 Clinically relevant 
medication errors are 
potential ADEs
5 86.4%
A/SA
A,A,SA 5 35.6* <0.0005
8d Where acceptable, 
interchange o f  generic or  
branded medicine is 
acceptable
3 89.1%  A A,A,A 3 64.5 <0.0005
14b Additions where 
compatibility are not 
documented
3 87.0%
Error
n/a 3 25.1* <0.0005
18a&b,
19
Failure to clean hands 
before preparation, or 
wear gloves
5 87.2%
A/SA
A,A,SA 2 29.7* <0.0005
20a Failure to swab an 
additive port or vial 
septum
5 87.0%
A/SA
A,A,SA 3 28.1* <0.0005
24 Withdrawal from  glass  
ampoules must be via a 
f ilte r  needle, or 19-gauge 
or narrower needle
5 80.9%
A/SA
A,A,A 2 33.8* <0.0005
Abbreviations used: A=agree, SA=strongly agree, n/a=not app icable, no.=number.
* Chi-squared test excludes one variable as no datum was observed in a one of the attitude categories.
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3.6.3.3.3 Consensus not reached
Consensus was not achieved in two areas. One was decanting of medicine into a sterile 
cup, also known as ‘open bowl technique*. The other area was whether it is acceptable to 
exclude unmeasurable issues during observational audit. These are shown in table 3.14.
Table 3.14 Statements where consensus was not reached, Delphi round three (n=49 
replies). __________________ ______ __________ __________________ ______________
Adapted
from
2nd
round
question
no.
Question topic Likert
scale
length
Valid 
response 
rate and 
attitude 
scale groups
Group
distribution:
25%,
median,
75%
Number
of
missing
data
values
Chi squared 
value
*2 P
4 Excluding 
unmeasurables is an 
acceptable study 
limitation
5 78.7% D/U D,D,U 2 33.6* <0.0005
new Decanting into a sterile 
cup
3 66.7% Error n/a 4 25.2 <0.0005
Abbreviations used: D=disagree, U=undecided, n/a=not applicable, no.=number 
* Chi-squared test excludes one variable as no datum was observed in a one of the attitude categories
3.6.4 Discussion
3.6.4.1 Response rate
A good response rate was obtained for this round (n=50), with 92% (n=49) suitable for 
study inclusion. As with the first and second round of this study, participants were 
predominantly UK based (80%, n=40), with a majority o f pharmacists from both the UK 
64% (n=32) and internationally 14% (n=7). However, the proportion of international 
replies had increased to 20% (n=10). This may have been because purposive sampling had 
identified those with a specialist interest in patient safety, particularly international 
respondents.
3.6.4.2 Study limitations
Questions to test for alternate form reliability would ideally have been included. This was 
not possible because if the survey had been longer response rate may have been 
jeopardised. Some idea of test-retest reliability would become apparent from comparing 
the results from round two and three had it proved possible to include identically worded 
scenarios in both rounds. However, to minimise attrition and panel fatigue this was not 
undertaken. Although not formally assessed, reliability is suggested by the number of 
respondents with similar replies and convergence towards agreement in round three, where 
statements were succinctly clarified.
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The main problem with survey administration and analysis was poor remote access to 
Cardiff University computing services. There were server problems with their so that it 
was not possible to communicate at all. It also took at least five minutes to download each 
respondent’s reply using remote access. These problems had not previously been 
experienced as the researcher had used a local NHS account that was no longer available.
3.6.5 Conclusions
The result o f round three was an agreed definition of an IVMPE and list of inclusion 
criteria, criteria to be excluded and some uncertainties when considering an IVMPE were 
also achieved.
3.7 Results of Delphi study -  rounds one to three
The recruitment and responses to all stages in this study are summarised in flowchart 
figure 3.14. From a total potential sample of 102 subjects, 49 (48%) remained to submit 
analysable replies in the final round.
Replies to questions posed
Overall 51 questions were included, three o f which contained subsections on similar 
themes (questions 13, 18 and 20). Results were reported based on these subject areas.
Consensus was reached in 34 areas (66.7%), with equivocal findings for five areas and a 
sixth sub issue, septum swabbing (10.8%). Statements which should not be included in the 
error definition consisted of 11 areas (one composed of questions 18 & 19) and a 
subsection of a twelfth area: failure to let the alcohol dry after swabbing.
3.7.1 Consensus issues
Definitions for IV medicines assembly, preparation, and errors have been agreed. The 
scope of the definition and a range of scenarios that should be considered errors for use 
when operationalising the definition have also been agreed. These are shown in table 3.15.
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Delphi Round 2 -  Delphi Round 3 -
Q u a lita tiv e  s tage Initial Quantitative stage Final Quantitative stage
Retired
n=1
Declined
n=1
Replied
n=62
No valid study 
response 
received n=13
Reply suitable 
for analysis 
n=53
Reply suitable 
for analysis 
n=49
No valid study 
response 
received n=4
No valid response 
received 
n=25
Subjects 
entered into 
next round 
n=68
Subjects 
contacted by 
snowballing 
n=48
Subjects 
entered into 
next round 
n=53
Expert
subjects
contacted
n=54
Declined to 
participate in the 
study 
n=8
Change in 
eligibility 
status, subject 
removed from 
study 
n=1
Declined to 
participate in this 
round, but agreed 
to inclusion in next 
round 
n=3
No valid response 
received, yet had 
expressed an 
interest in the 
study and agreed 
to inclusion in next 
round 
n=4
Figure 3.14 Schem atic overview  o f the Delphi study on an intention to recru it basis (102 subjects entered study, n=49 com pleting 
all rounds, n=53 exclusions).
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Table 3.15 Statements where consensus was achieved overall.
Adopted 
from 2nd 
round 
question
Question topic
Likert
scale
length
Valid
response rate 
and attitude 
scale groups
Group
distribution:
25%,
median,
75%.
la IV medication assembly definition -r3 5 93.5% A/SA A,A,SA
lb IV medication preparation definition -r3 5 97.8% A/SA A,A,SA
2a IV medication assembly or preparation error defmition- 
r3
5 95.8% A/SA A,A,SA
5 Patient Group Directions should be included 5 90.6% A/SA A,SA,SA
7b Chemotherapy must never occur in general areas 3 92.3% A A,A,A
7a Parenteral nutrition should not be prepared in clinical 
areas
3 95.7% A A,A,A
8a Unprescribed medicines 3 100% Error n/a
8b Wrong route error 3 96.2% Error n/a
8c Diluent, solvent or infusion fluid error 3 93.3% Error n/a
New Filtering where this may adversely affect stability 3 100% Error n/a
14c Addition to prepared parenteral nutrition or blood 
products
3 93.5% Error n/a
14h Dose withdrawn via a filter needle which is not 
changed before addition
3 97.8% Error n/a
15b Using multidose container where no date of opening is 
recorded
3 97.8% Error n/a
15d Faulty storage 3 95.6% Error n/a
15e Using of single use container where tamper evident 
seal is broken
3 95.6% Error n/a
14a Known addition incompatibility 3 96.2% Error n/a
14d Incompatible container 3 96.2% Error n/a
14g Failure to comply with directions to filter 3 100% Error n/a
14i Inappropriate addition method 3 94.3% Error n/a
14j Calculation mistake 3 94.3% Error n/a
15a Using expired ingredients 3 96.2% Error n/a
15c Use o f degraded ingredients 3 100% Error n/a
15f Latex exposure in latex allergic patient 3 96.2% Error n/a
16 Gross disregard for aseptic technique 5 97.9% A/SA A,SA,SA
21 Breach of no-touch technique 5 95.6% A/SA A,A,SA
8d Where imperative a named brand is used, deviation is 
an error
3 91.1% A A,A,A
8d Where acceptable, interchange of generic or branded 
medicine is acceptable
3 89.1% A A,A,A
9 Incorrect labelling 3 100% A A,A,A
10 Incorrect medicines formulation 3 100% A A,A,A
11 Wrong dose or infusion concentration 3 92.5% A A,A,A
12 Faulty reconstitution or mixing 3 96.2% A A,A,A
17 Using a single use container more than once 5 94.1% A/SA A,A,SA
23 Pouring into an unsterile cup 5 94.2% A/SA SA,SA, SA
25 Lack of appropriate infection control follow-up 5 90.2% A/SA A,SA,SA
(Abbreviations used: SD=strongly disagree, D=disagree, U=undecided, A=agree, SA=strongly agree, n/a=not 
applicable, no.=number)
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3.7.2 Issues where consensus was equivocal
Within the error framework there were areas where there was uncertainty that the 
situations should be labelled errors. These scenarios are described in table 3.16. When 
auditing these scenarios could either be discarded, or reported separately.
Table 3,16 Overall statements where it was uncertain whether consensus was reached.
Adopted 
from 2nd 
round 
question
Question topic Likert
scale
length
Valid 
response 
rate and 
attitude 
scale groups
Group
distribution:
25%,
75%.
3 Clinically relevant medication errors are potential ADEs 5 86.4% A/SA A,A,SA
14b Additions where compatibility are not documented 3 87.0% Error n/a
18a&b,
19
Failure to clean hands before preparation, or wear gloves 5 87.2% A/SA A,A,SA
20a Failure to swab an additive port or vial septum 5 87.0% A/SA A,A,SA
6 Practice deviations should not be errors 5 81.1% SD/D SD,D,D
16 Deviations from appropriate aseptic technique is an error 5 86.6% A/SA A,A,SA
Abbreviations used: SD=strongly disagree, D=disagree, U=undecided, A=agree, SA=strongly agree, n/a=not 
applicable, no.=number
Analysis of pharmacy staff replies compared with all other staff groups showed that 
pharmacy staff were more concerned with sterility, aseptic and poor practice issues. This is 
described in table 3.17.
Table 3,17 Analysis of responses by profession: pharmacy staff (n=43) vs. non-pharmacy 
staff (n=10 respondents)__________________________________ ______________ _______
Delphi
round
Question
no.
Question topic Mann-Whitney 
U value
P‘
2 7d Definition should exclude measures to protect the 
operator
118.0 0.021
2 12 Faulty reconstitution or mixing 172.0 0.003
2 14a Known addition incompatibility 172.0 0.003
2 14h Dose withdrawn via a filter needle which is not 
changed before addition
125.5 0.009
2 14i Inappropriate addition method 150.5 <0.0005
2 15b Using multidose container where no date of opening 
is recorded
133.0 0.003
2 15e Use of single use medicines despite no intact tamper 
evident seal
137.0 0.019
2 20a Failure to swab a vial’s septum 125.0 0.036
2 20b Failure to let any alcohol dry after swabbing the 
septum
117.5 0.034
2 22 Leaving the cleaned area during preparation 125.0 0.037
a Asymptotic significance (2-tailed values)
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3.7.3 Issues to exclude
A range of statements that should not be considered errors are shown in table 3.18. These 
areas were either where there was little agreement, or areas withdrawn after round two 
showed that consensus was unlikely to be achieved.
Table 3.18 Overall statements where consensus was not reached.
Adopted 
from 2nd 
round 
question
Question topic Likert
scale
length
Valid response 
rate and 
attitude scale 
groups
Group 
distribution: 
25%,median, 
75%.
4 Excluding unmeasurables is an acceptable study 
limitation
5 78.7% D/U D,D,U
24 Withdrawal from glass vials must be via a filter 
needle, or 19-gauge or narrower needle
5 80.9% A/SA A,A,A
New Decanting into a sterile cup 3 66.7% Error n/a
7c Filling o f rate controlled devices does not occur in 
clinical areas
3 54.7% A U,A,A
7d Definition should exclude measures to protect the 
operator
3 46.2% D D,U,A
8e Failure to use the recommended preparation area 3 51.9% Error n/a
13a Acceptable to prepare in advance 3 51.9% D D,D,A
13b Acceptable to prepare in advance where it is 
paramount medication delivery is uninterrupted
3 60.4% A U,A,A
20b Failure to let any alcohol dry after swabbing 5 70.0% A/SA U,A,SA
22 Leaving the cleaned area during preparation 5 67.3% D/U D,U,A
14e Preparing multiple doses o f the same medicine for 
multiple patients
3 37.3% U n/a
14f Preparing multiple doses for multiple patients at the 
same time
3 42.3% Error n/a
3.8 Overall discussion
3.8.1 Response rate
The overall response rate o f 48% (n=49) was acceptable, but would ideally this would be 
higher. Possible explanations for this were panel fatigue and attrition because this was a 
multiple round study. International respondents were more likely to complete the study 
(10/18 respondents) than those recruited from the UK (40/84 respondents). This could be 
because international subjects were identified by publications in patient safety, so were 
likely to be highly motivated, in contrast to UK nominations included those nominated by 
UK ‘experts* who may be less patient safety focused.
Participants were not contacted in advance of the study to request inclusion, which may 
also result in a lower response rate [Oppenheim, 1992]. If response rate were calculated 
based on positive participants replies this would be greater at 79% (n=62). This is 
consistent with reported response rates from similar Delphi studies. Dean and colleagues
133
Chapter 3: An investigation into what constitutes an intravenous medication preparation error
[2000] approached 43 potential respondents before a two round Delphi to request 
participation in their postal study, and from the 34 that agreed to participate received 
replies to both rounds from 26, equivalent to a 60% response rate. In a similar study, 
Ghaleb and co-workers [2005] approached 60 potential subjects, 50 o f whom agreed to 
participate in their two round Delphi, with 40 completing both rounds, equivalent to a 67% 
response rate. The response rate achieved in the study was sufficient to be confident in the 
validity of the study findings. However, it is not known whether non responders had 
different views from study participants, this remains a potential source o f bias.
3.8.2 Study limitations
The purposive sampling technique is not random or representative, therefore the findings 
of the study are not automatically generalisable, or possess external validity. The Delphi 
technique intentionally samples those with expertise and experience in the study area 
[Hasson et al., 2000]. Sample selection is important to ensure that all fields of expertise are 
included; one method of ensuring this is a large sample size. The sample approached for 
inclusion in this study was larger than other safety focused Delphi studies [Dean et al, 
2000; Avery et al., 2005; Ghaleb et a l, 2005]. In contrast with previous studies, 
participants were also recruited from outside the UK. The large sample size approached for 
inclusion in this study was chosen to ensure that sufficient participants were recruited for 
the study to be valid.
Snowball sampling was used as there was no easy method of ensuring all relevant 
participants had been identified. This helps to minimise selection bias within the sample 
and has been previously been used in Delphi studies [Mead & Moseley, 2001]. However 
one disadvantage of this recruitment method is that a profession can become over­
represented. As the majority of participants were pharmacists, they were more likely to be 
over represented. It was anticipated that there would be a large proportion of pharmacists 
as different pharmacists contributed to academic, clinical, aseptic and safety expertise. 
However it was anticipated that the snowball technique would have identified other 
pharmacy technicians, nurses, doctors, practice development and infection control staff. 
This method succeeded in gathering only a few nominations from clinical practitioners. 
This resulted in limited comments from clinical staff currently preparing IV medicines as 
part of their job. The inclusion of nurses, midwives and doctors would have added an extra 
dimension to this study.
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One criticism, often cited of previous Delphi studies, is that the methods are not described 
in sufficient detail to permit replication. This does not apply to the study, which could be 
replicated. Studies using a Delphi process to establish consensus on prescribing error do 
not adequately describe how their sample was selected and contacted to allow replication 
[Dean et a l, 2000; Ghaleb at el., 2005]
Electronic communications have been used in qualitative and Delphi studies [Beretta, 
1996; Alexander, 2000; Avery et a l, 2005]. A number of issues specific to this method of 
communication were experienced e.g. advice from an expert in information technology 
would have prevented some of these, and would be advisable for similar future studies.
Some of the known disadvantages of using a self completion questionnaire were apparent 
in this study. These included the inability to probe or clarify issues, lower response rate 
compared to a researcher administered questionnaire and missing data not remedied by 
researcher prompting [Bryman, 2004]. In addition, although respondents were asked to 
complete Delphi round two and three themselves and not discuss their views with others, 
this could have occurred [Beretta, 1996; Bryman, 2004].
Limited piloting prior to round two may have prevented the detection of ambiguous or 
unclear issues. The majority of the pilot sample were identical to those that commented on 
the pilot for round one. Time constraints limited the inclusion of all those used in round 
one. However, on balance it was decided that it was more important to issue the survey to 
the study participants before the summer vacation, especially as the piloters who provide 
detailed feedback in round one were all included. The time between rounds should be as 
short as possible to prevent panel members losing interest [Mead & Moseley, 2001]. There 
were months between rounds in this study, this may have reduced response rate to the 
subsequent round.
Consensus was achieved following three successive rounds with a panel o f experts which 
provided high face, content and concurrent validity [Beretta, 1996].
Reliability of the study findings are usually considered to be the consistency or 
dependability with which the instrument measures the attribute it was designed to measure 
[Beretta, 1996]. As there is no evidence of the reliability o f Delphi studies, alternative
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criteria have been suggested to ensure credible interpretation of findings. These are 
credibility, applicability (or fittingness), auditability (or consistency) and confirmability 
[Hasson et al., 2000]. Credibility was achieved and demonstrated by the consensus process 
using the panel’s expertise. The other parameters would be confirmed when the IVMPE 
and framework was used (chapter 4) and definitions explored with nursing staff (chapter 
5). These additional steps are needed to validate the findings.
3.8.3 Error definition and framework
The initial definition proposed of an intravenous medication assembly or preparation error
in the clinical setting was
"a situation or act by a healthcare professional in the preparation o f  an 
intravenous medication dose that deviates from a written, verbal or computer generated 
prescription fo r  an individual patient, or contravenes hospital protocol, professional or 
regulatory guidance. ”
This was refined and agreed as
“The preparation o f  IV  medication that deviates from the prescription, 
manufacturer '$ guidance, nationally or locally agreed policy, procedure or guidance or 
generic standards fo r  clean or aseptic preparation. ”
It is interesting that respondents rejected the initial definitions provided in round one and 
two as these were similar to those previously employed in published studies [Taxis & 
Barber, 2003a; Wirtz et al., 2003]. The main differences between the definition produced 
in this study and previously used definitions were the inclusion of aseptic technique issues 
and deviations from policies or procedures as errors. Previously, there has been uncertainty 
as to whether aseptic issues should be included within an error definition. Most researchers 
have overcome this by collecting and reporting such data separately from the error rate. 
[Mansfield, 2001; Wirtz et al., 2003; Cousins et a l, 2005]. In contrast, two studies 
evaluating prescribing error scenarios found that most scenarios not considered to be errors 
were deviations from policies and guidelines [Dean et a l, 2000; Ghaleb et al., 2005]. A 
possible explanation could be that there is limited guidance available on IV preparation, so 
that where it does exist it should be adherence to this. The NPSA commenced wide 
stakeholder consultation in January 2006 on a draft patient safety alert ‘safer use of 
injectable medicines in near-patient areas’ [2006]. The outcome of this consultation will be 
very interesting as it requires up to date written protocols and procedures on the 
prescribing, preparation and administration of injectable medicines and essential 
information for this to be available at the point of use. Therefore, this describes minimum
136
Chapter 3: An investigation into what constitutes an intravenous medication preparation error
national standards for organisations which can be evaluated by audit. It also provides safer 
practice standards, which are standard operating procedures. These could be adopted as 
minimum national practice standards and could be used to identify sub-optimal practice. 
Many of the equivocal statements are likely to be included in this alert, and it would 
benefit from review after this alert has been published.
All the error categories related solely to preparation and used in previous studies (table 2.2) 
were considered to be errors by this panel. Most of the scenarios that respondents felt 
should not be classed as error related to poor practice.
Previous Delphi studies evaluating prescribing error scenarios have finished with groups of 
scenarios that are errors, those that are not and included 'situations that may be considered 
prescribing error, depending on the individual clinical situation’ [Dean et al., 2000; Ghaleb 
et al., 2005]. This strategy was not adopted to minimise variability when the definition was 
used. Instead scenarios that remained in the equivocal category at the end of the study were 
left as equivocal issues. Data on these issues could be collected as the researcher's 
discretion, but should be reported separately from the error rate.
3.9 Overall conclusions
Agreement on what constitutes an IV medication assembly or preparation error in hospital 
clinical practice and a framework of error scenarios was obtained. This framework 
consisted of three categories of scenario: those that were considered an error, those that 
should be excluded and those where no consensus was reached. This definition and 
framework can now be used for observational audit for the quantification of IVMPE. 
Adoption of the IVMPE definition and framework would reduce variability in what is 
considered to be an IVMPE. Observation studies devoted to the preparation stage would 
collect data on potential IVMPE. Actual IVMPE can only detectable by observing both 
preparation and administration. The definition developed now requires practical 
evaluation.
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Chapter 4
A pilot audit of a consensus-derived framework for intravenous medication assembly 
and preparation errors in hospital clinical areas
4.1 Background to study
Audit has been used to assess compliance with medicines management standards for 
aseptic dispensing in unlicensed facilities as a quality assurance and control measure 
[Farwell, 1995; NHSE, 1999b]. Therefore, it is logical also to use audit to assess 
compliance with unlicensed dispensing in clinical areas. This has not previously been 
possible because there have been no standards against which to audit.
A practical, explicit definition and framework for hospital intravenous medicines assembly
and preparation errors in clinical areas was agreed by international experts from medicine,
nursing and pharmacy, [see chapter 3] where an error was defined as:
“The preparation o f  an IV  medication that deviates from the prescription, 
manufacturer’s guidance, national or locally agreed policy, procedure or guidance, or 
generic standards fo r  clean or aseptic preparation. ”
This pilot study will use this definition and framework as audit standards to develop an 
observational audit tool to evaluate when IV medicine preparation errors occur. The 
adoption of such an audit tool in practice would allow meaningful comparison of findings 
between and across study settings [Crowley et al., 2004a,b].
4.2 Aims
The aim of this pilot study was to determine whether the data collection tool developed 
could feasibly be used to record the number and type of IV medication assembly and 
preparation errors in hospital clinical settings.
Objectives.
■ To establish the training required to ensure observers have the necessary skills and 
experience for data collection.
■ To assess the feasibility of using an observer recorded data collection form in 
clinical areas.
■ To determine if the data collected shows whether an error has occurred.
■ To suggest how error categories can be amalgamated for compatibility with the 
NPSA medication data set of the NLRS.
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■ To highlight areas that would benefit from refinement before a large-scale study 
could be undertaken, or a generic training package developed.
■ To determine what is required to develop a full training pack to allow the Trust and 
other centres to use the audit tool.
4.3 Study methodology
4.3.1 Research strategy
Direct observation is the ‘gold standard* for detecting administration errors, and was 
employed in this study [Allan & Barker, 1990; Flynn et al., 2002]. The framework 
established in chapter 2 was intended to guide data collection o f directly observed 
practitioners preparing IV medicines. Observational research is a valuable tool that enables 
researchers to document actual events, rather than relying on reports that may not 
accurately represent what happened [Smith, 2002]. The audit tool was designed to enable 
quantification of IVMPE and poor practice. Quantitative observational study has been 
defined as
“The researcher observes and records activities and/or interactions to provide 
numeric frequencies o f  these different activities, often possibly with the intention o f  
investigating relationships between them and/or generalising the findings to a wider 
population ” [Smith, 2002;p.l61].
The IVMPE framework was developed as an audit tool, where it was envisaged that the 
data collector would not participate in IV preparation or administration. This has been 
defined as
“Non participant observation studies are those in which the researcher records 
activities and behaviours o f those under study in the capacity o f  an outside observer” 
[Smith, 2002;p.l62].
Observational research studies have previously been used in a variety of health care 
settings, including critical care, theatres and medication administration [Carthey, 2003].
Advantages
The advantages of using quantitative non participant observation are summarised below:
■ Enables capture of events as they happen.
■ More reliable and valid than self reports.
■ Greater precision on timing and duration of events.
■ Greater accuracy in time ordering of variables.
139
Chapter 4: A pilot audit o f IV medication assembly and preparation error framework
■ Some healthcare settings and tasks are better suited to this method e.g. theatres,
dispensing, medicines administration.
■ Not reliant on written reports that may be biased from intentional misinterpretation or 
misconceptions.
■ Independent o f willingness to report incidents.
■ Does not depend on existence of complete and accurate documents.
■ Not reliant on memory.
■ Enables detection of errors, where staff may be unaware.
■ High response rate with single observer (above 80%).
■ Researcher has control over completeness and quality of data captured.
■ Useful as a sole research method, and also in combination with another data
collection method as this improves reliability and validity e.g. video recording 
[Barker et al., 2002b; Bowling, 2002; Pope et al, 2002; Smith, 2002; Carthey, 2003; 
Bryman, 2004]
Disadvantages
There are a number of disadvantages to observational techniques that can affect the 
validity of the study. These require careful consideration to minimise bias, and are 
summarised below:
■ Labour intensive technique.
■ Expensive as often requires trained healthcare professionals.
■ Fatigue, need to maintain attention for long periods. In long data collection periods 
or studies more than one observer is needed.
■ Observers need careful training, rehearsal and competency assessment both in 
observation and the study topic.
■ Transferring skills and knowledge from the expert to novice observer can be 
difficult.
■ Must remain unobtrusive when data collecting.
■ Quality of the data collected is highly dependant on the observer.
■ Need to adapt readily to different settings and conditions.
■ Need accuracy of perception of detail.
■ Observer must be situated where they can observe all necessary data.
■ Participants may be less inclined to participate, or may modify their behaviour if the 
research topic is sensitive.
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■ Lower response rates are achieved where the observer’s presence is unsettling or 
disrupts activities.
■ Observer’s personal and interpersonal attributes are also important e.g. maintaining 
a fair-blame culture.
■ If more than one observer is used, inter-rater reliability should be undertaken to 
check for consistency.
■ Bias introduced by the research process or observer’s presence [Allen & Barker, 
1990; Dean & Barber, 2001; Bowling, 2002; Smith, 2002; Carthey, 2003; Bryman, 
2004].
The main issues with observation are effects created by the observer’s presence and by the 
research process and are known as reactive effects or the ‘Hawthorne effect’ [Bowling, 
2002; Smith, 2002].
The Hawthorne effect describes the situation where
“The presence o f  the researcher, and the knowledge that the study is taking place, 
may influence the behaviours o f the individuals being observed” [Smith, 2002;p.l68].
This may affect the validity of the study. Measures to minimise this include:
■ Spending time with staff in the study area before data collection starts.
■ Providing assurances regarding:
■ Confidentiality of results,
■ Anonymity of data (where relevant),
■ Importance of continuing with usual behaviour.
■ Emphasising the breadth of data collection to minimise where behaviour could be 
modified.
■ Discarding initial observations, as the observer’s effect reduces with time [Bowling, 
2002; Smith, 2002].
Except for the last recommendation, all of the above measures were employed in this 
study.
Observer bias has been defined as
“A systematic difference between a true situation and that observed owing to variation in 
perceptions (i.e. interpretation)” [Bowling, 2002;p.362].
This is minimised by careful observer training, with attention to recording what actually 
happened, not what was perceived and inferred [Bowling, 2002].
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As discussed previously IVMPE are readily detected by direct observation, so other less 
intrusive research methods were unsuitable. The observers were trained both in non­
participant observation and no-touch aseptic techniques. This provided them with a clear 
understanding of what they needed to observe, the data they needed to collect and how to 
minimise the impact of their presence on the study participant. It was envisaged that any 
inconvenience created through observation would be minimal, but could not be excluded.
In observational research a delicate balance is required between providing potential 
participants with sufficient study information to allow an informed decision to participate, 
yet avoiding introducing bias by a change in behaviour [Smith, 2002]. In previous 
observational studies o f medication administration errors, the study’s aims have been 
withheld to minimise bias and alternative rationale for observation provided [Dean et al, 
1995; Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Taxis & Barber, 2003a]. However, Armitage [2005] argues 
against this approach, suggesting that to comply with the Government’s strategies on 
research governance and an open, fair culture the methods should be transparent with 
participants fully consenting [Department of Health, 2001b, 2005]. In this pilot study an 
undisguised approach was chosen as the study was on a sensitive topic, and aimed to test 
the audit tool not the participant. In addition the study could not easily and credibly be 
explained in any other way. A potential limitation of disguised observational methods is 
that knowledge of the intended prescription places the observer in a difficult ethical 
position; if an error occurs they have an ethical duty to intervene [Dean & Barber, 2001]. 
Pre-registration pharmacy graduates were used as observers as they would have sufficient 
knowledge and skills to enable them to be trained in observation and aseptic techniques. 
To further minimise bias; prescription details were recorded from the patients medication 
chart after the dose had been prepared.
Research participants might feel uncomfortable being watched whilst undertaking routine 
duties. However, the study's objectives were undisguised, and research participants who 
felt uncomfortable were unlikely to consent to participate in this study.
The benefits of adopting consistent terminology have already been highlighted [chapter 2]. 
Therefore to allow data sharing and comparison the IVMPE framework derived [chapter 3] 
was mapped to the NPSA NLRS dataset [NPSA, 2003b], this is summarised in table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Summary o f IV medication preparation error codes and comparison with the 
NPSA NLRS in-process error descriptions dataset release 1.2.1._________ ______________
Error
category
Explanation and framework agreed NLRS code
Wrong route Preparing a medication dose for administration intravenously when 
it is prescribed by another route (i.e. wrong route).
Wrong route-P
Wrong
medicine
Where it is imperative a named brand is used, use of any other brand 
(e.g. conventional amphotericin B vs. lipid based amphotericin) is an 
error.
Where manufacturers’ instructions for preparation of a branded or 
generic product are identical, use of either is acceptable (i.e. not an 
error).
Wrong drug / 
medicine-K
Wrong dose Preparing a wrong dose product or wrong strength infusion. (Where 
products are made from whole vials e.g. amoxicillin 250mg from a 
250mg vial, no deviation from this dose would be allowed. Where a 
fraction of a dose unit is required, or any other measurement, any 
discrepancy greater than ±10% from the dose would be an error).
Wrong / unclear 
dose or strength-J
Wrong
medicine
formulation
Preparing an IV dose using the incorrect medicine formulation is an 
error, e.g. a depot formulation is given IV. (Where the product is 
unlicensed for IV use but is a documented accepted practice, this is 
acceptable).
Wrong
formulation-L
Diluent error Deviation from the manufacturer and/or hospital’s instructions on 
the choice, or volume, of a diluent, solvent or infusion fluid, without 
documented patient-specific instructions.
Wrong method 
of preparation-N
Wrong
addition
/mixing
Failing to fully reconstitute a product during preparation, or adhere 
to the mixing instructions. (This includes failure to dissolve the 
powder, failing to activate a minibag plus infusion device that has a 
vial of powder attached, or vigorously shaking a medication that 
foams e.g. teicoplanin).
Inappropriate addition to a syringe/infusion container (e.g. adding to 
a rigid or flexible bag hanging on an IV infusion stand, or not 
mixing thoroughly after addition).
Wrong method 
of preparation-N
Un-prescribed
error
Preparing for an individual patient, an IV medication that is not 
prescribed (excludes flushes).
Other-Z
Calculation
error
Any calculation mistake that produces a preparation (± 10% dose 
instructed) is an error.
Wrong/ unclear 
dose or strength-J
Incompatibi­
lity error
Adding a medicine to a syringe/infusion already containing a drug 
with which the medicine is incompatible.
Preparing a medication, in an incompatible container (e.g. insulin, 
glyceryl trinitrate).
Adding an IV medicine to a blood product or compounded (ready to 
administer) parenteral nutrition where there is not locally 
documented acceptability.
Wrong method 
of preparation-N
(Care: overlaps 
with equipment 
codes)
Faulty
labelling
Faulty labelling is an error. (Labels are required for all infusions. 
Labels for bolus doses are needed when more than one dose is 
prepared, or the prepared dose is put down or passed to another 
practitioner, or where administration is delayed).
Wrong / 
transposed / 
omitted medicine 
label-1
Allergy Preparing an IV medication for a latex-allergic patient without either 
avoiding latex exposure, or not following hospital guidelines, where 
available, on the care of latex-allergic patients.
Patient allergic 
to treatment-E
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Table 4.1 continued... Summary of IV medication preparation error codes and comparison 
with the NPSA NLRS in-process error descriptions dataset release 1.2.1 ______________
Error
category
Explanation and framework agreed NLRS code
Expired / 
degraded or 
unknown 
expiry
Preparing a medication using an expired ingredient.
Preparing a medication using degraded or unsuitable ingredient 
(includes cracked emulsions; solutions with unintended particles or 
discolouration; damaged containers).
Using a previously opened IV multidose container, where the date of 
first use is not documented.
Using a single use IV ingredient whose tamper-evident seal has been 
broken (e.g. an IV infusion previously removed from the outer 
wrapper).
Wrong / omitted 
/ passed expiry 
date-F
Wrong storage Using an IV ingredient that has not been stored according to 
instructions, without verifying its suitability with pharmacy before 
preparation (e.g. using a product needing refrigeration that was left 
at room temperature overnight).
Wrong storage-Q
Wrong
preparation
technique
Chemotherapy preparation must never occur in general clinical 
areas, without additional specialist facilities (e.g. isolator).
Re-using an intravenous medication that is licensed for single use on 
a subsequent occasion, or another patient, unless there is a written 
hospital policy authorising this, is an error (e.g. using an infusion 
bag to withdraw flushes for more than one patient).
Not filtering a product when the manufacturer’s instructions or 
hospital policy state the product must be filtered (e.g. epoprostenol).
Filtering a product whose stability may be adversely affected by this 
process (e.g. using a 0.22micron filter with a lipid).
Not changing the filter needle before adding to a syringe or infusion, 
having drawn up medication through a filter needle to prevent 
contamination of the product is an error.
Pouring the IV medication into unsterile cup to aid drawing up is an 
error.
Failing to take appropriate infection control precautions after an 
injury during preparation is an error (e.g. continuing preparation 
without changing the needle after a needle-stick injury).
Breach of ‘no touch’ technique, where the operator touches areas 
that might cause contamination such as the syringe tip or needle hub 
is an error.
Gross disregard for clean/aseptic technique during IV medication 
preparation is an error e.g. dropping an uncapped syringe and needle 
on the floor and continuing preparation without any corrective 
action.
Wrong method 
of preparation-N
4 .3 .2  S tu d y  settin g
Clinical areas were recruited from an acute teaching hospital N H S  Trust located on four 
sites, providing a wide range o f secondary and tertiary specialities with more than 1500 
inpatient beds [Anon., 2006b]. The pharmacy department was well integrated into patient
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care and worked closely as an integral part of the care team. This Trust supported a no­
blame culture, with learning from incidents and hazardous practices.
The study Trust had comprehensive written guidance on prescribing and drug 
administration procedures [ORH, 1998] and guidance was provided in the ‘Intravenous 
Drug Administration Guidelines' [ORH, 2002]. This A4 lever-arch file, available in all 
patient areas, contained an IV administration procedure, with individual monographs for 
each IV medicine used within the Trust. The information contained within the monograph 
was designed for use in conjunction with the medicine manufacturers* package insert, 
British National Formulary and Summary of Product Characteristics.
A comprehensive training programme was established for those registered nurses, 
midwives, operating department assistants/practitioners new to IV medicines 
administration. Separate training was provided in-house to radiography staff. Staff 
transferring from another healthcare setting into this Trust had to demonstrate competency 
in practice, before being permitted to administer IV medicines unsupervised. Doctors were 
not included in the in-house training programme, as this was considered to form part of 
their undergraduate curriculum [ORH.NOC, 2000].
Study design
Prior to the study, support was gained from the Pharmacy Department; Nursing 
Directorate; Trust Management and research approval was sought and granted. An 
application was made to the local research ethics committee [REC: 05/Q1606/22] but the 
committee decided this study was service development and therefore did not require ethical 
approval.
4.3.3 Data collection tool
A list o f the variables required to assess whether an error had occurred according to the 
IVMPE definition and framework agreed in Chapter Three was prepared. This minimum 
data set was used to develop a data collection tool for the structured observation and 
recording of IV medicines preparation. The design of the data collection form was based 
on one used in similar research [Hoppe-Tichy et al., 2002]. As this was to assess the 
suitability of the data collection form and not to assess the staff, personal information was 
not required; details of the staff observed and patient details were not recorded. A draft of 
the data collection tool [appendix 18] was pre-piloted by the researcher on a general
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medical and surgical ward with the staff and manager’s permission. Minor adjustments 
were made to the form to improve data recording before use on the study wards. The 
amended version is shown in figure 4.1. From the nurses interviewed [see chapter 5], it 
was estimated that on general wards each nurse did not prepare more than five doses 
during a 'typical' day shift. Based on previously reported error rates, it was envisaged that 
observing 20 IV medicines doses in area would be sufficient. A 13% hospital IVMPE had 
previously been reported [Taxis & Barber 2003a]. Therefore a sample of 20 doses from 
five clinical areas (100 doses) was considered a large enough pilot sample.
4.3.4 Sample recruitment
Practising Pharmacists based within clinical areas were asked to identify potential study 
areas and anaesthetists suitable for inclusion in this study. These pharmacists were aware 
of the numbers and types of IV medicines prescribed in their clinical area, the proportion 
of those requiring preparation in the clinical area, staffing levels and the physical 
environment used for IV preparation. It was important that study areas recruited had good 
working relationships between nursing and pharmacy, as this allowed support for the 
observers and appropriate follow up of any concerns raised during the audit.
Purposive sampling is defined as
“The identification and selection o f particular individuals who share 
characteristics relevant to the study, and whom the researcher believes will be most 
informative in achieving their objectives ” [Smith, 2002;p.l 19].
This method was selected for the study to ensure that piloting was undertaken in a diverse 
range of clinical areas that frequently prepare IV doses. Random sampling was not 
necessary as generalisation or a representative sample was not required. Five clinical areas 
were selected for this study across a wide range of clinical settings. These included 
operating theatres, paediatrics, general medicine, surgery and critical care. For each 
clinical area, the clinical pharmacist who suggested the anaesthetist or area made an 
informal approach to the ward manager or nurse in charge to establish whether they wished 
to be involved with the study. This included consideration of local issues such as ward 
relocations, staffing etc. To prevent bias, the selection excluded those areas where staff that 
have come forward for inclusion in the lead investigators' other research.
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Figure 4.1 Data collection form
CONFIDENTIAL
Product number (for coding):
Pilot audit data collection form for intravenous m edicines prepared in 
clinical a reas
Use ONE form per observed practitioner and product
Date: /04/2005 Observers initials:
Ward /department name: Site: Ch /JR / Rl
Job title of practitioner observed: Staff nurse
Team leader (nurse)
Sister/Charge nurse 
Practice development nurse 
ODP
Consultant
Other..................................
Were hands visibly soiled before starting iv assembly?
Were hands washed before iv preparation?
Were hands cleaned with alcohol/alcohol gel before preparation? 
Were gloves worn for preparation?
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
PTO to record observations.
Prescription details from drug chart, document exactly what is written/printed (record 
details AFTER observation)___________________________ __________________________
Item prescribed (name and brand where stated)
Dose and duration for infusions
Route
Time dose due (24 hour clock or state am/pm)
Which section of the drug chart is it prescribed on Once only 
As required (pm)
Regular medicine section 
Infusion therapy 
PCA
Other............................
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Figure 4.1 Data collection form continued...
Observe dose prepared and record ALL of the following details
Start time (24 hour) :
Medicine (generic name)
Brand name, or generic manufacturer
Quantity & strength dose units selected
Where had medicines been stored? CD cupboard / frid 
other.....................
ge / drug cupboard/
Within manufacturers expiry date? Yes No |
Tamper evident seals intact on everything assembled? Yes No, explain...
Date opened? not stated / ........................
Visual appearance of all ingredients chosen acceptable? Yes No
Diluent/solvent name na / WFI / NS / G5 / manufacturer supplied / 
other.......................................................
Diluent/solvent volume ml
Addition & mixing appropriate? Yes No
Volume of mixed product withdrawn ml
Infusion/diluent name na / NS / G5 / DS / H / other...............
Infusion/diluent volume ml
Volume of mixed/ready diluted product added ml
Addition & mixing appropriate? Yes No
Filter device used? Yes No type......................
Additions made using na / needle-free system / orange, biue, green needle other..................
Make of syringe used? B-D / other type..........................
Product labelled with? Patient name Yes No
Medicine Yes No
Dose Yes No
Route Yes No
Diluent/infusion Yes No
Total volume Yes No
Concentration Yes No
Time made Yes No
Date made Yes No
Signed Yes No
Check signature Yes No
Visual appearance of final product acceptable? Yes No
Any special precautions used (e.g. light protection)? Yes what?..... No
Clean technique acceptable? Yes No/unsure explain why...
Now record prescription details for this product overleaf...
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In the selected areas, the lead manager/nurse was asked to consent to their staff 
participating in the study. They were given standard information on: the study aims, study 
dates, number of IV doses to be observed, invitation letter and participant study 
information leaflet. All ward managers agreed to be included. Practitioners involved in IV 
medication assembly and preparation in the selected clinical areas were approached to 
participate in the study. For convenience, eligible staff that might be working during the 
data collection period were invited to participate.
A wide variety of staff worked in theatres without a ward-based pharmacist. Therefore 
anaesthetists with established links to pharmacy were approached for inclusion in this 
study.
Staff needed to be familiar in their working environment to enable robust testing of the 
audit tool and so temporary staff were excluded. For convenience student nurses were 
excluded as permission from the School of Nursing would be required.
Exclusion criteria:
■ Co-workers for the project.
■ Student practitioners.
■ Staff authorised to administer injectables that require no manipulation at ward level 
e.g. infusion fluids.
■ Agency staff.
■ Bank staff that are unfamiliar with the clinical area.
Inclusion criteria:
■ Registered doctors, nurses, midwives, qualified operating department 
assistants/practitioners that prepare and administer IV medicines including regular 
bank staff.
■ Clinical areas were sampled from the John Radcliffe, Churchill or Radcliffe 
Infirmary sites (this was due to the geographical location of the observers).
The researcher approached the anaesthetist directly with the study aims, study dates, 
number o f IV doses to be observed, invitation to participate letter and study information 
leaflet. Potential ward participants were given an outline of the study through an oral 
presentation by the researcher at a convenient time and place e.g. at ward hand-over. An
149
Chapter 4: A pilot audit o f IV medication assembly and preparation error framework
invitation letter, consent form and written information pack were supplied to those eligible 
for inclusion [appendix 19-21]. Those interested in participating were asked to either place 
their reply slip into a sealed clearly labelled envelope placed on each study ward one to 
three weeks prior to data collection, or to contact the researcher by email or pager.
Observer selection
Healthcare staff, such as nurses and pharmacy technicians, that understand asepsis issues 
and undertake IV medicines preparation as a regular part of their job would be suitable as 
observers. Four Pre-Registration Pharmacists were recruited opportunistically as observers. 
These were familiar with ward-based working, the Trust prescription chart, local injectable 
information sources available in clinical areas, microbiology and asepsis issues.
Observer training
In order to ensure consistency the observers received standardised training in two main 
areas: ‘best-practice’ for IV preparation in clinical settings and observational data 
collection. The researcher trained them in observation which included the study aims and 
remit, ethical issues, data collection, and being objective, non-judgemental, perceptive, 
alert, unobtrusive. A skilled pharmacy technician with a background in aseptics and prior 
experience in similar data collection assisted with this training. A commercial 
manufacturer had undertaken observational research on IV preparation errors in Europe 
and produced a booklet on ‘Good practices of I.V. preparation* [appendix 22] and CD 
training package ‘Training module on Good Practices in IV Drugs Preparation’ [Baxter, 
2002, 2003]. Permission was obtained to use this material to train the observers. Finally, a 
range of IV preparations were demonstrated and data collection practised in a ‘class-room’ 
environment on 20th and 21st April 2005.
The pre-registration pharmacists were familiar with ward-based working and that errors 
cannot be entirely eliminated within healthcare, as this formed part of their routine work 
and training. As these observers may have had some concerns about the observation and 
data collection for example, uncertainty of whether they had spotted an error, this was 
addressed by training in the research method. In addition a daily debriefing of each 
observer was undertaken by the researcher.
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4.3.5 Data collection
Written consent was obtained from those who agreed to participate in the study. Each 
observer introduced themselves to the clinical area, and negotiated convenient weekday 
times for data collection. Initial observations were used to familiarise the observer with 
practice and the clinical area when no data were collected. Once familiarisation was 
achieved data collection for the study commenced. Data were collected from April to May 
2005, with continued observation in each clinical area until 20 prepared IV medicines 
doses had been observed. Where possible, doses were observed from more than one 
participant in each area. The observer watched IV medicines preparation and recorded data 
on the data collection form. They positioned themselves where they could see the 
preparation, but attempted to be as unobtrusive as possible. If the observer was unsure of 
how to interpret any o f the details they has observed, they made details notes on the data 
collection form and discussed this with the researcher.
If the observer noticed what they believed to be a medication error o f which the participant 
was unaware, they suggested to the preparer that they believed a possible error may have 
occurred. The observer then asked them to get the preparation checked by another qualified 
member of staff. If they believed this had the potential to harm the patient if administered, 
they informed the ward pharmacist. This would allow the pharmacist to investigate the 
event, and where appropriate follow the Trust incident reporting procedure. If the 
participant admitted deliberately harming a patient, the observer confirmed what they had 
heard. If this were correct, they would terminate the observation and immediately report 
this to the ward pharmacist.
At the end of data collection the observers independently recorded data on a variety of 
demonstration IV preparations, which included intentional errors. This was undertaken to 
establish whether recording was consistent and accurate. A group debriefing session was 
held on 2nd June 2005 with the observers and researcher to discuss any issues which arose 
with the methodology as well as suggestions for improvement. This allowed information 
on the suitability, practicability and appropriateness of the data collection tool to be 
gathered. This information was recorded by the researcher as hand written notes. 
Discussion between the researcher, demonstrator and observers o f the differences between 
their recorded observations, along with issues arising during the analysis were used to
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refine the data collection tool, see figure 4.2. This was piloted on demonstration IV 
preparations on 12th July 2005 to test for consistency.
4.3.6 Data storage
Data collection forms were stored in a locked filing cabinet within the pharmacy 
department and will be kept for ten years. A copy of the data entered onto the spreadsheet 
will be retained. This data will not contain any personal information and will be stored on 
the pharmacy server accessed only by a password.
4.3.7 Data analysis
During the analysis stage some of the categories required more explicit criteria in order to 
determine whether an error had occurred. These issues were: faulty labelling, where the 
minimum label requirements had not been set. Therefore these were analysed, as the 
medicine name and a dose or concentration were imperative. The error category that 
advocated that large bore needles used to withdraw solution from glass ampoules 
constituted an error fell into the equivocal category and was excluded from the error 
framework. During the development of the framework it had not been conceived that a 
solution would be withdrawn from glass ampoules directly into the syringe without a 
needle, so this issue was not addressed. However this was included as poor practice during 
the analysis. Other issues not previously identified as errors were reported as poor practice 
issues.
The data from each observation was entered on an Excel spread sheet. Twenty records 
were independently selected by a lay person and data entered checked to ensure the quality 
of data entry. The data were analysed to detect where potential errors occurred and 
categorised according to the IVMPE definition framework [Crowley et a l, 2004b]. These 
errors were then coded according to the NPSA NLRS data set for patient safety incidents 
shown in table 4.1 [NPSA, 2003b]. Descriptive statistics were used.
Field notes were taken by the researcher whilst training the observers, and during 
debriefing and feedback sessions. Content analysis was used to identify common themes.
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Figure 4,2 Revised data collection form
CONFIDENTIAL IV Product number (for coding): __________
Data collection form for intravenous medicines prepared in clinical 
a reas
Use ONE fo rm  per obse rved  p ra c tit io n e r and p roduc t, circle o r tick appropriate response.
Date: day-month-year Observer identifier:
Ward/department name: 'Hospital Site: Ch / JR / Rl
Patient identifier:..............................  Date of birth.......... Patient weight............. kg
'Job title of practitioner observed: □ sister/charge nurse 
(as name badge) □ nurse team leader
□ staff nurse
□ other........................
Were hands visibly soiled before starting iv assembly session? Yes No
Were hands washed before starting? Yes No
Were hands cleaned with alcohol/alcohol gel before starting? Yes No
Were gloves worn for preparation? Yes No
C om m en ts .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Now record observations 
overleaf...
(Include details of any errors that the preparer identifies and corrects below)
Prescription details from medicine chart (Record only AFTER observing product preparation)  
Is the medicine you observed prepared for this patient prescribed? Yes No
I f  yes record exactly what is written/printed, do not interpret or alter details.
Name (generic name and/or brand)
Dose
Route
Time dose due (24 hour clock, or state am/pm)
'Other Information documented for this item e.g. infusion 
duration (include all information e.g. pharmacist annotation)
*Which section of the drug chart is it recorded on? □ Once only□ As required (pm)
□ Regular medicine section
□ Infusion therapy
□ PCA
□ Other..............................
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Figure 4,2 Revised data collection form continued...
Observe intravenous dose prepared and record ALL of the following details
Start time (24 hour) i
Medicine (generic drug name)
Brand name, or generic manufacturer
Quantity & strength dose units selected
Where had medicines been stored? □ CD cupboard, □ fridge, □ drug cupboard,
□ other......................................................
Within manufacturer’s expiry date? Yes No |
Tamper evident seals intact on everything assembled? Yes No, explain...
Date opened? □ Not stated / (dnta)
Visual appearance of ail ingredients chosen acceptable? Yes No, explain ...
Volume of medicine withdrawn from original container? □ None (dry powder), o r ............... ml
Diluent type? None / WFI / NS / G5 / DS / H / manufacturer 
supplied / other.............................
Diluent volume ml
Diluent added & mixed appropriately? Yes No
Volume of mixed product withdrawn/total volume? ml
Volume of mixed product used in next step? ............... ml
Further diluent type? None/ NS / G5 / DS / H / other....................
Further diluent volume ml
Medicine added & mixed appropriately? Yes No
Final volume of mixed product? ml
‘Filter device used? Yes, type.................... I No
‘Additions made using (tick all that apply); ‘Make of syringe used (tick all that apply):
□ direct into syringe, □ B-D standard syringe
□ needle-free system, □ B-D insulin syringe
□ orange, blue, green needle,
□ other.................................................................
□ other...........................
Product labelled (acceptable if product details are visible)? Yes No
If yes, what information was recorded (tick all that apply) □ Patient name
□ Medicine name □ Diluent name □ Time made
□ Dose □ Diluent volume □ Date made
□ Route □ Total final volume □ Check signature
□ Concentration □ Signed □ Other................................................
Visual appearance of final product acceptable? Yes No / Unsure explain why...
Any special precautions used (e.g. light protection)? Yes what?......................... No
Clean technique acceptable? Yes No / Unsure explain why...
Now check you have completed EACH box above, then record prescription details overleaf..
WFI=water for injections; NS=sodium chloride 0.9%; G5=glucose 5%; DS=glucose 4% & sodium chloride 0.18%; 
H=Hartman’s solution * Details may require site specific adjustment. Data collection sheet, revised July 2005.
154
Chapter 4: A pilot audit o f IV medication assembly and preparation error framework
4.4 Results
A total of 68 IV medicines doses were observed by four observers, details of which are 
shown in table 4.2 below. On the general medical, surgical and paediatric wards, the 
majority o f doses were intermittent antibiotics. Within theatres and critical care, more 
specialist medicines were seen which included bolus doses and intermittent and continuous 
infusions. Nursing staff undertook the IV preparation in all areas except the operating 
theatre.
Table 4.2 Details o f  medicine dose observed by area and medicine.
Clinical
area
Observer
Initials
Number of 
medicine 
doses 
observed
Type of 
healthcare 
staff 
observed
Medicine name Number 
of doses
General C, A, B 10 Staff nurses Cefuroxime & metronidazole 7
Surgery (all) Cefuroximef 1
Meropenem 2
Acute C 18 Staff nurses Cefuroxime & metronidazole 5
general xl7, Pabrinex™ 2
medicine Sister xl Cefuroxime 7
- Omeprazole 1
Benzylpenicillin 1
Meropenem 1
Flucloxacillin 1
Paediatrics A, D 17 Staff nurses Co-amoxiclav 5
(all) Metronidazole 1
Meropenem 6
Gentamicin 5
Critical A 12 Staff nurses Cefuroxime 4
Care xl 1, Ranitidine 4
Sister xl Noradrenaline 1
Metoclopramide 2
Actrapid™ Insulin syringe 1
Theatres A 11 Consultant Propofol & lidocaine 2
(all) Clonidine 2
Magnesium sulphate 2
Fentanyl 1
Lidocaine 3
Atracurium 1
t  One dose recorded as cefuroxime only prescribed, but cefuroxime and metronidazole was prepared [S4].
4.4.1 Training the observers
After initial training, feedback from the observers suggested that they felt competent and 
ready to commence piloting. Comparison of their observations from the classroom 
simulation observations showed proficiency with observing and recording data correctly on 
the audit form. Some, but not all of the intentional errors were detected by each observer. 
The observers found the group discussion held after these observations very helpful. They
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suggested that there was much for them to observe, with many intentional errors and this 
had limited their recording. They also found the ‘unreal* classroom environment a 
hindrance. They advocated retesting after some real observation, and this simulation was 
repeated after the piloting.
The post-pilot simulation demonstrations showed an improvement in the number of errors 
observed and recorded. The observers felt more confident in their observation, particularly 
as they were now familiar with the data collection form. There remained some 
inconsistency between what the observers had recorded because in some cases an error had 
not been noticed.
4.4.2 Observations of IV preparation
Errors were observed in 27 (39.7%) of the 68 doses prepared. For six doses more than one 
error was noted. Most errors were due to wrong mixing and addition or faulty labelling. 
Details of the errors observed and their coding within the IVMPE framework, and NLRS 
are shown in table 4.3.
A few observations had some inaccuracies and these are described in the table footnote. 
However, as each of these observations was associated with another observed error. 
Therefore, this does not alter the number of doses with errors observed.
The intentional addition of lidocaine to the propofol was classified under wrong 
drug/medicine as anaesthetic practice is to record that the patient has just received 
propofol, where in fact propofol and lidocaine was administered. The lidocaine is used to 
reduce the pain associated with propofol administration at induction, prepared aseptically 
immediately before administration [Astra Zeneca Ltd, 2006].
In addition to errors, the observers also documented two areas of poor practice. These were 
extrapolating between the marked volumes on syringes. For example, doses of 5.25ml 
were measured from a 10ml syringe marked in 0.5ml increments [P45, P38, P42] and 
9.56ml measured using syringe with accuracy to 0.5ml [P37, P34, P43, P44]. The other 
issue identified was withdrawing solutions from a glass ampoule directly into a syringe, 
without using a needle.
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Table 4.3 Details o f IVMPE observed (n= 68 doses)
NLRS category IVMPE
category
Examples of error 
observed
Total number of errors 
with observation codes
Wrong method of 
preparation
Wrong addition / 
mixing
Undissolved powder left 
in vial; air bubble not 
expelled before volume 
checked; not shaken; no 
mixing after addition.
16 errors:
[S4',S5,S8,M13,M15, 
Ml 8, M20, M23, M27, 
P35, P39, P42, P45, CC48, 
CC50, CC52, T66]
Wrong method of 
preparation
Wrong
preparation
technique
Unacceptable clean 
technique; re-use of 
single dose container.
2 errors: 
[S6, T58]
Wrong / omitted / 
passed expiry 
date
Expired / 
degraded or 
unknown expiry
Unsuitable appearance; 
glucose 5% tamperproof 
seal open
2 errors: 
[M24, CC50]
Wrong / 
transposed / 
omitted medicine 
label
Faulty labelling Missing medicine name; 
missing dose.
9 errors:
[S1,S2,S3,S7,
M12,M 15 ,M21 ,M27,T 66]
Wrong drug / 
medicine
Wrong medicine Cefuroxime & 
metronidazole prepared 
but cefuroxime 
prescribed; lidocaine 
added to propofol 
prepared but not 
prescribed.
2 errors: 
[S4 , T65]
Wrong method of 
preparation
Diluent error Prescribed 5ml final 
volume but made to 
50ml.
2 errors:
[S 4 \  CC 504]
S4 - recorded as acceptable mixing, but observer annotated that a clump of undissolved medicine was noted 
in the vial, recoded as an error; S42 - recorded as cefuroxime prescribed, however cefuroxime and 
metronidazole was prepared; S4 - data transposition error between 2nd diluent volume and volume of solution 
added; CC 504- final volume of noradrenaline syringe prescribed documented as 5ml, possible ‘slip’ as 
usually 50ml.
Information on hand cleanliness before staff began an IV preparation session showed that 
no-one began preparation with soiled hands. However, hand-washing, using an alcoholic 
gel or wearing gloves was inconsistent. There are some commonalities with wearing 
gloves in adult medicine and surgery, whereas in theatres hands were always washed. This 
is shown in table 4.4. Where the observer was unable to determine what had happened, 
these were recorded as ‘unsure’.
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Table 4,4 Observed hand cleanliness before IV medicines dose prepared (n=68 doses)
Clinical
area
Were hands visible 
soiled before 
starting IV 
assembly?
Were hands 
washed before 
starting?
Were hands cleaned 
with alcohol / 
alcohol gel before 
starting?
Were gloves 
worn for 
preparation?
General
Surgery
(n=10)
No = 10 No = 3 
Yes = 5 
Unsure = 2
No = 4 
Yes = 4 
Unsure = 2
No = 0 
Yes = 10
Acute
general
medicine
(n=18)
No= 18 No = 15 
Yes = 3
No= 18 No = 0 
Yes = 18
Paediatrics
(n=17)
No = 17 No = 4 
Yes = 11 
Unsure = 2
No = 5 
Yes = 12
No= 13 
Yes = 3 
Unsure = 1
Critical
Care
(n=12)
No= 12 No = 7 
Yes = 3 
Unsure = 2
No = 6 
Yes = 5 
Unsure = 1
No = 1 
Yes = 9
Missing data =2
Theatres 
(n= 11)
No = 11 Yes= 11 No = 7 
Yes = 3 
Unsure = 1
No = 9 
Yes = 0
Missing data =2
Totals No = 68 No = 29 
Yes = 33 
Unsure = 6
No = 40 
Yes = 24 
Unsure = 4
No = 23 
Yes = 40 
Unsure = 1 
Missing data =4
4.4.3 Feedback from the observers
Analysis of the observers’ comments identified four common themes, which were:
■ Observation and aseptic training.
■ Access to observe staff.
■ Culture/blame issues.
■ Data collection form issues.
Observation and aseptics training
The observers reporting feeling inexperienced in both observation and practical aseptic 
issues. They suggested that qualified pharmacist and technicians were ideally suited to 
undertake this audit because they had been taught aseptic theory. However, the observers 
found that this was not always easy to translate into interpreting practice. For example, was 
forcefully squirting a solution into an infusion bag adequate mixing? The pre-registration 
pharmacists had not yet visited an aseptic unit and they suggested that orientation or prior 
experience in an aseptic unit would be beneficial. In addition the opportunity for a 
‘practical hands-on play’ with the same equipment that staff in clinical areas used would 
have been helpful.
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The observers also suggested additional ward orientation, and time observing and 
familiarising themselves with the clinical area in advance of data collection. They advised 
that training should include the common drugs likely to be seen and common combinations 
used, so they would be able to anticipate staff actions.
Access to observe staff
In ward areas the ward sister was pivotal to the success o f data collection as the nurses 
trusted and respected them. They acted as the ‘gatekeeper’ to negotiating access to observe 
staff. Observers reported a variety of ward attitudes, ranging from “very nice” to 
“brusque.” In addition they identified the need for persistence to ensure they were able to 
maximise opportunities for observation. In some situations they felt they were intruding.
Although most of the medicines were scheduled for administration between midday to 
2pm, this coincided with other ward commitments such as hand-over. Therefore it could be 
difficult for the observer to establish when IV preparation would occur. They suggested 
that ideally the data collector would be ward-based to avoid missing doses prepared and 
ensure they were present from the start of preparation. Some observers reported that when 
they arrived on the ward at the mutually agreed time to find assembly had already taken 
place.
Culture/blame issues
Some of the nurses appeared to be very nervous about being observed. One observer 
suggested they considered this a cultural issue. Despite awareness that the data collection 
tool was being tested, not the individual, some nurses asked the observer how they had 
performed.
Data collection form issues
The observers found data collection time consuming. They reported that it was easy to 
miss details during the observation since the procedures happened very quickly. In 
particular it was difficult to see the volume drawn into a syringe without being obtrusive. 
They commented that it was easier to collect data when the medication was checked by a 
second member o f staff.
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A number of suggestions to improve data collection were made. These were:
■ Request that all the medicines and diluents are left out, rather than discarded to 
allow recording o f expiry date details etc.
■ Add an introductory paragraph to instruct the observer to record details of all 
errors noted and corrected by the preparer.
■ Revise the drug labelled section to that if the details were already evident from 
bag they do not need to be written on label e.g. metronidazole.
■ Consider revising the drug labelled section to allow recording of “not labelled but 
given straight away”.
■ Add a column for either washed hands or alcohol gel used.
Once the observers were familiar with the data collection form, they found it easy to 
complete. When conducting the audit they suggested the first five observations undertaken 
should be discarded as the observer may have missed events. As there were so many 
details to watch in such a short time frame they recommended observing the preparation 
first and then completing the form retrospectively. This would reduce the instances of 
missing data on the data collection form. Difficulties were reported with observation in 
theatres environment. These arose because the medicines were often administered without 
a prescription, which it was presumed was completed retrospectively. In addition where 
medication administration was recorded, it was on a separate document, the "anaesthetic 
record’ instead of the patients drug chart. This practical limitation has previously been 
identified [Wheeler & Wheeler, 2005]. At induction of anaesthesia many medicines were 
given in rapid succession and it was impossible to observe and record the detail using a 
separate data collection sheet for each medicine. It was recommended that the data 
collection sheet would need modification before it was suitable for use in theatre 
environment.
4.4.4 Analysis and coding of observations
During analysis it was apparent that weight should be included on the data collection form 
to enable clarification of correct doses in clinical areas such as paediatrics.
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4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 Training of the observers
The observers were trained in two areas, aseptic technique for IV preparation and 
observational data collection. This posed several study limitations. Observational research 
methods were new to all observers who had little exposure to qualitative or social research 
methods. Therefore, they had difficulties understanding some of the intricacies of this 
method. Additional in-depth training and practice with observational techniques would 
have been beneficial.
Although the pre-registration pharmacists had received theoretical instruction in aseptic 
preparation, they had limited or no experience of this area in practice. It became apparent 
that theoretical training did not cover much of the knowledge and skills required to 
determine if minimum accepted IV preparation standards had been met. Therefore, 
additional training in aseptic techniques was required. This was provided by pharmacy 
technicians with experience in aseptic preparation. This was an important obstacle, as the 
observers needed to gain an understanding of the rational behind the practice to apply to 
the observation. It was important to demonstrate a variety of different methods, to 
familiarise the observer with aspects they might observe on the wards. The feedback from 
the observers highlighted that additional in-depth training was required. Therefore, it is 
recommended observers should either have recent training and experience within a 
pharmacy aseptic unit, or an orientation and assessment of competence in aseptics would 
be required in order to conduct the audit.
Ideally multiple observers would be used in the audit to minimise fatigue and attention loss 
during the long data collection periods. Inter-rater reliability could then be assessed before 
data collection [Dean & Barber, 2001]. This would highlight any inconsistencies which 
could be remedied to ensure the reliability of the data collected. Inter-rater reliability could 
also be checked during the data collection period as a quality assurance measure.
Previous work has shown that researcher and observer bias does not alter the overall 
medication administration error rate [Dean & Barber, 2001]. Comments from the observers 
highlight that at times they felt intrusive and inexperienced within the clinical 
environment. Therefore the presence of the observer and the research process may have 
altered the nurses’ behaviour, introducing bias.
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In addition the observers would have benefited from additional ward orientation and time 
spent observing IV preparation. Staff in the clinical area would then become used to the 
presence of an observer. At the same time the observer would become familiar with the 
environment, processes, common medications used and their appearance.
4.5.2 Feasibility of data collection
Recruitment into the study was slower than anticipated. This was in part due to the limited 
time when the pre-registration pharmacists could be released to undertake the observation. 
In general they were only available from 9am to 2pm. This meant they were able to 
observe doses due at 12 o’clock. However, they rarely observed any ‘as required’ doses or 
continuous infusions. In this study it appeared that doses were more commonly due on the 
morning or evening medicine round.
Despite reassurances that the study trust advocated a fair-blame culture, and that the study 
aimed to test the audit tool not the staff, it appeared that nurses were concerned about 
being observed. This identified the need for sensitivity and careful explanation before 
undertaking patient safety audits. This could be overcome using disguised observation. 
However, as audit findings would be shared within an organisation, it is important that 
participants were fully informed of the study aims. In addition, this supports the 
philosophy of an open and learning culture, central to patient safety [NPSA, 2003a].
The data collected contained the occasional missing value. Comments from the observers 
suggested that this arose from the volume of data recorded, particularly during early stages 
of data collection. Therefore, their suggestion of excluding some of the initial data 
collection forms so ensuring comprehensive data capture is recommended. To prevent 
missing data on the data collection form, the researcher could check the data collection 
forms at the end of each collection period and clarify any omission with the observer. In 
cases where the observer was unsure, detailed notes on the form enabled the researcher to 
interpret the observations.
The study identified the difficulty of data collection in the operating theatres using the 
audit tool. This was because practice differed from other settings in a number of ways. 
These were:
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At induction of anaesthesia a large number of medicines are given in rapid 
succession posing difficulties for observation [Fraind et al., 2002].
The anaesthetist is often the prescriber, preparer and administrator, in such cases a 
prescription is not required before the medicine dose is prepared, as The Medicines 
Act [1968] allows this to be documented retrospectively.
Medication details are recorded on the anaesthetic chart, and not always written out 
in full, with abbreviations in routine use.
- The addition of lidocaine to the IV preparation immediately before use to minimise 
pain on injection.
These issues confounded data collection in this area. The differences in clinical setting 
should be incorporated into the error framework, as this could also apply in other settings 
e.g. resuscitation on a general ward. In this study the prescription details had not been 
recorded before the patient was transferred into the operating theatre, hence multiple 
missing data entries for this clinical area. Further work evaluating the best approach to 
gather data on IV medicines doses prepared is required. Consideration should be given to 
using multiple observers or using observation in conjunction with video recording. Such 
combined methods have been used during simulated paediatric resuscitation [Kozer et al.,
2004]. If multiple observers were used each observer could focus on a single medication. 
To ensure data were accurately observed and recorded it is unlikely that every IV medicine 
prepared could be included in the study, instead a sample of IV doses prepared could be 
captured within an observation period. An alternative strategy would be to collect 
information on the prescription once the patient had returned to the ward area and the 
anaesthetic record completed.
4.5.3 Pilot study findings
Errors were detected in 39.7% of doses prepared. This is higher than the 13% previously 
reported in a UK hospital [Taxis & Barber, 2003a]. The majority o f errors were reported in 
the labelling or faulty addition and mixing categories. The data was mapped onto the 
NPSA NLRS medication categories, with the majority o f errors assigned to wrong method 
of preparation (18 of 68 doses prepared). Previous work has also reported faulty 
reconstitution, addition and mixing to be a common problem [Hoppe-Tichy et al., 2002; 
Wirtz et a l, 2003]. Inadequate labelling has often not been looked for in previous similar 
Studies. One study reported 43% of IV doses prepared in UK hospitals contained some
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type of labelling error, and that in 20% of cases where the label was missing or incomplete 
the dose was not administered to the patient immediately after preparation [Cousins et al.,
2005]. The findings from this pilot study support previous observational findings.
No attempt was made to assess the clinical significance of the errors observed, as this study 
was to assess the suitability of observational audit methods. However, most were likely to 
be of none or minor significance to the patient. The tool is suitable for use in conjunction 
with a previously validated scale to assess the clinical importance of observed errors where 
all errors are submitted to a panel o f four practitioners to rate the severity outcome for the 
patient [Dean & Barber, 1999]. The panel would contain at least one of the following 
pharmacist, nurse and physician. Those selected would also has an understanding of the 
patient safety agenda and able to put potential incidents in clinical context.
Analysis of the data collected identified four values that appeared incorrect. In one, the 
observer had recorded acceptable reconstitution of a powder, but noted a clump of 
undissolved powder in the medicine vial [S41]. This was recoded as an error by the 
researcher, but without the annotation would have been missed. In another case the 
prescription details recorded were only for cefuroxime, but cefuroxime and metronidazole 
was prepared. It is unclear whether the wrong medication was prepared, or this was a data 
recording error [S4 ] as other problems were identified with this observation [S4 ] and data 
recoding [S41]. On another occasion the total volume of a noradrenaline syringe prescribed 
was recorded as 5ml. As this would usually be 50ml, it could either be a prescribing error 
or a data recording error. Patient identifiers were not required for the audit, so it was 
impossible to retrospectively verify this information. However, this information would be 
collected in a formal audit. Data appeared to be have transposed between two adjacent 
boxes, where one required the volume of second diluent added and the other the total 
volume of solution. This appeared to be a data entry error. In the last three cases, an error 
had been noted in another part of the preparation of the dose, so would not alter the number 
erroneous doses. However, it would have added three false errors to the total.
The extrapolations between syringe markings noted in paediatrics were small and would 
not have been significant enough to be greater than 10% of the required dose. Therefore, it 
was appropriate for these to be recorded by the observer as practice issues rather than error.
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No-one started IV preparation with visibly soiled hands. Approximately half of those 
observed washed their hands before preparation, and about one third used alcohol gel to 
cleanse their hands. This contrasts with data previously collected in the UK in 2001-2002, 
where hands were never washed before preparation [Cousins et al., 2005]. One explanation 
for this could be the national high profile “Clean Your Hands ” campaign [NPSA, 2004].
4.5.4 Revisions to the data collection tool
A number o f useful amendments to the data collection form were recommended by the 
observers, and implemented. During data analysis it was discovered that patient’s weight 
had not been requested; this was needed to confirm weight based doses. This should be 
added to the data collection form. The data collection form was revised to include these 
details, and successfully retested by the observers on simulation IV preparations, shown in 
figure 4. 2
Piloting identified three issues that were not considered in the IVMPE framework. These 
were the preparation and administration of doses where the prescriber is also the preparer 
and administrator as in theatres. In such cases, preparing a dose without a prescription 
would not be considered an error. Another scenario that was not envisaged was 
withdrawing medication directly from a glass ampoule into a syringe. The scenario 
‘withdrawal from glass vials must be via a filter needle, or 19-gauge or narrower needle’ 
was not considered the basis for an error by respondents in the previous study [see chapter 
2]. From the observation in the audit it would have been relevant to ask whether 
withdrawal from a glass ampoule without using a needle, or similar device, would have 
considered an error. Lastly, the addition of lidocaine to the active medicine to minimise 
pain on injection had not been considered, so no agreement had been reached on how this 
should be documented. It is appropriate that all medication a patient receives should be 
recorded, including local anaesthetics.
4.5.5 Further work
To enable this audit tool to be used in other settings, further guidance would be needed to 
allow consistent use. This should include preparation of the following:
■ Instructions to describe the information available to staff preparing IV medicines.
■ Instruction to familiarise the audit team with organisational and local policies, 
procedures or guidance that cover IV preparation.
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■ Preparing a list o f medicines where filtration would adversely affect the stability.
■ Preparing a list o f medicines with special requirements together with the 
requirement, such as light protection or plastic incompatibility.
■ Modification of the final data collection form to include local information to 
minimise repetitive data entry, such as hospital site.
Standardised training material for the observers on IV preparation would ensure greater 
consistency. This could be in a variety of audiovisual formats, and could include guidance 
on good practice for IV preparation in clinical areas as well as error containing scenarios. 
Specialist advice could be sought to develop a database for data entry and analysis. All 
observed incidents should then be rated for the likely clinical outcome to the patient.
4.6 Conclusions
The audit tool has been validated for use in both adult and paediatric general and specialist 
ward areas. Refinement o f the data collection form or method is required before use in a 
theatres environment. Observers undertaking this audit need training and assessment in 
observational techniques and aseptic preparation prior to use.
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Chapter 5
Nurses’ perceptions of intravenous medicines assembly and preparation in clinical
areas - a medicines safety perspective
5.1 Background to study
The proposed research will focus on the preparation of those medicines that require 
manipulation in the clinical environment. This preparation stage is located between 
medication supply and medication administration. Intravenous medicines that require no 
manipulation in the clinical setting fall outside the scope o f this study. Gandy and 
colleagues [2002] proposed that these stages should be termed assembly and preparation. 
The multi-professional derived definitions for both are detailed below:
Assembly is,
“Gathering together on a cleaned tray, trolley or appropriate work surface, all o f  
the items o f  equipment and pharmaceutical agents requiredfor the aseptic preparation and 
administration o f  a medicines to a patient, whatever the form, route, and method/technique 
o f administration” [Gandy et al., 2002;p.244].
Preparation is,
“Preparation follows assembly. It is the procedure o f  using all o f  the assembled 
items in drawing up, mixing, combining or reconstituting the pharmaceutical agents, 
diluents and/or infusion fluids into the right form, combination and strength according to 
the patient’s prescription sheet, and via the correct delivery vehicle/administration device. 
Preparation includes following clinical guidelines fo r  the correct use o f  equipment 
[Gandy et al., 2002;p.244].
However, an alternative definition of preparation has also been proposed
"The manipulation o f  ingredients and components to make the final product” 
[Clinical Resource and Audit Group/NHS Scotland, 2002; p.6].
Little is known of the steps involved with IV medicines preparation, concerns, difficulties 
encountered, and the sources of guidance or advice used by staff in resolving problems. A 
study to investigate the views, problems and solutions encountered by clinical staff in IV 
medication assembly and preparation on a practical level would be both timely and shed 
light on this poorly researched area.
5.2 Aims
The study aims were to explore nurses’ views and opinions on the practical problems they 
have experienced during IV medication assembly and preparation in clinical areas, and to 
describe the solutions they used to resolve these issues.
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Objectives
To describe the steps in assembling IV medicines in clinical areas.
To describe the steps in preparing IV medicines bolus and infusions in clinical 
areas.
To elucidate nurses’ perceptions regarding problems encountered during IV
medicines assembly.
To elucidate nurses’ perceptions regarding problems encountered during IV
medicines preparation.
To establish nurses’ perceptions of why these problems arise.
To identify how nurses resolve these problems in practice.
To establish whether there are links between intravenous training, competency and 
experience with regards to problem identification and resolution.
To suggest how and where Pharmacy should prioritise its resources to improve IV 
medicines safety.
5.3 Study methodology
5.3.1 Research strategy
To elucidate nurses’ views and opinions required a qualitative research method that
allowed subjects to express their views freely and in detail. Face-to-face unstructured
interviews were used as these allowed complex, sensitive and open-ended questioning, 
with the ability to probe and clarify issues [Frey & Oishi, 1995]. As an exploratory study, 
in-depth and extended responses were required. An ethnographic approach was used to 
enable understanding of the professional’s views in their own clinical setting, and to allow 
the identification of previously unknown issues [Fetterman, 1998].
5.3.2 Study setting
Subjects were recruited from the two main sites of the Oxford Radcliffe NHS Hospitals 
Trust which provide a wide range of secondary and tertiary specialities for approximately 
1,100 inpatients. Pharmacy is well integrated into patient care and works closely as an 
integral part of the care team. This Trust supported a no-blame culture, with learning from 
incidents and hazardous practices.
The arrangements for guidance on IV prescribing, drug administration and training were as 
described in section 4.3.2.
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Study design
Prior to the study, support was gained from the Pharmacy Department and Nursing 
Directorate. Trust research management and local ethical approval was applied for and 
granted [REC 04.0XA.023].
5.3.3 Data collection tool
The researcher was trained in ethnographic and in-depth interview research methods 
following published methods [Spradley, 1979; Gillham, 2000]. Data were collected by 
unstructured in-depth ethnographic interviews between the researcher and a single subject. 
This type o f method required skill, with particular attention to avoid leading the 
participant. It is important that the participant’s meaning was clearly understood, without 
misinterpretation. Wherever there was potential confusion, clarification was sought. Probes 
and prompts, especially non-verbal and those communicating active listening were widely 
used. The researcher adopted the terminology used by the interviewee, and adopted a 
neutral mindset, so as to prevent introducing bias through verbal or nonverbal techniques 
[Spradley, 1979; Burgess, 1984; Gillham, 2000; Fetterman, 1998].
Designing the interview schedule
The interview schedule was designed to gather demographics and ask about key details
about IV medication assembly and preparation identified from published literature, and
then discuss issues raised by the participant. Its format was based on Spradley’s
[1979;pp.85-91] ‘Grand Tour’ descriptive questions which,
“Aim to elicit a large sample o f utterances in the informant’s native language. They 
are intended to encourage an informant to talk about a particular cultural scene ” [p.85].
This technique allows freedom within the interview, where the aims of the interview and 
the topics limits are agreed at the outset. The participant is allowed to direct the shape and 
format of their responses. The interview schedule acts as prompts on a checklist; this 
flexible approach permitted questions to be asked when appropriate, including varying the 
question order [Burgess, 1984].
Pilot interview
The proposed interview schedule was piloted on two nurses who worked outside the study 
Trust [appendix 23]. The schedule was amended in light of comments and feedback from
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the interviewees, particularly to clarify the wording for the target audience, shown in figure 
5.1.
(To be read by the interviewer before beginning the interview)
Hello, my name is Clare Crowley. I am the lead researcher on the project entitled: healthcare 
practitioners* perceptions of intravenous medicines assembly and preparation in clinical areas - a 
medicines safety perspective. This project is part of my PhD studies at Cardiff University. I am 
interested in your thoughts and opinions on these issues and would like to spend up to an hour to 
discuss them.
Thank you for your willingness to participate in this research project, it is very much appreciated. I 
plan to tape record the session, but will destroy the recording after I have completed my PhD 
research. I need a recording of your agreement to this so will start the recorder now............
Just before we start the interview I want to reassure you have very definite rights.
First, your participation in this interview is entirely voluntary.
You are free to refuse to answer any question at any time.
You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time.
The interview will be kept strictly confidential and will only be available to members of the 
research team.
Excerpts of this interview may be part of the final report, but under no circumstances will your 
name or identifying characteristics be included in this report or any publication.
Please confirm that you understand that should you disclose that you have caused deliberate harm, 
or are aware of some one who has, but have done nothing about this I will terminate the interview? 
I am then required to start a trust incident report, which includes the serious incident policy?
I would be grateful if you could sign the consent form.
(Completed forms -interviewer keep one copy, leave other copy with participant 
Where consent not obtained, destroy form and audio recording and thank participant)
Then, shall we begin................
If you have any questions or would like anything clarified, please ask me as we go along. 
(Unlimited non-verbal and verbal probing and prompting at interviewers discretion)
First I would like some background information on where you work.
Which wards or departments do you work in?
What type of patients do you care for in your clinical area(s)?
In a typical shift how many intravenous doses would you administer to a patient?
Of these, how many would require some form of manipulation at ward level before you could 
administer them to the patient.
In a typical shift, how many staff would be eligible to do this?
Grand tour questions
This card contains definitions of intravenous medicines assembly and preparation.
(Give 'show card' with definitions on.)
Please take your time to read this, I am going to leave you to do that. (Check -  Have you had an 
chance to think about that? before proceeding)
How would vou refer to these processes?
Is that what most people would say?
Are there any other terms or names you would normally use?
Figure 5.1 Interview schedule
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It is these areas that I am interested in, so I would like to restrict the focus of the interview to these 
issues.
What are the common stages in iv medicines assembly (substitute their terminology)
How would you usually make an iv bolus dose in a syringe?
How would you usually make an iv infusion dose?
Can you recall the last five or so iv doses that you made on the ward?
Now I would like you to imagine that you are making an iv bolus drug in a syringe of your 
choice. Can you talk me through each of the steps that you would take, from reading the 
prescription through until you are ready to start administration? (if can't think of example suggest 
iv furosemide)
Now I would like you to imagine that you are making an iv infusion drug of your choice. Can
you talk me through each of the steps that you would take, from reading the prescription through 
until you are ready to start administration? (if can’t think of example suggest iv antibiotic 
infusion)
Mini tour questions:
What difficulties do you come across when doing these tasks?
Can you think of some specific examples you could tell me about?
How do you overcome these difficulties?
Can you talk me through two different examples you have been involved with, and show me how 
they were solved?
Typically, what sources of advice or information do you use?
Can you give me the names of the books, websites etc (use prompt from above question) that you 
refer to?
How long have you been preparing iv medicines for?
How did you learn your skills for assembly and preparation (use their words)?
Can you describe in detail any training that you have undertaken about iv medicines?
Do you have any suggestions about how this could be improved?
What do you feel are the most important areas that should be looked into, to make preparing iv 
medicines easier?
What do you feel are the most important areas that should be looked into, to make preparing iv 
medicines safer?
Can you suggest some examples of how this might be improved?
Which drugs cause you a problem when making up?
Can you explain why this is?
Can you recall a specific example?
Can you recall the circumstances where you were most concerned about making up iv doses?
Could you explain why this is?
Do you ever ask for a colleague to check your preparation?
If yes, could you expand on when?
Can you give me some specific examples?
Figure 5.1 Interview schedule continued...
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Are there any safe practices that have been put in place where you work?
Now I am coming near the end, are there any issues you would like to raise?
Within this Trust, please state your current title and grade for your main job.
What length shifts do you work?
Do you also work elsewhere?
If yes, please tell me about this...
Finally then, if it were up to you, what do you feel is the most important issue to tackle first? 
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Thank you, you’ve given me a lot of useful material. I’m really grateful.
(Issue leaflet)
Probe reminders
What makes you say that?
You’ve lost me there, could you explain....
What exactly do you mean when you say “........”
How did you cope with that?
Let me see if I’ve got things in the right order...
What happened after that?
Tell me a bit about...
What were your expectations?
Prompt reminders (use bold ones first)
Interruptions
Ward staffing/nursing establishment
Nursing shortage/lack of registered nurses 
Obtaining drug supplies 
Priority amongst other nursing duties 
Maths skills/drug calculations 
Culture
Appropriate work surfaces 
Induction process 
Medical training
Figure 5.1 Interview schedule continued...
5.3.4 Sample recruitm ent
It was anticipated that the sample size would be small, ideally 20 subjects; a maximum of 
50 subjects was set for feasibility purposes.
Subjects were recruited by an opportunistic sampling strategy. Consent was gained from 
the managers/nursing leads for each clinical division for their staff to participate in this 
study, with the potential service benefits to the Trust used as a motivating factor for their 
involvement. All divisions granted approval, and were asked to display poster 
advertisements in staff areas.
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Inclusion criteria
Nurses involved in IV medication assembly and preparation in hospital clinical areas 
including bank and agency staff.
Exclusion criteria
Bank staff that also work weekdays (8am-6pm) at the Radcliffe Infirmary.
Expert advisors on the project e.g. IV therapy practice development nurse, and any 
colleagues aware o f the lead investigator’s professional role.
Student practitioners.
Those that practiced exclusively outside the hospital setting e.g. community midwives. 
Staff authorised to administer IVs that required no manipulation at ward level e.g. 
fluids.
As the researcher had worked as a clinical pharmacist at the Radcliffe Infirmary since 
January 2004, subjects that may have come into contact with the researcher in her 
professional role were excluded from the study. The researcher had attempted to preserve 
her research anonymity through avoiding visible working on the recruiting sites, including 
weekend and on-call duties. Recruitment to the study was slow; therefore a substantive 
study amendment was applied for to extend those areas eligible for inclusion to the care of 
the elderly wards at The Radcliffe Infirmary. Although this was granted, no one from this 
site was interviewed.
Posters were hand delivered to all clinical areas to be displayed in prominent staff areas 
e.g. tea room, requesting those involved in preparing IVs to contact the researcher for 
further information [appendix 24]. The poster was also displayed on the intranet. Potential 
participants who contacted the researcher were screened for study inclusion [appendix 25], 
and those eligible were sent a letter at their work address with details of the study, 
information; consent forms and a confidentiality form [appendix 26]. They were asked to 
indicate their willingness to participate on a reply slip. This was returned through the 
internal mail to the researcher care of the Pharmacy and Therapy Director’s Personal 
Assistant to prevent coercion or bias. The researcher could also be contacted by a radio 
pager dedicated for this study. Each responding participant was then contacted at work to 
arrange a suitable date and time for interview. This was verified by telephone 24-48 hours 
before the agreed meeting in a manner convenient to the respondent.
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5.3.5 Data collection
All interviews were carried out in a neutral, private area remote from both the participant’s 
working environment and the pharmacy department. This minimised bias, background 
noise, and interruptions during the interview. On the John Radcliffe site the Patient Advice 
Liaison Managers office, located near the main entrance was used. At the Churchill site, a 
consulting room within the Hugh Ellis Paediatric Assessment Centre was made available. 
However, some participants were interviewed at an alternative location because of 
participant preference e.g. ward seminar room.
Information disclosed during the interview was anonymised. The only exception was to be 
if participants disclosed awareness of they, or another, causing deliberate harm. If this 
arose, the ethics submission indicated that interview would be terminated and the process 
outlined in figure 5.2 followed. Participants were made aware o f this in the written 
information previously issued, and it was also reiterated before the interview started.
As the research area was a sensitive issue it was possible the participants might become 
upset or distressed whilst discussing issues. This was more likely if  they realised during the 
interview that they had been involved or had witnessed a preparation error. Therefore, if 
the participant became obviously distressed the researcher would terminate the interview. 
It was intended that the interview guide would be modified in light of key themes 
identified from the interviews. No modification was required. Sampling was continued 
until no new themes emerged in subsequent interviews. Once this stage was reached two 
further interviews were performed to confirm theme saturation.
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Research participant, having consented to 
inclusion in the research study reveals 
evidence of either unsafe practice by them 
self, or deliberate malpractice by them self 
or another practitioner currently employed 
by the ORH Trust.___________________
i
Researcher confirms that they have not 
misheard or misunderstood what the 
interview participant said, with unlimited 
verbal prompting as needed.__________
yes
Has the participant disclosed evidence of The interview will be terminated and the
practice intended to deliberately harm? Trust incident reporting policy instigated.
Has the participant disclosed unsafe 
practice that in the researchers view is not 
common within the organisation and is 
potentially dangerous?
yes
The interview will continue until 
completion. After the interview the 
researchers’ concerns will be fed back 
directly to the participant, and the 
participant advised that it is their 
responsibility to seek help to rectify these 
issues themselves as a priority e.g. by 
training.
Their attention will be drawn to the 
section on the leaflet issued at the end of 
the interview to all research participants 
with suitable contacts.
These issues will also be reported to the 
organisation at the end of the study, but 
the participant’s anonymity will be 
preserved.________________________
If the participant disclosed poor practice, 
which in the researcher’s view, is not 
regarded as unusual or immediately 
dangerous practice.
The interview will continue until 
completion. These issues will be fed back 
to the organisation with the results at the 
end of the study. These areas will be 
highlighted within the report._________
Figure 5,2 Procedure to be followed in the event of actual or potential disclosure of unsafe 
or deliberate malpractice by an interview participant during the research interview.
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The interview
The interviewer confirmed that written consent had been obtained before the interview 
started, and verbally checked that the participant understood. They were reminded to ask 
any questions, or to ask for clarification at any stage. The researcher was able to make 
notes for use as prompts during the interview, and explained to the participant that this was 
to avoid interrupting them. To enable active listening and a verbatim record, the interview 
was audio recorded onto a memory card using a digital voice recorder (Sanyo ICR-B150). 
A leaflet containing general information on IV medicines assembly and preparation with 
practical tips was issued to each participant at the end of the interview [appendix 27].
5.3.6 Data analysis
Each interview transcript was downloaded to an ORH computer, with additional password 
security. The interviews were transcribed verbatim with respondents’ details and clinical 
areas coded to preserve confidentiality. The coding data were kept separate from the 
transcripts. The audio recordings, transcripts and back up computer files were stored in a 
locked filing cabinet within the pharmacy department, only accessible to the researcher. 
Once the thesis has been completed and the degree awarded, these recordings will be 
destroyed.
The transcripts were imported into a computer assisted coding package [QSR N6], and 
qualitatively analysed using the ‘framework’ analytic approach [Ritchie & Spencer, 2002]. 
The key features o f framework analysis are:
■ Grounded or generative -  developed from original accounts and observations of the 
participants.
■ Dynamic -  open to change, addition and amendment throughout analysis.
■ Systematic -  permits methodical treatment of all similar units of analysis.
■ Comprehensive -  enables full review of the data collected.
■ Easily retrievable — allows between- and within-case analysis.
It is undertaken in five stages, with both concurrent and sequential working between 
stages. These are summarised in table 5.1. To ensure quality, the researcher’s PhD 
supervisor independently validated the themes identified.
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Table 5.1 Summary of the process of framework analysis [Ritchie & Spencer, 2002]
Sequence Analytical stage Description
1 Familiarisation The researcher immerses themselves in the data collected.
2 Identification of 
thematic framework
Recurrent themes that emerge as important to those 
interviewed are recorded. A list of key issues, concepts and 
themes is compiled, with consideration of the research aims 
and emergent issues. This is iteratively applied to the 
transcripts and refined until the emergent and analytical 
themes are clear. An index framework with categories and 
themes produced.
3 Indexing The index is systematically applied to the transcripts.
4 Charting The indexed data is collated under its coded theme. For each 
theme a summary of each respondent’s view is made.
5 Mapping and 
interpretation
Key themes arising from the data, charting from section 4 and 
the research aims are noted. The characteristics of each 
category’s range, limits, commonality and divergence are 
recorded. Check for association, explanations and within and 
between respondent’s attitudes and opinions. Suggest 
strategies for change.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Recruitment results
A total of 19 nurses replied to the recruitment invitation, of which 16 consented to and 
completed the interview. Three nurses were lost to follow-up, one due to the unreliability 
of the internal post, one did not reply and the third went on long-term sick leave after 
agreeing to participate.
The nurses ranged from D to I grade with previous and current experience in a variety of 
clinical settings including general and specialist surgery, medicine, emergency and critical 
care environments caring for both adults and children. All respondents were female and 
had been preparing IV doses for between six months to over 30 years. Further 
demographic elaboration has not been undertaken as it could enable respondents to be 
identified.
5.4.2 Interview results
Thematic analysis o f the transcripts identified three broad categories. These are described 
below:
Description of the preparation process.
Physical constraints on the preparation process.
Issues that arise during the preparation process.
An overview of the thematic framework is given in figure 5.3
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Category The
preparation
process
Physical 
constraints on 
the preparation 
process.
Issues that arise during 
the preparation 
process.
Information and 
training
- Theme. - Definitions.
- Terminology.
- Process 
described.
- Workspace.
- Interruptions.
- Time pressures 
and competing 
commitments.
- Staff availability.
- Unavailability of 
equipment.
- Unavailability of 
medication.
- Culture.
- Medicines specific
issues (problems
and solutions):
- M athem atics an d  
m easurem ent.
- Reconstitution  
an d  mixing.
- O pera tor caution.
- O verarching issues
- Global solutions:
- Labelling.
- Checking.
- P resentation  o f  
the m edicine.
- Evidence of a 
training or 
competency 
deficit.
- Skills and 
knowledge base.
- Initial training.
- Ongoing training.
- Competency.
Figure 5.1 An overview o f the categories and themes identified.
5.4.3 T h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  p r o c e s s
The nurses were asked a variety o f questions to establish their views on the scope and 
components in the IV preparation process.
5.4.3.1 Definitions and terminology
During the interview definitions o f IV medicines assembly and preparation were shown, 
and comments requested. The responses showed that assembly was not a concept used in 
their practice. Typical comments received are shown below.
I wouldn V quite call it assembly, its IV preparation, gathering your equipment the whole 
thing is a preparation o f  going on [N07:64-66].
...I don ’t think anyone would say assembly [N08:159-160].
I t ’s not such a conscious action that ... it seems to come across as when i t ’s written down 
as IV medication assembly [N16:112-114].
The nurses included assembly under the umbrella o f preparation, as illustrated by the 
following comments:
...it just all comes under the one thing, preparation. You can ’t really split it down [N07:66- 
67].
I probably would call the whole lot preparation and not distinguish between one and the 
other. From start to finish I prepare it by getting it together and putting it together 
[N09:49-51].
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The preparation of the flush solution(s) was described as an integral part o f the preparation 
stage. The comments highlight that the boundaries of where preparation starts and finishes 
varied between respondents. A pre-preparation process was described which included 
evaluating the patient's suitability for medication, or establishing the patient's vascular 
access. The limits o f where preparation finished and administration began were also 
discussed. Some typical examples are described below.
...depends i f  they’ve got IVfluids running or not. I f  they’ve IVfluids running the 1*11 get a 
5ml flush i f  they haven 7 then I I I  get a 10ml /7ks/l..[N10:135-137].
But it also takes on the patient condition as well, because sometimes before you even get to 
go and think o f  preparing a medication, you *re already assessing whether the patient has 
allergies ..., whether they’re suitable for medication. So why go and start preparing it i f  
they can 7 have it? [N08:146-150].
I  think preparation is quite a descriptive word. It describes the whole process really up to 
the point o f  actually administering, to me. I  mean that includes the preparation o f just 
immediately prior to infusing it at the bedside, or administering it at the bedside. So that 
would include the extra hand washing or hand rub, or clearing the bed space... [N03:77- 
82].
Respondents reported using a range of every day terms to describe assembly and 
preparation, summarised in figure 5.4. They did not appear to clearly distinguish the 
composite stages involved, but gathered them all under the umbrella o f IV administration. 
The term the nurses repeatedly cited was ‘drawing up’.
Draw up, drawing up, draw up the IVs Mix, mixing, mix up
Get ready, get an IV, get together Prepare, preparing
Give an IV Put it up
Make up, making up Reconstitution
Figure 5.4 Everyday terms that nurses used to describe IV assembly and preparation
5.4.3.2 Process described.
An overview of the stages the interviewees undertook when preparing an IV medication 
dose, starting from when it is clear a dose was required, until preparation was completed 
are shown in figure 5.5
When describing the steps involved in preparing a medicine dose it was apparent that there 
were common actions predominantly undertaken by most of the nurses interviewed.
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However, in other areas there were inconsistencies in practice, as the nurses reported 
approaching similar tasks in different ways. One nurse eloquently described this as:
I  think fo r the most part, I  would say probably 90 to 95% o f what we do is the same 
[N14:897-898].
Those interviewed identified a number of areas of controversy with respect to preparation 
practice. A typical example is described.
And there's always a bit [of a] debate, you know, over whether you should clean things or 
you shouldn't clean them and what size needle you should use and things like that you 
know, but the Trust doesn't have a stance on any o f  that, ... its all about your own 
professional practice [N04:532-536].
The nurses were asked to recount the steps involved in preparing an IV bolus dose of their 
choice. A summary of these, identifying areas of commonality and divergence is shown in 
table 5.2.
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Medicine reconstituted with diluent
Medicine transferred 
to infusion via a 
reconstitution device
Single 
dose vial
AmpouleMultidose
vial
Withdrawn 
into a 
syringe
Unreconstitued dry 
powder medicine, 
presented as:
Withdrawn 
and diluted 
in a syringe
Added to an 
infusion bag
Patient requires a dose 
of iv medicine
Medicine already in 
solution in vial or 
ampoule
Medicine dose in solution drawn into a syringe
Added to a burette and 
diluted with the 
attached 
solution
Ready for administration to a patient via an iv 
cannula, infusion port or infusion tubing.
Figure 5.5 Schematic representations of different paths that may be taken in preparing on 
IV medication, depending upon the initial medicine presentation and intended method of 
administration.
The nurses interviewed revealed particular anxiety and concern about using needles during 
IV preparation. Most o f this concern arose from a fear o f needle stick injuries to
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themselves or their colleagues. Therefore this is covered under operation caution, section 
5.4.3.4.3.
Table 5.2 Summary of the key steps involved in preparing an IV bolus dose requiring 
reconstitution and withdrawal into a syringe._______________________________________
Common steps Variance in practice
I. Check the prescription.
5. Prescription is taken to the 
preparation area.
9. Medicine and diluents assembled.
10. Syringes, needles and other 
disposable equipment assembled.
II. Dose prepared into a receiver or 
onto work surface.
12. Name, dose and expiry of
medicine and diluent(s) checked.
15. Visual check of reconstituted 
dose e.g. no residue, particle free 
etc.
19. Compatible flush prepared.
2. Check the patient’s allergy status.
3. Patient specific assessments that may determine how the 
IV dose is prepared e.g. fluid restriction.
4. Identify that vascular access is available and what type.
5. Area varies from patient bedside to treatment room.
6. Receptacle and/or work surface cleaned.
7. Gloves are worn, particularly if an antibiotic is being 
prepared or glass ampoules are used.
8. An information source is consulted, particularly if it is 
an unfamiliar medicine.
10. The equipment available for reconstitution and transfer 
varied from solely needles to needle free devices. 
Needle used varied from orange (23 gauge) to green 
(19 gauge)
11. This ranged from a disposable papier-mach£ to a 
designated reusable plastic tray.
12. Visual check of appearance of container and contents.
13. Top of vial swabbed with alcohol
14. Sealed system generally maintained throughout 
preparation, some didn’t e.g. injected air to equal 
pressure differences.
16. Air bubbles collected and expelled.
17. Labelled the product. Infrisions were labelled, but 
practice varied in other situations from no label to 
labelling if there was more than one syringe of the 
same volume.
18. Preparation checked. This varied from no checks to all
preparation checked. A common practice was 
checking in specific cases e.g. part vials, unfamiliar 
medicines, vancomycin, insulin etc.
5.4.3.3 P h y s i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  o n  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  p r o c e s s .
5.4.3.3.1 Workspace
During the interviews the nurses expressed numerous issues relating to the environment in 
which IV medicines preparation occurred in their clinical area. The nurses identified 
difficult situations and predicaments which they had encountered. Typical examples are 
given below.
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Problems
... at the moment the area we prepare our IV  drugs, is the same area we use to check 
controlled drugs, and the same we use to unpack pharmacy when it comes. So its one big 
work station, but we only got one work area that is fla t and clean enough to use for  
preparing IV  drugs, so its currently got lots o f uses [N09:663-667].
...I don't like two lots o f  drugs on one table.... I  think i t ’s a recipe fo r  disaster, we draw up 
so many drugs, any drug, that i f  I  was drawing up metoclopramide and someone else put 
cyclizine on the side, I  don ’t want to accidentally pick up their cyclizine while I'm drawing 
up my metoclopramide. I  want to make sure my drug stays separate from their drug, to 
make sure I  don 7 accidentally pick up their syringe... [N09:195, 199-203].
In an ideal world you would have a designated area fo r  preparation o f intravenous drugs 
[N01:567-568].
Summary: The respondents advocated a designated area for IV preparation. However, in 
reality some found that they prepared IV doses in conditions they considered less than 
ideal.
Solutions
Some examples of the ways in which the respondents had overcome the difficulty 
associated with no dedicated workspace for preparing IVs are shown below.
The main thing is space and i f  you ve got more than one person making up drugs it 's 
easier to come back and wait until later on, but that's not always practical [N09:188-200].
...some will come along while I'm in the middle o f drawing something up and [someone] 
come along and start something next to it. And what I  tend to do then, is the tray I  already 
got to one side, I  put everything in the tray and then work from the tray then, rather than 
work from the work surface [N09:212-216].
... the only solutions that you come up with was like to have another little trolley, that you 
like, like the patients bedside trolley which you say push over and then say draw up on 
there [N08:684-686].
So, sometimes you might take it all, what you require to the patient ’s bedside i f  there were 
too many people around... [N08:729-730].
...redesigned our treatment room and we just had basically kitchen units and kitchen 
surfaces put in. But it meant that we had long bench areas where someone could work one 
bench and you could work on another bench [N13:389-392].
Summary: The nurses acknowledged that a dedicated space for IV preparation was the 
ideal. However, in practice they had developed local solutions which partially addressed 
this limitation.
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S.4.3.3.2 Interruptions
A common issue identified by the nurses as problematic were avoidable interruptions and 
distractions during the preparation process. These they identified as creating opportunities 
for error.
Problems
The nurses interviewed identified a range of problems created by interruptions, examples 
are described below.
Distractions I  think are a problem because I  think that’s possibly when errors happen 
[N03:715-716].
I  think they [interruptions] are potential areas where errors could come in, 4cause i f  you 
can't concentrate properly ... [N05:546-548].
I  think a lot o f  it is being disturbed with either phone calls or other members o f  staff 
coming in. Sometimes there can be a lot o f staff in any one area at any one time, and 
you’re kind of; you know battling a bit for space. That ’s very dangerous because then 
you’ve got a lot o f  drug charts laid out in front o f you, and that is an issue [N13:347-351].
... i f  you leave a tray unattended somebody could have put something else on that tray or 
taken something o ff that tray so, i t ’s time consuming because you just have to go through 
the process o f  checking the bottles and the vial etc and everything again, so that you can 
be sure that what you are drawing up is what you intended to draw up [N03:360-374].
So when you draw up or prepare a drug for somebody that is number one priority and 
you’ve got to concentrate on that and not try and do six other things at once. But i f  you 
have to stop what you ’re doing, well you have to start again from scratch... You have 
to discard all that and go to the cupboard again and start absolutely from scratch... 
[N12:461-464,466-467].
Summary: The nurses interviewed revealed that avoidable interruptions interfered with 
their concentration, and increased the likelihood of not completing the preparation task as 
intended.
Solutions
Several suggestions for minimising interruptions were given. Typical examples are 
described below.
I  think the main bonus o f  it is having this admin person there who can just field  things a bit 
for us, just fo r  5 minutes whilst you finish what you ’re doing, because it doesn’t actually 
take you very long but i t ’s not a good idea to be interrupted [N05:577-581].
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... i f  you had a room that was solely designated to drawing up drugs and only had the 
equipment fo r drawing up drugs in there. People could assume that i f  the door was shut 
and you were in there drawing up drugs, that that was your job fo r  that moment and not to 
disturb you [N03:380-384].
...maybe some sort o f  notice on the door saying please don’t interrupt unless you have to... 
[N05:781-783].
I f  fo r instance I  was drawing up a morphine infusion there's no way I  would go to the 
telephone fo r  that. I  would just ask someone to phone back. So you just have to weigh up 
what you 're doing with the need fo r being distracted or taken away from it [N03:391-395].
So there's always interruptions all the time and you have to be able to say “well no I'm  
doing this ", but then you know it's going to take 10, 15 minutes to sort o f  draw it up, give 
it. It's just trying to stay focused and concentrate [N15:368-372].
I  normally try and get a quite time to do things, or i f  it gets really pushed I'll say to 
someone else I ’ve got all this to do, do you mind doing that fo r  me or something [N10:356- 
360].
But then very often I  won't start doing it, i f  I  think I'm going to get called away. I f  I'm 
waiting fo r a phone call I  wont go in treatment room and start drawing up antibiotics 
because there's no point i f  I ’m going to get called away half way through [N09:466-469].
Summary: From the interviews, the nurses were aware that distractions could give rise to 
errors, and advocated several practical measures to minimise these including challenging 
non urgent requests for their attention, instigating ‘no interruption’ during drug 
administration and using clerical staff as an initial point of contact for queries in clinical 
areas.
5.4.3.3.3 Time pressures and competing commitments
Preparing IV medicines was just one of a wide range of duties that nurses were required to 
perform. The nurses interviewed recounted the need to prioritise their workload and 
manage IV preparation along with competing commitments.
Problems
Some typical examples o f the issues the nurses confronted everyday are described below.
...one o f  the bigger problems is that sometimes the ward is just so busy that you are trying 
to juggle several different jobs at the same time [N03:360-362].
Time, is usually quite a constraint because there lots o f  other things going on at the same 
time, so the sort o f  the time that the IV  drugs are due often corresponds with when you 're 
trying to do other drugs as well [N15:238-240].
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... you worry that one o f these days you know there could be a mistake made because you 
are rushing and you shouldn’t. I t ’s not something that should be rushed but you feel that 
you do sometimes just to get everything done for somebody [N02:267-268].
... sometimes you know things have to be done at speed because they want the patient to 
have a, the drug now and they want to get them down to some department. There’s a lot o f  
pressure to do things very quickly sometimes. Um, sometimes, you know, i f  you are sort o f  
fingers and thumbs because you ’.re trying to do things in a hurry you can drop something, 
in which case you rather have to go back to the drawing board to wash your hands, to get 
another sterile syringe, needle, drug, whatever you know it breaks up the proceedings a bit 
and I  suppose also the more o f  a hurry you ’re in and so on mistakes are more likely to 
happen [N12:438-446]
... the last few  nights have just been overwhelmingly busy and therefore I ’ve been quite 
late with my IVs. I ’m very aware that i t ’s quite late and therefore I  am sort of, Ifee l myself 
under stress to get them out and in there, you know, as close as possible on time bearing in 
mind that you ’ve got to give them again at 6am in the morning, so that makes me quite 
anxious. Being tired is a big thing, especially on night duty [N13:354-360].
Summary: The nurses reported that clinical areas are busy with a heavy workload, and that 
preparing IV medicines was a competing pressure.
Solutions
The nurses interviewed suggested a number of solutions to resolve the problems they 
experience with time pressures and competing commitments affecting IV medicines 
preparation. Typical examples are given below.
The main way round it, is you ’ve got two members o f  staff on night shift who both do 
intravenous antibiotics then you can split it up between you, then you only do one or two 
each [N09:756-758].
What we do say to them is to delegate their intravenous things i f  they’re busy [N09:830- 
831].
I  think i t ’s just time management on the nurses side to look at their charts and see what 
they’ve got to give and what time its got to be given and actually manage their time 
appropriately to f it  it in [N15:454-456].
Lunchtime isn ’t as bad even though antibiotics are all due at the same time, one person 
will do them at half 12 and the other will do them at half one [N09: 225-227].
... our intravenous antibiotics are given at 6 o ’clock in the morning, so is frusemide
[furosemide] given at 6 o ’clock in the morning any IV  drug that’s written up fo r 8
o ’clock is given prior to the arrival o f  the day staff, so it gets actually given earlier than 8 
o ’clock [N01:550-551,554-556].
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So that's the oral drug round that shifted to the morning staff... And w e’re not doing both 
oral drug round and IV  drug round as it were so that I  think probably weighing up the pros 
and cons is probably slightly safer [N13: 760, 764-766].
... whether you had a cor.., pool team o f IV  administrators that came round to the ward 
and gave IV  drugs? [N13:654-656].
... the only other thing that would maybe improve practice is i f  you had one person on that 
shift whose responsible for giving all the IV  drugs... [N13:641 -643].
Summary: The nurses provided a variety of suggestions to overcome the time required and 
pressures involved with IV preparation. These included delegating IV preparation and 
administration to another nurse on duty, reconsidering the scheduling of medicines 
administration rounds and reassigning this responsibility.
5.4.3.3.4 Staff availability
The nurses interviewed reported there was a shortage of suitably trained nursing staff, and 
this was a constraint on preparing patients’ IV medicines.
Problems
Typical examples of staffing problems described during in the interview are provided 
below.
...wards are quite short [of nurses] and we’re forever lending to other wards [N 10:616- 
618].
Yeah tiredness is quite difficult actually. I t ’s all right at 10 o ’clock at night because that’s 
your normal sort o f  waking sort o f  working pattern, but when yo u ’ve been awake all night 
and often have worked during the day, which you will find  with bank nurses happens all 
the time [N13:462-465].
... the girl I  was working with on Thursday night had worked an early shift and was 
working the night shift, so that happens therefore, you know it will happen. It will get 
worse and worse as NHSP [National Health Service Professionals i.e. NHS bank staff] are 
becoming increasingly unable to fill our shifts and therefore the ward will be relying on 
substantive staff to do it [N13:468-472].
Summary: Those consulted reported a shortage of qualified nursing staff, and difficulties 
recruiting temporary staff to fulfil the nursing establishment. This shortage was considered 
to impact on the nurse’s ability to prepare IV therapy.
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Solutions
The only solution given was to increase staffing.
...lots more time, more nurses... [N 10:616].
Summary: No solutions were given, with the exception of needing qualified nurses if IV 
preparation practice were to continue in its present format.
5.4.3.3.5 Unavailability of equipment
The interviewees highlighted problems with the availability and accessibility of the 
disposables e.g. needles, syringes. This posed a problem when they were required for 
medicines preparation and were not available, particularly during times o f high usage.
Problems
Typical examples of the problems that the nurses recounted with missing equipment are 
shown below.
They [general hospital stores] know what our routine stock would be but i f  our demands 
have been greater than our routine stock then they don’t know that. ... We pre-empt that 
and say look we need extra this week or whatever. But then you run into problems with 
storage space, you know we don’t have the space to store vast amounts o f  extra equipment, 
and because it then becomes a hazard you trip, you know you ’re going to trip over it, or 
store it in places that aren ’t particularly appropriate [N03:414-416, 418-423].
When yo u ’ve run out o f  needles or syringes and you have to go down to the store cupboard 
and to get them and bring them back up because somebody hasn ’t bothered? ... normally 
our night staff are very good and they fill it all up for us, but sometimes i f  it hasn ’t been 
done and you ’ve run out or somebody’s used the last one and not gone and got another 
box [N10:671-673, 675-678].
... you go to get something and you find that you’ve run out and somebody hasn’t 
reordered it, that’s always a pain in the neck. Umm i t ’s often very practical things ... 
[N14:673-674].
And o f  course i f  yo u ’re waiting, then the patients waiting as well and that can be 
problematic at times too [N14:686-697].
Summary: The nurses suggested that to prepare patients’ IV medicines in a timely manner, 
the disposable equipment needs to be readily accessible in the preparation area. In addition 
they need such supplies to be provided in a manner that could accommodate variable 
demand.
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Solutions
The only solution one interviewee provided was to source it from another clinical area.
... waiting for it to come up from stores takes time, so we often go to the wards from either 
side and beg, steal and borrow it. [N03:403-405].
Summary: A nurse reported difficulties in obtaining equipment in a timely manner. 
Consideration needs to be given to managing peaks in demand for disposable equipment.
5.4.3.3.6 Unavailability of medication
The nurses interviewed in this study recounted problems when medicines were 
unavailable. They suggested that it often arose due to a lack or planning and foresight.
Problem
The nurses described the situation where they had become reliant on the availability of 
stock medicines. Typical examples are given below.
... the biggest difficulty is that you get there and somebody's used the last dose and hasn ’t 
said so, ... especially with the antibiotics is you have to give them every 6 hours to keep the 
levels up. So you ’re then having to chase pharmacy to get some more, you know which just 
takes time... [N04:238-242].
Certainly that happens a lot on the [Clinical area 22], just because they ’re so many people 
that are on so many intravenous drugs and erm.... particularly at the weekends, there 
always seems to be such bad planning for the weekends. You would think by now 
everybody would have the weekends sussed and try and look at things on Thursday 
evenings and Friday during the day and say you know, have we got enough to see us 
through the weekend or not? But certainly I ’ve had situations where you ’ve gone to get 
something and its not there and err and then you have to spend time calling round to other 
wards and saying, you know have you got any o f  this? You know and can you spare us 
some, can you spare two because I ’m going to give one now and one a 6 o ’clock in the 
morning? [N14:701-711].
... you quickly need to draw up an adrenaline infusion and you go to the cupboard and 
somebody hasn’t restocked it. Umm i t ’s been a particularly busy shift or something and 
they just haven’t got there yet and then you have to run o ff and the pharmacy box hasn’t 
been emptied for example..., you ’re rummaging though the pharmacy box [N16:566-570].
Summary: The nurses interviewed identified a lack o f forward planning to prevent running 
out of IV medication prescribed, or routinely used in their clinical areas.
189
Chapter 5: N urses’ perceptions o f  IV medicines assembly and preparation errors in clinical areas 
Solutions
The nurses explained that to resolve this issue, advance planning was needed, to prevent 
shortages. It was important that such issues were communicated from one nursing staff 
team to the next and to pharmacy colleagues.
...that's the last dose that I'm going to give fo r example and we need some ordering ... 
[N06:337-339].
I t ’s [an] individual’s responsibility to think ahead. Not everyone does that, but it has to be 
almost ingrained to become part o f  a culture and thinking, right i t 's the weekend and we 
need to get, you know, Fridays the only day we get some antibiotics or some ranitidine. So 
let 5 order some more, and so i t 's just sort o f  thinking really [N13:456-461].
We do have a daily, a pharmacist who comes round every day so i f  we run into problems 
with stock items then we generally report it to her and she j l  try and speed things up to get 
us some up, or we can just take a patient prescription down to the pharmacy... [N03:434- 
438].
Summary: The nurses identified that an integral part o f patients IV therapy is taking 
responsibility to ensure that medication for subsequent doses is available in the clinical 
area.
5.4.3.3.7 Culture
The nurses interviewed raised concerns about several cultural issues which they considered 
affected patient safety.
Problems
A number of difficulties were shared during the interview. These included the nurse’s 
ability to ask questions, even if these were directed to a senior or more experienced 
colleague. They disclosed that they did not feel this aspect of a no- or fair-blame culture 
had been adopted, and that incidents were not universally accepted as opportunities for 
learning. Two examples of safety culture issues raised during the interviews are shown 
below.
...we're all too accepting o f  we come to work, and this is what we've been told to do. It 
doesn't mean that it's all right, it's like i f  somebody comes out and says that's OK you give 
it, and they 're a very senior person. It takes a very long time to be able to learn that skill to 
be able to say no [N08:728-730].
...we say we 're blame free but I  think a lot ofpeople, when they write their incident reports 
especially i f  you know, you 're an adaptation nurse and you've come from another country
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and you know they 're terrified i f  they make a mistake they might be deregistered or you 
know have to go home, so you know, them writing an incident form is something they really 
have grave fears about the consequences, whether they 're going to get into serious trouble, 
what's going to happen from this. ...for them to recognise that incident reports are there to 
help us [N08:1062-1069,1075-1076].
Summary'. The nurses had reservations about how embedded the safety culture was within 
the Trust.
Solutions
Those interviewed advised that incident reporting, and its potential value should be 
included in IV training.
I  think it would be nice i f  we could get into a situation where we all realise that its better to 
tell everybody what you've done [N08:1054-1056].
One nurse reflected positively on their efforts to minimise interruptions, and demonstrated 
learning from those colleagues creating the distractions.
We've actually now started saying to the doctors “I'm sorry I  can't talk to you at the 
moment you '11 just have to wait a minute " [N05:555-556].
...and they're more used to it now and they will actually i f  they see that were busy doing 
something like that, they will actually just stand and wait [N05.*559-561].
Summary: Those interviewed advocated further work to embed a fair-blame culture within 
the organisation, to enable staff working with patients to share any incidents and concerns.
5.4.3.4 I s s u e s  a r i s i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  p r o c e s s .
The nurses discussed numerous problems and potential issues that they had encountered 
during IV medicines preparation which related to a medicine or the physical task of 
preparation. These are summarised in table 5.3.
The problems identified were categorised into four major areas:
1. Mathematics and measurement -  these centered on calculation tasks, many of 
which needed to be completed before preparation of the dose could begin.
2. Reconstitution and mixing -  numerous issues associated with practical aspects of 
reconstitution, dose withdrawal, additions and pharmaceutics were incorporated 
into this category.
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3. Operator caution -  this encompasses issues where the operator had heightened 
awareness primarily due to health and safety issues or error prone packaging and 
labelling.
4. Overarching issues -  issues encountered throughout the preparation process.
Table 5,3 Problems reported when preparing intravenous medicines*
Problem  type Details o f problem Example
M a t h e m a t ic s
a n d
MEASUREMENT
Calculation issues Unfractionated heparin infusions, adrenaline, 
paediatric doses, weight-based dose regimens, 
iron infusions
Weight based regimens Vancomycin, gentamicin, aminophylline, 
infliximab, acetylcysteine
Small doses Insulin, octreotide, paediatric doses
R e c o n s t it u t io n
AND MIXING
Highly effervescent TazocinTM
Foams Vancomycin, infliximab, streptokinase, 
ciclosporin, teicoplanin
Heavy, so settles as a 
concentrated layer in the 
infusion
Potassium chloride, ciclosporin
Difficult to accommodate 
the stated reconstitution 
volume in vial
Vancomycin, flucloxacillin, Tazocin™
Time consuming to 
reconstitute
Teicoplanin, immunoglobulin, Tazocin™, 
dantrolene, clarithromycin, amphotericin, 
vancomycin.
Vacuum packed Aprotonin, glyceryl trinitrate, fluconazole, 
propofol.
Require filtering Abciximab
Multiple vials needed to 
prepare dose
Gentamicin, acetylcysteine
Light protection Sodium nitroprusside
Physical strength required Withdrawing 50ml fluid from a 500ml infusion
O p e r a t o r
CAUTION
Objectionable smell Paraldehyde, acetylcysteine
Stains Multibionta™
Toxic metabolite Cyanide from sodium nitroprusside
Similar names Medicines starting c e f... e.g. ceffadrine, 
cefuroxime
Needle use Widespread but particularly used when adding 
to infusion bags.
Similar packaging Potassium chloride and miniplasco™ diluents, 
lidocaine and sodium chloride miniplasco™, 
different strengths o f  vancomycin.
O v e r a r c h in g Time consuming Cefuroxime and metronidazole co-infusion, 
controlled drugs
Unfamiliar Infliximab, adrenaline
Expensive Infliximab
f  To protect interviewee confidentiality the following examples have been taken from interviews N01-N16.
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The nurses reported a variety of difficulties that arose with particular medicines. In some 
cases, they revealed that if they knew of potential difficulties in preparing the medication 
then they would approach the preparation task in a different way.
Some medicines appeared in multiple categories, such as vancomycin, gentamicin, 
infliximab.
5.4.3.4.1 M a t h e m a t i c s  a n d  m e a s u r e m e n t
The nurses were concerned when preparing medicines that required one or more 
calculations in the preparation process.
Problems
The nurses highlighted the types of calculation that they found most troublesome. 
Examples are:
... /  have to be honest and say that [in] paediatrics all doses are based on weight and that 
terrifies me, absolutely terrified me [N02:722-723].
I  can work out drug calculation its not that I  can % but I  don ’t feel confident in complex 
calculations fo r  things like drugs specifically for children. When you go mmol per kg, mis 
per k g ... [N02:726-731].
.. .gentamicin I  found a real problem because the prescriptions write up some astronomical 
amount like seven hundred and eighty or something like that and the vial that it comes in 
are actually mg, 80mg in 2mls and erm you know I ’ll be the first one to admit that maths 
has not always been my strong point and I  find the calculation fo r  that quite difficult ... 
[N14:l 105-1110].
... i f  you ’re feeling rushed or under pressure, sometimes it can be difficult to calculate and 
your brain will just go, oh no! [N15:269-271].
Summary: Dose preparations requiring complex calculations, particularly weight based 
regimens, were a source of worry and anxiety for the nursing staff interviewed
Solutions
During the interviews the nurses shared different ways of overcoming this problem. 
Examples of these are given below.
I  always check things like that with my colleagues; you know just to make sure that I've got 
the math [sic] correct [N14:l 110-1112].
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... w e’ve got round the weight issues because w e’ve all got little cards that tell us how 
much we need fo r what weight, which is fantastic, as you know you ’ve got to draw up that 
many mis... [N02:633-636].
... an adrenaline infusion fo r a patient that was really, really sick and I  really just could 
not get my head around the 1000 and the 10,000 and one in, and phoned up CCU 
[Coronary Care Unit] and their senior nurse kindly came round and helped me with it 
[N02:769-772].
Summary: The nurses interviewed were aware of the potential mistakes involved in 
calculation and described the additional safety measures employed to support their 
practice.
5.4.3.4.2 R e c o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  m i x i n g
5,43,4.2.1 Foaming
The nurses described a phenomenon called 'foaming', which occurs when a medicine if 
shaken forms a froth which prevents accurate dose measurement. Sometimes this foam was 
produced reconstituting a freeze-dried powder. Many of those interviewed reported that 
teicoplanin was prone to this particular problem.
Problem
During the interview the nurses were asked to elaborate on the problems associated with 
foam production, some examples are given below.
A n d  docs the fro th ing  cause  u p rob lem ?  [iliscussinu teicoplanin]
Can do in that I  think sometimes the dose isn’t drawn up right, well not the total dose, i f  
you draw up froth and you look at the vial and it looks like you’ve got your 2mls in there 
which is what you require, once it all completely settles you may actually have only about 
a ml in there. So [if] people don ’t wait for that defrothing to happen then potentially 
you’ve got the wrong dose [N03:631-637].
...you have your little vial o f  teicoplanin and you have your little vial of, I  think its 3mls o f  
water fo r  injection and you don ’t think its going to be enough and your automatic reaction 
is push it in, put it in and push it in straight away and then shake it all, but you have to put 
in it a tiny wee bit and a time and roll it and then keep pushing it in and rolling it, pushing 
it in a rolling and it, and it just takes fo r ever and even rolling it and pushing it in i f  you 
roll it too quick or you push it in too quick it will just froth and you cant give it because 
you have to wait until it, you either have to throw it out or leave it fo r 20 minutes to get the 
froth down [N07:460-470].
... we give two thrombolysis drugs here streptokinase and tPA and the tPA comes with the 
vacuum things, and the transfer device and then you just whack one in and its mixing itself 
up as your getting the pump ready. Whereas this other stuff, streptokinase you ’re having to
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mixing it up and you have to be really careful; cause it just bubbles and bubbles and 
bubbles i f  yo u 're not really gentle with it. That’s horrendous drug to mix, absolutely 
horrendous [N02:559-605]
Summary: Nurses reported that medicines known to foam are time consuming to prepare. 
Rushing such preparation in these situations only created other difficulties and took longer 
than cautious preparation in the first place.
Solution
The only solution that the nurses provided was to reconstitute the medicine slowly, an 
example of which is given below.
You just have to do it really, really, really slowly but it takes longer and the thing is you, 
another one o f  clinical area 2 pressures is the 20 minute, door to needle time so you have 
to get it out as fast as you can. So you ’re trying to mix it slowly but you want to do it quick 
at the same time. So i t ’s a bit o f  nightmare drug to mix really [N02:599-605, 609-613].
Summary: For medications known to foam, the interviewees advised that the only option 
was to allocate time to reconstituting them slowly.
5.4.3.4.2.2 Difficult to withdraw dose
Injectable medicines are usually supplied as vials or ampoules in which is a liquid or dry 
powder. In the preparation process the medicine has to be withdrawn from its original 
container. The nurses interviewed identified that this task could pose difficulties.
Problem
One nurse described a particular problem encountered with ciclosporin. This is described 
below.
... with some o f  the solutions its very difficult to get all o f  the solution from the top o f the 
vial, the ampoule, glass ampoule from the small hour glass bit down into the bigger bit at 
the bottom. It's quite tricky to get it go down there before you then snap it off. So 
sometimes you have to do it as a two part process draw it up from the bot...., from the 
bottom part o f  the ampoule and then draw it up from the top part [N03:343-349].
Summary: It was reported by the nurses that some injections were supplied to clinical 
areas in packaging that makes it difficult to prepare the IV dose.
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5.4.3.4.2.3 Reconstitution issues
Many of the IV medicines issued to clinical areas were provided as dry powders, requiring 
reconstitution with a diluent before use. Nurses reported a variety o f problems associated 
with this task.
Problem
Two typical comments were made about reconstitution, a characteristic example of each is 
provided below.
...a s you dissolve it says put in 20ml. I f  you put in 20mls it creates such a large volume it 
won't f i t  back into the syringe again. So you either have to use a 30ml syringe, which most 
places, and we don't stock, or put 19mls in and draw it back [N09:697-700]
... sometimes depending on the antibiotics it can take a while to reconstitute. Umm when 
you've injected your sterile water it can take a while so you can be there agitating it fo r a 
while... [N16:602-605].
Summary: Nurses found that some IV medicines posed unforeseen problems during 
reconstitution.
5,4,3,4.2.4 Glass ampoules
The nurses interviewed had concerns about medicines supplied in glass ampoules.
Problem
The nurses reported difficulties with glass ampoules, they were particularly anxious 
because of the risk of self injury.
I've got bit o f  a thing about snapping o ff the glass vials ...because I've cut my hand a 
couple o f  times [N11:396-397, 399].
Glass ampoules are difficult to break sometimes not always but sometimes. Sometimes 
they 're so easy to break that you 're almost putting too force on a, too much force on them 
they shatter. They shatter in your fingers, which is why I  wear gloves for doing that 
particularly. Some o f  them are very, very difficult to break [N03:312-316].
Summary: The nurses expressed concerns about medication supplied in glass ampoules for 
health and safety reasons.
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5,43,4.2.5 Vacuum packed medicines
During the interviews, an issue that most of the nurses raised was difficulty manipulating 
certain medicines. In particular those that needed more than 10-20ml of diluent to be added 
to reconstitute a medicine caused difficulties during preparation.
Problem
The nurses interviewed found difficulties when attempting to withdraw some solutions 
from a vial, whilst at the same time maintaining a sealed system. This is illustrated below.
Some o f the bigger bottles with bungs in, are actually very hard to draw the solution out o f  
because o f the vacuum [N03:641-642].
Summary: The nurses reported difficulties when withdrawing solutions from vacuum 
packed drugs.
Solution
Several nurses reported how they had overcome this problem by balancing the pressure 
differences inside the vial with the environment. Representative examples of this are 
shown below.
... in those instances I  put a little air inlet in, so a tiny orange needle, just stick an orange 
needle in and it acts as an air vent and you can draw the drug up easier so they are quite 
tricky [N03:644-647].
... the interlink system is very, very good, in that you do have a fairly wide bore that makes 
it easier to draw up things, drugs that are in that kind o f vacuum [N01:299-301].
Summary: Nurses overcame the problems associated with dose withdrawal from 
pressurised container can be overcome through balancing the pressure with the external 
environment.
5.4.3.4.3 OPERATOR CAUTION
Those interviewed shared concerns about using needles and the potential for needle stick 
injuries and advocated the need to change the way in which drug solutions are withdrawn 
into syringes from the manufacturer’s container.
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Problem
Nurses raised inconsistencies in practice with regard to the availability of vial access 
devices. This is illustrated by the example provided.
I  can ’t quite understand how the same hospital, you know different sites in the same Trust 
is [sic] using a different system I  would have thought it would be standardised amongst the 
Trust, but its clearly not [N11:1046-1049].
When questioned about why the nurses preferred needle free systems, they cited safety 
concerns. Typical examples were:
Just because you weren 7 handling needles so the safety aspect... [N10:608-611].
I ’m thinking purely from a health and safety point o f  view [N16:872-873].
...the whole issue that I've talked about access to the containers and reducing the risk to 
the nurse as she’s preparing those particular medicines. I  don 7 like the system here on the 
ward I  don 7 like using needles and would prefer that to change [N12:1230-1233].
...one o f the concerns that I  have is that i f  Vm working with antibiotics I  don't to be 
splashed with them and I  don 7 want...any contact with them, because the antibiotics not 
fo r me. ...ifyou use needles to do that process [reconstitution]... You might end up with a 
bit o f splash back using a needle to go into the vial or when you *re pulling out [N14:248- 
255].
Summary: The nurses highlighted safety concerns with respect to needle use and antibiotic 
aerosolisation, particularly when alternatives were available in some areas within the Trust.
Solution
The nurses revealed that some clinical areas used a needle free system called Interlink™, 
whilst others had encountered this on other wards or during prior employment. This was 
the solution advocated by some nurses to reduce needle use.
I  would like a system where you don 7 have to use needles. [N10:571]
We had the needle less system which was better basically than having to use needles..., 
because you were less likely to stab yourself and any patient [N11:538-541].
I f  i t ’s a glass vial, I  think that’s about the only time when yo u ’d  would use a needle then 
replace it with this plastic thing [needle free system], or you ’d  need to use a needle say 
putting it into an infusion [N11:568-571].
I ’m not sure i f  they can really eradicate the sharps thing but as much as possible, i f
its being just lessened the use o f needles and things it would be great [N06:673-677].
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Summary: Those nurses interviewed advocated changing to needle free systems wherever 
possible.
5.4.3.4.4 O v e r a r c h i n g  is s u e s
5.4.3.4.4.1 Unfamiliar medicines
The interviewees commented that when they were asked to prepare a new or rarely used 
medication this required concentration and additional attention to detail.
Problem
Some examples of their feelings when presented with an unfamiliar medicine to prepare 
are shown below.
... i t ’s like anything I  think, i f  you ’re unfamiliar with it and you haven’t come across it 
before, it tends to be very, it tends to slow you up, quite a bit. But once you are familiar 
with it that obstacle is taken away [N01:329-332].
...if its something I ’ve not come across before, i f  its something that I ’m not familiar with, i f  
its something new, then I  would be concerned [N15:629-631].
Summary: Preparing unfamiliar medicines takes additional nursing time and resources.
Solution
Those nurses interviewed typically referred to the Trust IV guide when faced with an 
unfamiliar medicine requiring preparation in the clinical area. In specialist areas, they 
described how proactive training can circumvent this problem. Examples of experiences 
given by the nurses interviewed are described below.
...have an IV  drug book, with sort ofpolicies o f how to draw them up etc on the ward. So 
anything that I ’m not familiar with or use on a regular basis, always refer to that [N15: 
629 - 642].
...the first time I  started on [Clinical area 23], the infliximab, that is quite specialist to 
[Clinical area 23], not many other place give it. So the first time I  came across that 
somebody actually stood by me and went through it and taught me exactly how to draw 
them up, what to do, how to do it, how to give it, sort o f step by step so now I ’m confident 
with it. I t ’s not a problem. But I  do the same now for anybody else who’s coming across it 
fo r the first time and teach them step by step because i t ’s an unfamiliar drug [N15:633- 
641].
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Summary: When nurses have to prepare unfamiliar medicines, problems are minimised 
through local guidance being available in clinical areas and training for unfamiliar items.
S.4.3.4.4.2 Global solutions
Some of the suggestions given by the interviewees to overcome the practical difficulties 
they described could be applied to the whole preparation process, rather than solely to a 
specific medicine. Such global solutions were labelling, checking and review of the 
medicine presentation.
5.43.4.4.2.1 Labelling
The nurses interviewed all reported that they would label an IV infusion. However there 
was wide variation in practice with respect to IV bolus preparation. Some nurses described 
other ways in which they identified the boluses or flushes. Typical examples are provided 
below.
I  label infusions; I  don’t label bolus doses unless I  am in a position where I  have two 
syringes o f the same size with the two different drugs in them and I  don 7 want to run the 
risk o f  not knowing which one I  am giving. So I  label those. Most common one for us is 
when you ’re giving morphine and you Ve drawn up saline as well... [N01:171-175].
...use the needle less thing fo r  drawing up, and probably just leave the needle-less one in 
the saline, so I  know which one, because their both lOmls effectively [N04:144-146].
... I  think it's quite important that every-body’s drugs, intravenous drugs like that are 
labelled with their name on. I  just think i t ’s a safer practice [N05:482-484].
I  tend to put the patient’s name on the bottom o f the label, though our labels up here don 7 
actually prompt you to, but I  tend to. They don 7 have.., it seems very strange [N09:164- 
166].
[I label] only infusions, because boluses you’d draw it up, check it with your colleague and 
administer it straight away...
... i f  we were giving boluses o f  midazolam ... make it lmg a ml so its easy to see what were 
giving, and then we would label the syringe and we’d have it there to give say lm l or lmg  
bolus at a time [N16:543-544,548-552].
... i f  you have to draw up a lot o f  drugs for the one patient. You draw it up, you label it, 
you draw the next one up, you label it. You don 7 leave it so you have a few  syringes and 
think oh what did I  put in that? [N01:534-537].
Summary: The nurses routinely labelled IV infusions and were aware of the potential for 
confusion when bolus doses were prepared with a flush. In these cases they used a variety 
of different strategies to enable identification of the IV medicine.
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5.4.3.4.4.2.2 Checking
The nurses interviewed identified that although the local hospital policy did not require 
checking, there were a variety of situations where they would ask a colleague to check 
their preparation. Others used the local IV guide as a reference to check against, 
particularly in situations where they felt more vulnerable. Typical examples are shown 
below.
Potassium has to be double-checked. Obviously CDs, anything that is slightly out o f the 
ordinary, anything that isn’t, isn’t one o f our familiar, familiar drugs really... [N03:825- 
827].
...get insulin and heparin checked as well
Because i t ’s such a concentrated small amount... [N03:833-836].
...heparin because i t ’s a calculation and i t ’s so you know again i t ’s a very powerful drug, 
you get it wrong it can be life threatening ... [N03:839-841].
. . . i f  it was a cardiac drug I  would definitely [have it checked] [N04:776-777].
... or i f  i t ’s a calculation I  would ask them to work it out. I  wouldn’t tell them what I  
worked I ’ve out. I ’d ask them to work it out just to make sure, so like as a double check 
that w e’d come out with the same sort o f numbers [N04:777-780].
.... i f  I ’m feeling particularly tired like on night duty in the morning, I  know I ’m tired so I  
might actually check something [in the Trust IV guide] whereas I  wouldn’t maybe i f  I  was 
feeling not tired. Or i f  I  was feeling very busy I  tend to maybe check the literature more 
even though I  think I  know it [N13:289-294].
...because I ’m not very experienced, I  always check the guidelines written up by the Trust 
to make sure that you know, I ’m doing it correctly... [N14: 213 - 215].
Some of those interviewed identified concerns about the robustness of the checking 
process and what a second check actually entailed. Several nurses had reservations about 
the benefit of routinely checking all IV preparations. These ranges of opinions are 
illustrated in the example given below.
You don’t have to double-check anything in this Trust... [N04:782-783].
... I  think people just presume that you have, that you have got the right stuff you know and 
they just quickly look at it, you know so its not as robust as sort o f  sitting there and you 
both going through it together and you know, but I  think research has shown that anyhow, 
that second checking doesn ’t really make a lot o f difference. I  think i t ’s just a prudent thing 
to do... [N04:794-799].
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... my opinion that a proper check would be literally that you hand over what you've 
prepared with like all the empty bottles and bits and bobs that you ’ve used with the 
prescription and say can you check that for me please and then you go and stand back and 
don’t have anything to do with i t ... [N05:857-861].
I  think the problem is that the persons that checking it has to have enough self-confidence 
that i f  they’re not sure they will risk saying I ’m not sure because they lay themselves open 
to being wrong [N05:875-878].
I t ’s a culture thing as well because when you ask someone to check what you ’re doing you 
actually want them to confirm that your right, don’t you really? [N05:898-900].
I ’m not 100% convinced in my own mind that getting another qualified nurse to check a 
drug before you give it is necessarily another safety step. I ’m not convinced [N05:836- 
838].
... i f  I ’m drawing it up I ’ve already double checked it myself, I  don 7 feel the need to have 
someone else checking it. And it always concerns me that i f  I ’ve got someone else checking 
it I ’ll not check it as well myself [N09:301-304].
I  worry more about double checking someone else’s things just in case they haven’t 
checked it right beforehand. I  sometimes think i f  they think someone else is checking it they 
do it quite blaze as they think oh somebody else will check that [N09:317-321].
Summary: The nurses interviewed were uncertain or questioned the benefits of routinely 
checking another nurses IV preparation. However, many did advocate a second check with 
specific medicines or scenarios where they believed errors were more likely.
S.4,3.4.4,2.3 Presentation o f  the medicine
From the nurse interviews it was apparent that medicines were provided to their clinical 
areas in a variety of different forms or presentations. Some preparations, such as parenteral 
nutrition and chemotherapy were supplied ready to administer to the patient. Others require 
several manipulations and/or calculations before the medicine was transformed into a 
ready to administer form. They found this process time consuming and it also created 
opportunities for error. Typical examples of the comments regarding the medicine 
presentation are shown below.
... the main risk would be people mixing the wrong fluid with the wrong drugs, or the 
wrong doses in the wrong volume. But I  can’t see a way that it can be got around, unless 
everything was premixed... [N16:935-938].
...like the gentamicin that’s ready in solution ...the ready prepared ones are good. In that 
you haven’t got that extra stage [reconstitution] which is all very time consuming. ...I t  all
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takes time so you ’re down to the time element and the user-friendly... [N03:588, 579-580, 
583-594].
... it would be lovely i f  it was premixed and just draw it back and you haven’t got all the 
worry o f mixing it in [reconstitution] [N07:871-873].
I f  they [antibiotics] came in a vial already mixed and you just had to draw it up and give it 
to the patient, or it was in a syringe and you just gave it to the patient. That would be 
lovely... [N16:899-901].
Ready dilute, that would, I  think it would be much easier to check it would be ready 
reconstituted you’d maybe reduce the risk o f error through the process and it would save 
time [N16:1028-1030].
... those little packs were they come with the water, you know like fo r  tPA when you have a 
vacuum and you have the right amount o f water and literally you just put the water in on 
one end and the powder and the other and they just mix up together like that. That’s 
brilliant, ... its right dose, right amount and ... it just mixes so much better [N02:585-590].
... pamidronate which now comes with its own diluent in it. Its very clearpamidronategets 
dissolved in 3mls o f  water because it comes with 3mls o f  water, so that’s very clearly how 
it gets dissolved and that prompts people to know it must be dissolved because it comes 
with its own diluent. ...I think it takes away, takes away the margin fo r  error [N09:591- 
597].
... we have emergency drugs that can be found in a crash trolley that are pre-drawn and 
they are very easy, ’cause you just grab it and check it and give it... [N01:235-237].
It would be easier i f  somebody else drew them up for use and that they came, arrived 
made. Or that they were made on the ward in a separate area but made by a designated 
person who was making them up and labelling them up so that they were there ready... 
[N03:671-674].
...if they were all pre-prepared and just arrived as something you could just click together 
and deliver, that would be nice [N08:864-865].
The thing that would be useful, would be to have the drug ready made in a way that you 
would have gone in and made it yourself, but i f  you provided it ready to go but in the 
wrong way that may not help at all [N10:664-666].
They [the hospital] do pre-filled epidural syringes and also pre-filled PCA [patient 
controlled analgesia] syringes and they are more expensive, but i f  it stopped... drug errors 
and sort o f  maximised the nurse’s efficiency ... there’s a lot to be said about that 
[N13:671-674].
... anything that can come ready-mixed, should be ready mixed. I  think the less number o f 
steps that you have to do; the less chance there is fo r  a mistake. I f  it comes ready mixed 
then you can ’t mix it wrong, can you? [N05:731-734].
203
Chapter 5: Nurses' perceptions o f IV medicines assembly and preparation errors in clinical areas
Summary: Those interviewed advocated that whilst nurses continued to routinely prepare 
IVs in the clinical setting, they would prefer presentations that required minimal 
manipulation before administration as it saved time and prevented errors. Alternatively 
some suggested that this task could be delegated to specific staff, so that nurses were 
issued with ready to administer doses.
5 .4 .3 .S  T r a i n i n g  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n
Training, competency and information issues were raised within both the preparation 
process and problem medicines sections. These are discussed together below.
5.4.3.5.1. Lack o f  information or guidance on preparation
Within the study Trust the nurses interviewed revealed that the main sources of 
information they used to prepare IV doses were the manufacturer’s package insert and the 
locally developed Trust IV guide.
Problems
The nurses interviewed explained that information provided by the manufacturers for those 
preparing medication was valuable, but needed to be in a convenient format for healthcare 
staff. Some commented that the information leaflet was not always supplied with 
medicines when dispensed from pharmacy. Illustrative examples of the problems this 
posed are described below.
... a couple o f years ago you could go along and take out that insert i f  you weren ’t familiar 
with the drug and you could read it, it would tell you the indications, the contraindications. 
It would tell you how to draw the drug up, with solutions it could be mixed in etc., and how 
quickly to administer it; now i t s  a patient information leaflet. And i t ’s an intravenous 
drug that a patient can’t give themselves and I ’m sure the idea is you hand them the leaflet 
i f  they are interested in having a read about the drug you ’re just about to give them. But 
they ’re absolutely no use to the person who needs to give the drug, and I  don’t understand 
the sense o f it in that i f  you did give it to a person there is usually 10 doses in most o f the 
boxes that we give, so you would have to take it back o ff o f them again to give it to the next 
patient. But this..., it means you are wholly reliant upon, I  know that Pharmacy in this 
Trust supply a book with the most commonly use intravenous drugs in it and they go 
through indications, contraindications, side effects and how to prepare the drug and how 
quickly to administer it. But there is no way it can cover every drug that is given [N01:351- 
368].
... i f  i t ’s a drug that isn’t individually boxed that comes up, in a white box from pharmacy 
[a repackaged dispensed item] sometimes people take the [manufacturer's] information
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sheet out and they don’t replace the sheet in the box, so its not always f/*ere...[N03:493- 
496].
...they’re [information leaflet] quite hard to understand, which is why I  always go to our 
book [iv guide] that we have [N15:596-597].
Summary: The nurses required information in a convenient, readily accessible manner to 
enable them to appropriately prepare medicines in clinical areas.
Solutions
The nurses interviewed routinely used the local hospital IV guide for information about 
preparing IV medicines. Where this information was not available, they relied upon a 
variety of other resources, ranging from more experienced nursing colleagues, to 
colleagues in other areas where the medicine was used more often. They also accessed the 
pharmacist during the working day as well as out of hours. Typical examples of the ways 
nurses sought information are provided below.
... i t ’s easy in this Trust because this Trust has actually got a great big folder with every 
drug you ’re likely to give so it does make it a lot easier fo r us [N09:618-620].
... when I  first started giving IV  drugs there wasn ’t a book [Trust IV guide] so that’s been 
a major help because you used to have to read all the leaflets, we used to keep leaflets in a 
folder, for each o f  the drugs. But since the books come out that’s been fab  [N10: 474 - 
477].
.. .Pharmacy in this Trust supply a book with the most commonly use intravenous drugs in 
it and they go through indications, contraindications, side effects and how to prepare the 
drug and how quickly to administer it. But there is no way it can cover every drug that is 
given.... we have another two folders with protocols that we have put together for all the 
drugs that we use within [clinical area 3]... [N01:364-371].
...other members o f  sta ff that have been doing it, because you may not know, but other 
people might have used it... [N07:617-619].
... ring the senior nurse on [N10:426].
... sometimes certain drugs are used a lot more in certain areas. So maybe ITU use it a lot 
so I ’d probably ring them and see what they say. ... Just speak to the senior nurse on, 
usually [N10:429-430, 432].
Tend to ask the pharmacist, ... there’s the pharmacy information [Medicines Information] 
i f  there any problems that no one else can answer [N15:459-460].
... i f  its 2 o ’clock in the morning and then you end up bleeping an on-call pharmacist... 
[N01: 377-378].
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The nurses found other information sources were less useful when it came to advice on IV 
preparation. Examples of which are given below.
... the thing about the BNF [British National Formulary] is its good but it's limited 
[N01:379-380].
...it [the BNF] doesn ’t tell you how to mix it up, how much water to put it in or anything 
like that, you have to go and source that from other places... [N04:404-406].
I  know that you can get information via the clinical intranet that would take me a bit of 
time to work our way around that, so I  would use other resources first... and I  would 
probably go to the pharmacist before I  would go to the clinical intranet [N01:414-418].
...in my experience, don’t trust a doctor when it comes to looking fo r  whether it should be 
given neat or whether it should be mixed and stuff like that, I  wouldn % I  would rather find  
out fo r myself via an alternative route [N01:401-404].
Summary: Routine guidance on preparing IV medicines was available in the hospital IV 
guide. Where additional information was required this was not readily accessible and was 
sought from other nursing colleagues or pharmacists.
5.4.3.5,2 Evidence o f  a training or competency deficit
During the interviews areas of inadequate training, or failure to apply these skills in 
practice were described. These portray the issues the nurses encountered in practice. Below 
are two scenarios, with the nurses’ suggestions for how each dilemma was addressed.
Example problem and solution A
... i t ’s quite common to see people pushing it [morphine] in and you see, you know, a 
percentage o f  the drug dribbling out, and you know that that's not exactly the right 
amount...
... sometimes i f  they just sort ofput it [morphine] in and the syringe is completely full [with 
diluent] they will loose some o f their morphine and so the patients not getting as much. 
[N08:382-384, 376-378].
...ifyou 've  got your 9mls o f  solution and you've ‘drawn it down' and then add your drug, 
so you sort o f  make sure that it comes down a little bit, then inject it in and then bring it to 
the top [N08:374-375, 378-379].
Example problem and solution B
I  think [what] is desperately important is aseptic technique and cleanliness, keeping things 
sterile, clean hands, clean hands, clean hands ...sometimes when my patients are on wards 
here and I  see nurses come up to, and you know, they don't wash their hands, and Ifind  it 
frightening [N05:711-715].
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I  would hope very much that any [training on] IV  drug mixing, reconstituting, whatever 
even just giving it involves a huge, you know, a really heavy session about aseptic 
technique and clean hands [N05:718-720].
5.4,3,5.3 Skills and knowledge base
The nurses interviewed reported a great variability in the training provided to qualified 
nurses on IV preparation. It was suggested some of this could be explained by the time 
elapsed since registration, inconsistencies between training sites and also no nationally 
agreed curriculum. In general, the nurses explained there appeared to be little focus upon 
the preparation stage during formal IV training. Those interviewed had acquired their 
preparation skills from watching other colleagues and during subsequent practical 
supervision.
Problems
The nurses identified that preparation is rarely covered in the formal IV training process, as 
shown below.
...any focus on IV  administration has always been on the drug you're giving, the side 
effects and how you give it. I t ’s never been on sort o f the whole process o f  checking that 
really, and how you draw that up... [N13:591-594].
Interestingly enough, [I learnt] purely by watching other people and having a mentor, 
which are pros and cons aren 7 there? But nobody ever taught me how the, no one ever 
taught me the procedure o f  IV  administration full-stop. It was not included in my 
training ...[N13:570-573].
...the Trust I  trained in, they did go into quite a lot o f details about mixing, about the 
preparation you know about the importance of, you know, keeping things clean and all 
that... [N04:505-507].
...I remember my lecturer saying to us “you know about how you could mix certain drugs 
with certain amounts o f  fluid” she said “butyou all work in different areas it's too much to 
go into, it's in your book” [N16:836-838].
...having completed the [IV] study day, then [I] had to be formally assessed with the 
mentoring watching you draw it up, going to the patient and watch me administer it, and 
assess me as safe and signed o ff [N09:709-711].
And there's always a big debate, you know, over whether you should clean things or you 
should clean them and what size needle you should use and things like that, you know. But 
the Trust doesn't have a stance on any o f that, ... it's all about your own professional 
practice [N04:532-536].
... as a student [nurse] you watch and depending on where you are you can practice 
[N07:660-661].
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...Vm sometimes concerned that because people aren’t taught the practicalities o f it, that 
they’re just, one scenario fits all, which it doesn ’t [N04:600-602].
Summary: Training for IV medicines preparation was either rarely covered or not included 
either at undergraduate level or during hospital IV training.
Solutions
Typical examples of the suggestions given by the interviewees to resolve these training 
issues are provided below.
I  would say the IV  study day should include actually being shown how to draw it up and 
how to, things like keeping the syringe attached to the vial so your not breaking the system 
twice... [N09:559-569].
I  think more emphasis on the actual preparation would be g o o d  having more o f a
policy on how to draw up and much more clearer, rather than just saying add saline to this 
[N02:498-500].
...be useful just to as part o f  your training, spend about an hour. Even i f  it is just with 
syringes and needles drawing up saline, mixing it with antibiotics, drawing out o f glass 
vials, getting used to the feel o f  it, because when just qualified you ’re quite nervous about 
it anyway because, you know yo u ’ve been bombarded with you know I  could give drugs to 
patients, they could have an anaphylactic reaction, they might arrest. So your nervous 
about doing that anyway and then you’ve got to get used to umm the feel o f  drawing drugs 
up. I t ’s just a whole new way o f manipulating a syringe [N16:852-860].
...having more o f  a policy on how to draw up and much more clearer rather than just 
saying add saline to this [N02:499-500].
Summary: The interviewees considered that practical, hands-on training should be 
provided for nurses undertaking IV preparation. Such training would provide nurses with 
the skills and knowledge that could be readily transferred into practice, and would be 
realistic and achievable in the clinical setting.
5.4.3.5,4 Initial training
The nurses also described concerns they had with the undergraduate nursing curriculum. 
Problems
The issue of when and how the training was delivered arose. There was concern that the 
impetus to increase the number of IV trained staff might lead to student nurses qualifying 
and being expected to prepare and administer IV medication from the outset, i.e. as soon as
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they become registered. Those interviewed considered this unrealistic, and suggested that it 
should be addressed as a post registration nursing competency.
... they wanted student nurses to come on to the ward from their training fully trained up in 
IV  drugs and administering them. And I  have personally grave concerns about that... 
[N13:777-779].
I  think that the newly qualified nurses should be busy running their patient workload not 
trying to do intravenous antibiotics and extending the role at the same time [N09:793-795].
At the moment we're kind o f  squeezing IV  therapy in amongst everything else. ...I think 
[N13:827-828].
From their responses, the nurses interviewed described different experiences and exposure 
to IV preparation during their pre-registration training, depending on their mentor and 
clinical setting.
... as a student [nurse] you watch and depending on where you are you can practice 
[N07:660-661].
Concern was expressed by the interviewee’s about ensuring that training was practically 
focused, and reflected the work-based needs.
...I'm sometimes concerned that because people aren't taught the practicalities o f it, that 
they 're just, one scenario fits all, which it doesn't [N04:600-602].
...it's just the thing of; i f  you 're faced with a drug you know how do you practically? How 
do you go from the drug in the vial to giving it to the patient? You know what are the 
various options? How do you find  out? That, that part o f the training, so then when people 
take that into the practice they 're automatically thinking right this is the drug, how do I  
find out how to, you know what are my areas, sources o f knowledge you know, and what is 
good practice and what isn 't...? [N04:840-847].
Summary: Some of the interviewees recommended that training needed to provide nurses 
with the skills and underpinning knowledge which could be readily transferred in practice. 
Training also needed to be realistic and achievable in the clinical setting.
Solutions
The general sentiment, shared by respondents, was that nurses needed some time post 
qualification before undertaking IV duties. A typical quote is shown below.
I  do think that people should be qualified at least 6 months before going ahead to do 
intravenous administration post-registration [N09:813-815].
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Summary: The interviewees recommended that nurse IV training should be provided 
several months post registration.
5.4.3.5.5 Ongoing training 
Problem
The nurses identified that once trained; there was no follow up training or a re-certification 
process. An example of their views is supplied below.
There's no update, there's no sort o f  going back through and just reminding... just going 
back through the basics really,,, [N02:677-678].
Summary: The nurses reported that no formal ongoing training on IV therapy was 
provided.
Solutions
The nurses interviewed made several suggestions about ongoing training and also how this 
could be delivered.
... maybe something like that [an IV update] would be quite nice to keep things fresh in
people's minds... And maybe that's a way ofpicking up i f  they're not that competent,
or there is a problem... Its one way o f picking it up and it's a safeguard fo r  the Trust... 
[N02:678-679,683, 684-685,687].
...if there was a link person on the ward that went on regular updates and then fed  back to 
the staff. I  mean we tend to have link people for most things... [N15:498-500].
... educational board that would sort o f sit on a ward for a month or two and you would 
bring that up with kind o f  a couple o f on the ward workshops to sort o f improve that 
[N13:610-612].
...whether there should be more emphasis from ... each divisional professional 
development nurse? [N13:627- 629].
Summary: A variety of suggestions by the interviewees for updating and educating staff 
on IV issues were given.
5.4.3.5.6 Competency
Some of those nurses interviewed drew on previous experiences and advocated that 
competency needed to be demonstrable. Some clinical areas had introduced local 
competency assessments, to standardise practice.
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Problems
Typical examples of the comments received are described below.
... part o f  that training involved doing a practical assessment on drug administration, 
which is something I  think is severely lacking from project 2000 onwards... I  would be an 
advocate o f  going back to the old style training and have it as a practical assessment that 
i f  you fa il that, you cannot pass your training and register [N01:276-278, 819-822].
I  think they 're right in this Trust with saying, just having done the study day doesn't mean 
that your competent, and so its good to have these competencies signed o ff [N11:484-486].
Something which we do which encourages safe practice is that any-one to work on here, 
regardless o f  which Trust they've come from gets assessed when they work on the ward 
[N09:769-771].
Summary: The interviewees identified that competency assessment in the workplace is 
beneficial as it allows identification of problems. Further investment in competency 
assessment could make significant improvements.
Solution
A few suggestions were provided by the nurses to resolve competency issues. They are 
illustrated by:
( Where com petency  was  not demonstrated]  ... I  would much rather they went through our 
own Trust training, that clearly their training; their previous training wasn't the same as 
ours. ... they repeated our Trust training, but up until then they get supervised [N09:779- 
782].
...to have an annual drug assessment... I  feel as though that that would be a very good 
idea [N08:761,763-764].
Summary: The nurses interviewed provided limited suggestions to address competency 
issues. However, revalidation or supervised practice prior to undertaking the Trust IV 
training was suggested.
5.5 Discussion
This study examined nurses’ views and opinions on the difficulties they experience whilst 
preparing IV medicine doses in the clinical area. It then sought an understanding of why 
they thought these issues arose and how they could be resolved.
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The findings show that these problems can be broadly divided into two categories: 
environmental issues that constrain the nurse’s ability to prepare IVs and the problems that 
arose with the medicine or associated with the specific preparation.
5.5.1 Study limitations
Participants were opportunistically recruited to the study, and may represent those with an 
interest in IV therapy or patient safety. Sampling continued until theme saturation; 
however staff who did not volunteer for this study may have held different views and 
opinions. Ideally staff would have been randomly selected by grade and then by speciality. 
The data from qualitative studies are never generalisable, but this method of recruitment 
would have maximised the chances of scoping each category identified in the framework 
analysis, and might yield additional categories. It was apparent that the full characteristics 
of each category: range, limits, commonality and divergence may not have been fully 
elucidated where there was only one solution identified e.g. staff availability. The study 
was restricted to nurses since it was exploratory and they perform the majority of ward 
based IV preparation. Other staff that prepare IV medicines such as midwives, 
anaesthetists, doctors could have been recruited, and it would be interesting to compare 
issues other staff groups raise with the nurses’ views.
One limitation of the interview approach is the participants can only raise issues which 
they are aware of and their discussions may not truly reflect how they behave in practice 
[Savage, 2000]. Some of the nurses interviewed struggled to visualise a preparation, to 
enable its step-by-step description. One solution would have been to use simulation, but 
participants’ behaviour still might differ from practice. In addition, respondent fatigue 
would have become a problem if this lengthened the interview. These limitations could be 
overcome by field observation in the clinical environment. Other researchers employing 
informal discussion whilst undertaking disguised or direct observation of IV preparation 
and administration cite similar limitations with this study methodology However, in those 
studies direct observation did not allow in depth exploration of issues and was restricted to 
those preparations observed [Taxis & Barber, 2003a]. It is increasingly difficult to justify 
disguised observation methods; similar research has been performed with an undisguised 
approach [Tissot et al., 2003]. It would appear that by combining the findings from each 
study method the limitations of each may be addressed. This is known as ‘triangulation’
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and is widely used in health services research to gain different perspectives on phenomena 
and to assess the validity of data [Smith, 2002].
Recruitment was slower than anticipated; this appeared to be due to problems with 
releasing staff from their clinical duties, low organisational morale and fear of discussing 
this sensitive area. If staff had been personally reimbursed for attending the interview this 
might have improved recruitment. Although midwives were approached for inclusion in 
the study, none volunteered. Their inclusion may have altered the findings of this study. It 
is important that participants' reservations about openly discussing hazards and incidents 
are not underestimated. The requirements for the participant information sheet may have 
raised concerns that participants had not even considered e.g. 'your employment will not 
be affected in anyway’.
5.5.2 The preparation process
It is interesting to learn, from the nursing perspective, that IV preparation is a continuous 
task and includes assembly and preparing the dose and any flush solutions required. This 
differs from the work undertaken by Gandy and colleagues [2002] to ascertain common 
nomenclature for parenteral aseptic medicine preparation within pharmacy and on wards. 
Their findings clearly differentiate between assembly and preparation, and no reference is 
made to preparing flush solutions. They do acknowledge that assembly meant very 
different things to nurses compared with pharmacists, but found nurses did use the term 
when gathering various components for administering drugs to the patient. An explanation 
for this could be the attempt to establish a commonality between pharmacy and ward 
terminology. With pharmacy aseptic dispensing, the assembly and preparation tasks are 
clearly differentiated and may even be undertaken by different staff. In addition medication 
provided from pharmacy in a ready to administer form is not supplied with a flush solution. 
This may be because the pharmacy service is not provided at the point of patient care. The 
type of flush solution, if  one is needed, is governed by the vascular access device that the 
medicine will be administered through and concurrent IV fluids, clinical context etc. 
Therefore this information is patient specific and will vary within the patient’s hospital 
stay. These issues highlight differences between aseptic preparation in pharmacy and 
clinical areas, and suggest that it is not possible to adopt uniform nomenclature for both 
settings. This is problematical as different healthcare staff use different terminology and 
understood different things by the same term. This raises important issues, as in order to
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establish inter-professional dialogue to address preparation concerns, it is vital that 
everyone understands the terminology and uses it in a consistent manner.
It has been suggested that the preparation process ends with a ready to administer dose 
with parenteral giving set attached and infusion device available [Gandy et al., 2002]. This 
is broadly congruent with the interviewees’ replies. However results from the interviews 
suggest there is an additional step, before assembly, which has not previously been 
identified. In this step the nurse considers the clinical context o f the patient, what vascular 
access the patient has and makes decisions which influence how they prepare the dose e.g. 
bolus for administration via a central route or peripheral intermittent infusion. This ‘pre­
preparation’ stage needs to be included within the IV medicines use process. However, 
nurses in the study did not readily identify with the term ‘assembly*; it would seem 
pragmatic to combine the assembly and preparation tasks under the broader preparation 
term. Preparation should also include the drawing up of appropriate flush solution(s). This 
differentiation into preparation and administration already breaks down a process that 
nurses tend to group under the overarching heading of administration [Dougherty & Lister,
2005]. Gandy and colleagues [2002] used different terminology which was the start of the 
‘aseptic process’ where for nurses this begun with hand washing before preparation. It 
would appear that a profession understands itself, but this is not shared across professional 
boundaries.
When the interviewees’ description of the preparation process is compared with 
professional nursing standards there are deviations from those standards. These included 
employing good hand washing and drying techniques, maintaining a closed preparation 
system wherever possible, inverting the container a number of times to ensure mixing, 
adequate cleaning o f additive ports of infusion bags and the tops of medicine vials and 
ampoules [Dougherty & Lister, 2005; Royal College of Nursing, 2005]. It is of concern, 
that those interviewed did not adhere to their professional standards for IV preparation and 
administration; further investigation of this is warranted. One possible explanation is that 
the nurses do undertake these tasks but failed to describe them at interview. This could be 
validated by direct observation of the nurses. However, this would not explain all 
deviations, as upon direct prompting about some of these issues the nurses shared and 
justified their routine practice e.g. not shaking a minibag after adding a reconstituted 
antibiotic powder.
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5.5.3 Physical constraints on the preparation process.
The nurses interviewed identified the following environmental issues that hindered their 
ability to prepare IV medicines: inappropriate workspace, interruptions, time pressures, 
competing commitments, inadequate staff, the unavailability of medicines or equipment 
and cultural issues.
In the largest published study of its kind, from Japan in 1989, 2,800 IV medication 
incidents and near misses without resultant patient injury were analysed to determine the 
causal factors [Kawamura, 2001]. Eight major causes of IV injection errors were 
identified, of which three are similar to this study’s findings. These were:
1) Interruptions in the middle of tasks. Staff caring for multiple patients requiring 
simultaneous yet different interventions combined with frequent distractions.
2) Crowded workspaces and inaccurate mixing processes. Where workspaces were 
being used for tasks other than IV preparation and were poorly designed. 
Deficiencies in the preparation procedures were identified e.g. multiple doses being 
prepared simultaneously.
3) Time pressures arising from an imbalance between the available staff and resources 
and the work required.
There were great similarities between the studies in their findings with respect to physical 
constraints, despite the work being undertaken in Japan some years ago, and not restricted 
to the preparation stage. Suggestions were given for each of the causes identified. These 
were:
1) Re-organising work processes so that clinical staff were not required for 
administrative duties e.g. employing clerks.
2) Re-considering the layout of workspaces to prevent errors. Standardise preparation 
processes to eliminate error-prone activities e.g. preparing more than one medicine 
at a time, no checking system.
3) Improve work systems to reduce time pressures; they acknowledged this needed 
addressing at organisational level including middle management input [Kawamura, 
2001].
Elements of each of these suggestions were proposed by some of the nurses interviewed. 
However, less emphasis was given to involving management in potential solutions.
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In 2001, 88 of 90 nurses working on four ward at a Japanese hospital replied to a survey to 
determine those working conditions that were associated with ‘near-miss’ IV medication 
errors. They found more errors reported with lack of experience on the particular ward and 
higher workload. The suggested that experienced nurses and a ‘lack of fatigue’ may 
improve medication error detection before administration to the patient [Seki & Yamazaki,
2006].
The only issue not previously identified as a separate category were the safety culture 
influences. In contrast, Taxis and Barber [2003b] identified cultural context as a 
contributor to IV drug errors. An editorial argued there is a complex interplay of factors 
associated with decreased performance and patient safety. The authors suggested that 
multimodal strategies that address team relationships, leadership and job design need to be 
addressed alongside issues of long work hours and inadequate sleep [Firth-Cozens & 
Cording, 2004].
Tissot and colleagues [2003] investigated medication errors in 523 doses to identify 
associated risk factors. Injection administration was not found to be a risk factor, but nurse 
workload and prescription issues were identified.
Other research on general medication errors within the USA, Europe and the UK lends 
additional support to these findings, sometimes using slightly different descriptors for the 
causal factors. Those identified included: distractions, tiredness, exhaustion, stress, heavy 
workloads, poor skill mix, long hours, staff shortages, job overload, long drug rounds, lack 
of confidence to challenge, inadequate support from senior staff, stressful atmosphere, 
busy wards, working overtime, unsafe working practices and lack of concentration, care or 
attention to detail [Gladstone, 1995; Meurier & Vincent, 1997; Osborne et al., 1999; Tissot 
et al., 1999, 2003; Hand & Barber, 2000; Pape, 2003; Taxis & Barber, 2003b; Mayo & 
Duncan, 2004; Abeysekera et al., 2005; Zavery et al., 2005].
Interruptions on drug rounds have been studied, with nurses disturbed on average seven 
times per round, and a maximum 29 interruptions recorded [O’Dowd, 2004]. Similarly the 
nurses in that study felt there should be no interruptions, as being diverted from the task at 
hand was potentially dangerous. The Trust concerned was investigating ways to reduce 
interruptions and were trying protected meal times. Publications of their findings are
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awaited. Another suggestion was to allocate and clearly identify one nurse to be the 
‘medication nurse’ enabling them to focus on medication without interruption or 
distraction [Capriotti, 2004; Pape et al., 2005; Wrench & Allen, 2006]. This mirrors 
suggestions made by the interviewees.
Greengold and co-workers [2003] evaluated the impact of a dedicated nurse assigned to 
prepare and administer medicines to 16 - 18 patients, compared with a general nurse 
responsible for six patients. They found no impact on error rate, and postulated this could 
be due to an incomplete knowledge of each patient’s clinical condition or else the ratio of 
patients per administration nurse required to reduce errors was exceeded.
Previous IV errors studies in the UK and Germany have highlighted the lack of a dedicated 
workspace to prepare IVs as error contributing, forcing nurses to prepare doses in less than 
ideal conditions. In general, wards had no dedicated preparation area; therefore they used a 
store room, patients’ bedside or nursing station for this task. [Taxis et al., 2003; Tissot et 
al., 2003]. The nurses interviewed described similar scenarios. The findings from a survey 
of preparation facilities on 71 wards in two UK hospitals revealed that 78% wards had 
cultured medicines preparation areas [Zavery et al., 2005]. This highlights the lack of 
recognition of the importance of design to patient safety within the NHS [Department of 
Health and the Design Council, 2006]. There are already plans to rectify this within the 
revised draft hospital HBN. This requires a dedicated easily-cleanable area for IV 
medicines preparation, with good lighting that is removed from thoroughfares and common 
sources of environmental contamination [Architects for Health, 2006].
The findings from this study, supported by the literature, highlight the importance of 
holistically evaluating the IV medicines preparation process, as environment, management 
and the organisation’s culture can affect patients’ safety. Consideration and suitable 
priority should be given to overcoming these problems. It is paramount that such factors 
are included in the planning and design of new clinical areas.
5.5.4 Issues arising during the preparation process.
There were a variety of factors that posed problems with the preparation process, these 
included the following issues: mathematics and measurement, mixing and reconstitution, 
operation caution and overarching issues.
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The mathematics and measurement category mainly encompassed problems with 
calculations. The literature shows that nurses’ mathematical proficiency is inadequate 
[Bindler & Bayne, 1991; Blais & Bath, 1992; Hutton, 1998; Wilson, 2003; Oldridge et al., 
2004; Wright, 2004]. Gladstone [1995] gathered information on the mathematics 
qualification of 81 trained nurses at a district general hospital and discovered that 60.5% 
had ‘O’ or CSE level mathematics, yet 18.5% did not have any formal qualification. The 
majority (81.2%) had subsequently had their calculation skills evaluated during their 
training. Other work suggested that as there is no minimum mathematics qualification 
needed to enter nursing, mathematics should be taught in the nursing degree and potential 
students should not be excluded solely on the basis of inadequate mathematics 
qualifications [Hutton, 1998; Wilson, 2003]. This is contrasted with Wright’s [2004] 
finding that basic mathematic theory required for medicines calculations was not taught at 
the local nursing school.
Trim [2004] questioned the robustness of relying on drug calculation tests to assess nurses 
mathematical skills as this has not proved reliable in identifying those likely to make 
errors, nor does having the test affect error rate [Conti & Beare, 1988; Ludwig-Beymer et 
al., 1990]. Blais and Bath [1992] identified three domains of medication calculation 
deficiencies: mathematical, conceptual and management, where conceptual errors were 
most common. Conceptual errors were those associated with difficulty ‘setting up* the 
problem. This finding has been confirmed by other workers [Segatore et al., 1993; Arnold, 
1998, Weeks et al., 2000]. Nurses found calculations easier in clinical practice where the 
ability to visualise the scenario helped them to resolve it. It is recommended that 
mathematical proficiency needs practical evaluation and that conceptual issues should also 
be addressed [Wilson, 2003].
Poor mathematical skills are also prevalent amongst other healthcare staff, and is of 
concern if staff are unable to convert between units and concentration as this is 
fundamental to effective prescribing, preparation and administration [Perlstein et al., 1979; 
ISMP, 2003a; Oldridge et a l , 2004; Wheeler et al., 2004]. Solutions proposed to overcome 
this include the use of a dose conversion chart for medicines with concentrations expressed 
as a percentage or dilution ratio e.g. adrenaline, lidocaine and standardisation to a single 
concentration or applying warning labels where standardisation is not possible [ISMP, 
2003a].
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Numerous studies have shown that miscalculations contribute to errors [Gladstone, 1995; 
Flynn et al., 1997; Hand & Barber, 2000; Ross et al., 2000; Mayo & Duncan, 2004; 
Preston, 2004]. Complex calculations are recognised to increase the potential for IV 
medicines preparation error [Clinical Resource and Audit Group. NHS Scotland, 2002]. 
Several tools have been developed to risk assess IV medicines preparation, amongst the 
risk factors included are use of part of a medicine ampoule or vial, complex calculations 
and multiple dilutions [Beaney et al., 2005; Tunstell, 2004]. The NMC [2004a] advises 
that two practitioners should be involved in complex calculations. Trim [2004] suggests a 
pocket sized formulae card should be available for use in clinical areas. The nurses 
interviewed cited similar concern regarding calculations and also identified similar 
solutions.
Paediatric patients are more susceptible to errors as medicines are provided in adult dose 
units, yet these patients* doses vary according to age, weight and organ function 
[Schneider et al., 1998]. Neonates are especially vulnerable to tenfold and 100-fold errors, 
further confounded by the frequent need to use adult strength dose forms [Chappell & 
Newman, 2004]. The results from this study reveal that of 1,348 IV doses from 336 
neonatal prescriptions, 25% used less than one tenth of a vial and 2.4% doses administered 
were for less than one hundredth of a vial [Chappell & Newman, 2004]. This poses 
particular difficulties in emergency situations where IV medicines are needed rapidly. 
Parshuram and colleagues [2003] studied IV morphine infusions prepared on paediatric 
and neonatal ICUs. Analysis o f the morphine concentration in those syringes where the 
label and prescription were identical revealed that the concentration deviated from the 
prescription by more than 10% in 65% of syringes (n=232). No tenfold errors were found, 
6% of errors were double or greater concentration.
Several ways of minimising errors in paediatrics have been proposed. These include 
standard tables with guidance on dose, calculation, preparation and monitoring of IV 
medicines, limited prescribing to predefined standardised IV concentrations, individualised 
emergency medication sheets, standardisation to a single strength of high risk drugs e.g. 
morphine, and pharmacy supplying ready to administer syringes [Santeiro et al., 1992; 
Ross et al., 2000; Lucas, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2004]. In the present study there were a few 
comments regarding the difficulties associated with paediatric calculation and dose
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measurement. However as many of the participants worked primarily with adults this may 
explain the limited comments received.
The mixing and reconstitution category consisted of practical problems encountered during 
dose preparation. The RCN IV therapy forum [2005] has published national practice 
criteria which require organisations to have a protocol for reconstituting, which should be 
developed with pharmacy input. This was not present in the Trust when the study was 
undertaken, but knowledge of those medicines that cause particular problems would be 
invaluable in producing such a document. Mixing and reconstitution errors were one of the 
main types of IV error identified from IV studies and general studies within intensive care 
where the IV route is commonly used [Schneider et al., 1998; Taxis & Barber 2003b; Tissot 
et al.,2003; Wirtz et al., 2003; Cousins et al., 2005].
One particular hospital IV guide contains information on the different ways in which 
medicines are provided to clinical areas and provides generic information on the associated 
disadvantages [Schulman et al., 1998]. For example reconstitution is time consuming, 
especially if the powder is difficult to dissolve and care is needed with drugs susceptible to 
foaming as there is a risk of withdrawing an incomplete dose. The disadvantages given 
where similar to those described by the nurses in this study [Schulman et al., 1998]. This is 
consistent with the RCN infusion therapy standards [2005] which require a protocol for 
reconstitution, produced with pharmacy input. They also require the Trust to list those 
medicines which the nurse may not reconstitute. From the information gained in the 
interviews, the study trust complied with these criteria, through information provided in the 
IV monographs.
In this study the nurses identified problems with manipulating some medicines. Where 
multiple manipulations were required, such as in preparing a once daily gentamicin 
infusion, this posed a risk of microbial contamination of the product, because of the 
numerous manipulative steps [Beaney et al., 2005]
The operator caution category primarily included health and safety issues or areas where 
the operator needed to exercise particular care due to error prone packaging and labelling. 
Error prone packaging and labelling caused problems when the names looked or sounded 
similar e.g. cefradine, cefuroxime, ceftriaxone, cefotaxime etc. or where similar strengths
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of the same medicine were not clearly distinguished. This problem is widely acknowledged 
to contribute to errors, with the pharmaceutical industry identified as key to resolving these 
issues [Kawamura, 2001; Taxis & Barber, 2003b; Mayo & Duncan, 2004]. A systematic 
review of the literature was undertaken to evaluate recommendations to prevent IV bolus 
administration errors in theatres [Jensen et al, 2004]. Much of the material available for 
review was opinion rather than experimental data. However, the authors were able to make 
four ‘strong’ recommendations (a-d below) and three recommendations (e-g below). These 
were:
a. Read and carefully check the medicines label.
b. Optimise the legibility and contents of labels and syringes, according to agreed 
standards with respect of some or all of the font, size, colour and information included.
c. Syringes of prepared medicines should be labelled.
d. Medicines, their storage and workspace should be formally organised with attention to 
tidiness and the positioning of ampoules and syringes. Similar drugs should be 
separated and dangerous drugs removed from theatres where possible, or separated.
e. Labels should be checked specifically with a second person or device (such as a bar 
code reader linked to a computer) before they are drawn up and administered.
f. Stock holdings should focus on minimising the risk of drug error and any changes in 
packaging should be notified in advance.
g. Similar packaging and presentations of medicines contributes to error and should be 
avoided wherever possible.
They concluded that
“The present disregard fo r patient safety in the presentation o f drugs by many 
manufacturers is unacceptable” [Jensen et al., 2004; p.501].
Within the UK, improvements in medicines packaging and labelling have been made with 
the medicines regulatory authority’s best practice guide [MHRA, 2003]. Some 
pharmaceutical companies, mainly generic manufacturers, have redesigned their packaging 
and labelling, however healthcare professionals believe that further improvement can be 
made [Gross, 2005a]. The recent publication of ‘Information design for patient safety’ 
provides further guidance for packaging designers and pharmaceutical companies about 
oral dose forms and dispensing labels [Helen Hamlyn Research Centre, NPSA, 2006]. 
However many of the key messages are more widely applicable. This document described 
best practice, user testing and a concise 24-item checklist of problems, with associated 
recommendations to resolve them e.g. small type size is difficult to read therefore use body
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text in a minimum of 12 point font size. It has been recommended that prior to formulary 
inclusion hospital organisations should proactively review the risks posed by the packaging 
and labelling of a medicine throughout the medicines use process [Jones, 2003; Murri & 
Somani, 2004], Pharmaceutical companies also need to consider the way in which their 
medicine are used and consider all safety aspects as part of the development process 
[Jones, 2003; Gross, 2005a].
Within the NHS a national risk management initiative, the 'purchasing for safety* strategy 
has been developed to aid decision making in the purchasing process for licensed 
medicines for secondary care [Alldred, 2006]. The aim is to highlight features that may 
increase the risk of errors, verify the product as fit for purpose, and determine that the 
manufacturer’s prior performance has been acceptable. Where there is no option but to 
purchase items with medium to high risks, this information will be shared to enable 
hospitals to manage these risks locally. Therefore, the onus for risk assessment of 
unlicensed medicines and ‘off-label’ medicines remains with the Trust.
In addition, numerous local initiatives have been advocated to reduce selection errors. 
These include:
■ Standardise practice where more than one size or concentration of a similar medicine 
is available.
- Do not store easily confused medicines with each other e.g. heparin and insulin, both
prescribed in units.
■ Sound alike medicines should not be stored alphabetically e.g. cefuroxime, 
ceftazidime.
■ Employ ‘tall man* lettering, where different parts of the drug name that are prone to 
confusion are capitalised e.g. DOP Amine, DOBUTamine; vinBLAStine, 
vinCRIStine.
■ Over label unacceptable packaging within pharmacy.
■ Read the label three times: when selecting or preparing it, when administering it and 
when putting it away or discarding it.
■ Colour labels/packaging/products should not be relied upon to identify a medicine
■ Provide education and training on error prone design issues [Hadaway, 2001; ISMP, 
2004; RCN, 2005].
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Tools have been designed to assess the risks associated with the preparation of parenteral 
products in clinical areas and identify as a risk factor, materials hazardous to the operator. 
This includes teratogenticity, mutagenicity and cytotoxicity [Tunstell, 2004; Beaney et al., 
2005]. One tool also identifies the risks associated with opening glass ampoules as well as 
those medicines that are difficult to prepare [Tunstell, 2004]. These risks mirror those 
comments received from the nurses in this study.
The concerns that the nurses expressed about antibiotic spray during reconstitution are 
supported by other work, where overpressure within antibiotic vials caused aerosolisation. 
In this study the environmental contamination by antibiotics was sufficient to leave an 
odour, dampen surfaces and inhibit bacterial growth on agar plates in the preparation area 
[Bradstrup, 2005]. Staff concerns following repeated antibiotic exposure and of needle 
stick injuries have previously been reported [Mercier, 1994].
Overarching issues related to process problems, with the time consuming or expensive 
medicines, varied according to the individual’s prior experience and exposure. New or 
unfamiliar medicines featured widely in this category. This is similar to the findings of 
Taxis and Barber [2003b] where frequent mistakes were reported with new products or 
uncommon procedures. Other work also supports unfamiliar medicines as a risk factor. 
Beaney and colleagues [2005] suggested that unfamiliarity with a product or preparation 
increased the likelihood of error, they quantified this as fewer than six ampoules or vials 
used within a 12 month period.
The nurses advocated a variety of solutions that could be applied to the preparation 
process, regardless of which medicine was involved. These included labelling the prepared 
product and asking a colleague for a check. Marriott and co-workers [2000] surveyed 
practice across 22 Trusts and reported that independent checks were not routinely 
performed in any Trust although certain staff groups or clinical areas were using double 
checks e.g. paediatrics, chemotherapy. Jensen and colleagues [2004] suggested that double 
checks could have prevented 58% IV bolus administration errors in a theatres environment 
and was the most effective single error reduction measure. In this study there was 
considerable debate about the role, limitations and potential benefits of checking by the 
nurses interviewed. However, nurses* comments in this study showed that in situations 
where they felt vulnerable e.g. tiredness; or situations where the potential for patient harm
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with an error was greater e.g. preparing insulin or heparin; then they employed some form 
of second check. This check was with a colleague, calculation chart or guideline. Cousins 
and colleagues [2005] have previously reported inadequate labelling of prepared products 
and advocated several design solutions which the pharmaceutical industry could adopt to 
assist with product labelling in practice, such as containers with flag labels that could be 
transferred to prepared doses.
The way in which the medicine was presented, with those supplied to the clinical area in a 
ready to administer form, or a solution that solely required withdrawing into a syringe was 
preferred by nurses in this study. These findings mirror previous work, and the standard set 
by the RCN [Taxis & Barber 2003a,b; Wirtz et al., 2003; RCN, 2005]. Alternatively it was 
suggested that IV doses could be supplied to the ward ready to administer, having been 
prepared either in pharmacy or on the ward by dedicated personnel. These issues were first 
identified and reported on in 1976, when it was recommended that then need to add IV 
drugs to sterile IV fluids on wards should be minimised and where necessary this should be 
undertaken in central aseptic conditions under the control of a hospital pharmacist 
[Breckenridge, 1976]. These opinions have been re-enforced by other national publications 
and echo the findings of previous studies [Audit Commission, 2001; Taxis & Barber 
2003a,b; RCN, 2005]. It is surprising that despite this volume of support, much progress 
would be required to comply.
Some medicines can be purchased in a ready to administer form e.g. metronidazole 
infusion, pre-filled adrenaline syringes. One concern cited by nurses in this study was the 
increased acquisition costs o f using ready to administer products. An economic evaluation 
in a ‘real-life’ setting of ready to administer dobutamine infusions compared with those 
prepared on the ward was undertaken in Belgium [van der Linden et al., 2002]. They 
reported a 32% saving in nurses’ time, lower total costs and raised user satisfaction with 
the ready made preparation and no difference in safety or efficacy. Economic evaluations 
that assess the total costs to the organisation need to be undertaken in the UK.
Many hospitals do not have adequate facilities to prepare in pharmacy all injectables that 
cannot be purchased in a ready to administer form [Turner et al., 2003; Beaney et al., 
2005] Therefore, pharmaceutical manufacturers have designed novel reconstitution 
methods to overcome some of the risks identified with ward based preparation, such as the
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Baxter Minibag Plus™ and Macoflex transfer set™. These allow the reconstitution of 
powders by the infusion fluid through a transfer device or via a special additive port. An 
evaluation of these systems compared to a conventional needle and syringe technique 
showed time savings, fewer interruptions, fewer problems, no needle stick injuries and 
ease of use [Nichols et al, 2001; Turner et al., 2003]. User satisfaction and cost savings 
were greatest with the vial transfer device [Turner et al., 2003]. When the Minibag Plus 
system was compared with needle and syringe technique, significantly fewer doses were 
microbially contaminated (0 vs. 21%). However, no change in clinical outcome was 
observed [Nichols et al., 2001]. There are a variety of needle free transfer devices 
commercially available, which include some of the devices described by the nurses 
interviewed e.g. Interlink™ system. In contrast, the nurses interviewed perceived the main 
benefits to be fewer needle stick injuries, minimising contamination of themselves and the 
product. Time and financial savings with fewer in use complications were not discussed by 
the nurses. These needle-free devices are only suitable where the dose required is a 
multiple of a whole vial, so they are unsuitable when only part o f a vial is required such as 
in paediatrics.
Additional safeguards have been advocated for ‘high-alert medications’. These are those 
where the risk of patient harm as a result of error are increased [Cohen & Milo, 2000]. 
Hadaway [2001] advised that such products should be purchased premixed or prepared in 
the pharmacy department and supplied to the clinical areas in a form ready to administer. It 
is also recommended that multi-step products, multiple dilution products and products 
requiring mixing created opportunities for error, so they should be avoided [Jones, 2003; 
Gross, 2005a]. Previous research has identified multi-step preparation, where drugs need 
measuring and diluting or reconstituting, as an error prone stage in the IV MUP [Taxis & 
Barber, 2003a]. It is recognised that ready to administer preparation are more costly; 
however it has been suggested that the additional expenditure provides higher product 
quality and lower risk to the patient [Jones, 2003].
5.5.5 Information and training
The nurses needed access to information in order to safely prepare the medicine in their 
clinical area. The key document they used was the Trust IV drug administration guidelines, 
which they described as invaluable. A number of suggestions to improve this document 
were provided. They also relied on the manufacturers package insert, but noted that
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recently its format had changed from professional information to a patient information 
leaflet. This had limited its value to the nurses when preparing the medicine. When the 
medicine or required information was not contained within the IV guide, information was 
not easily accessible and nurses relied on colleagues and pharmacists to fill this gap.
It is suggested that current and reliable medicines reference materials should be available 
for practitioners in their clinical setting, available on the hospital intranet, or in portable 
format either electronic or paper based [AORN, 2002; ISMP, 2004]. A lack of protocols 
for the preparation and administration of parenteral medicines has been associated with 
administration errors within critical care [van den Bemt et a l, 2002]. Previous audit across 
two UK hospitals showed that 48% ward areas (n=71) had no reference sources for IV 
medicines preparation [Zavery et al., 2005]. Standard guidance for continuous IV infusions 
within neonatal critical care has been shown to prevent calculation errors [Santeiro et al, 
1992]. The nurses interviewed advocated the need for easy access to information in their 
clinical areas. It would appear that the concerns raised in the Breckenridge Report 
regarding inadequate training and ready access to information in clinical areas remain 
[Breckenridge, 1976].
It was apparent from the interviews that there were concerns about the knowledge and 
skills of some nurses in practice. The interviewees shared examples of poor practice and 
identified deficits in training provision. Within their professional practice a nurse is 
governed by the NMC document ‘The Code of Professional Conduct* [2004b]. This 
encouraged nurses to expand their practice, provided they have the necessary knowledge, 
skills and to accept responsibility for their actions. IV therapy used to be considered as an 
expanded nurse role, however over the last decade has become a core role [RCN, 2005]. 
However, from the comments received during the interviews, it would appear that some 
nurses may not be following their professional code. These findings are supported by 
previous research examining the nursing causes of errors, where the rationale given for 
errors made by nurses included a lack of knowledge/information, faulty judgement, and a 
lack of supervision [Meurier et al., 1997]. In addition, a previous audit confirmed that core 
standards, such as swabbing the vial’s septum were not commonly followed in 99% cases 
[Cousins et al, 2005]. This is at odds with the RCN practice criteria [2005] requiring 
aseptic technique be used throughout reconstitution, including adequate cleaning of 
infusion additive ports, vials and ampoule tops.
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Adequate knowledge of a patient's treatment and medicines are key to preventing 
medication errors. Kawamura [2001] suggested that nurse's knowledge of the new and 
ever increasing number of specialist medicines was limited. They advocated strengthening 
of the pharmacists' role and recommended that they should take an active role in nurse 
training. Their study found that nurses with less than two years experience in practice 
found the gap between the knowledge they had obtained at qualification and the ‘real 
world' was too vast. Training would need to be adapted to the clinical environment and 
should also include error prevention [Kawamura, 2001]. Variables reported to affect 
knowledge include the length of experience, and the level and recency of professional 
education [Armitage & Knapman, 2003].
The RCN standards for infusion therapy [2005] provide clear guidance on the aspects of 
practical and theoretical training nurses should have undertaken. This includes legal, 
professional and ethical issues, mathematical calculations related to medications, risk 
management, pharmacology and pharmaceutics related to reconstitution. Further 
elaboration on the knowledge required for reconstitution is also given. It requires nurses 
undertaking infusion therapy to be clinically competent in all aspects of infusion therapy, 
and have validated competency in clinical judgement and practice. It clearly places this 
responsibility jointly with the individual and the trust [RCN, 2005;p.7]
“All staff have a professional obligation to maintain their knowledge and skills 
[NMC, 2004b]. It is also the responsibility o f the organisation to support and provide staff 
with training and education. ”
The findings of this study showed little attention, if any, was given to the practical training 
for IV preparation either at undergraduate or post registration level. Most had gained their 
skills for preparation from observing their colleagues. This reflects a key finding from 
similar work [Taxis & Barber, 2003b]. Analysis of 85 human errors attributed 41 of these 
to lack of knowledge, routine and experience in drug preparation. They also found that the 
practical aspects of IV drug preparation were neither taught nor assessed in their study 
hospitals [Taxis & Barber, 2003b].
The nurses interviewed in this study advocated that staff should attend update or refresher 
sessions and that all needed to be able to demonstrate competency with this task. Other 
workers have also advocated an annual review of IV medicines competencies, in line with 
other mandatory training [Nicholas & Agius, 2005].
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5.5.6 Further work
There was a need for a documented, readily accessible organisational practice standard on 
IV preparation, information in the clinical area, and a review of IV training and 
competency. These issues highlight organisational problems with the staffing, equipment 
and environment in which IV medicines are prepared. It identifies the need for investment 
in building a safety culture embedded within and throughout the organisation where staff 
feel valued, able to raise concerns, and learn from incidents and near misses. These 
specific issues should be addressed by the Trust.
Analysis of this study data using the framework approach identified key categories, but it 
is unlikely the full extent of each category was explored in this exploratory study. It would 
be useful for further work to be undertaken to ensure that all categories were identified and 
also to ensure comprehensive description of their characteristics. Nurses are just one of a 
range of healthcare practitioners who undertake IV preparation. Therefore views of other 
healthcare professionals e.g. paramedics, doctors, radiographers, perfusionists could be 
investigated.
From the comments received from the nurses interviewed, some problems arose from 
earlier steps in the medicines use process e.g. poor prescribing or pharmacy not supplying 
manufacturer’s leaflets with dispensed items. Therefore the IV preparation process cannot 
be addressed in isolation. Consideration should also be given to exploring these issues. It 
would be beneficial to approach some of these research questions in a multiprofessional 
environment, such as focus groups. This would enable cross boundary issues and solutions 
to be investigated. Healthcare professionals may not always consider problems or solutions 
that fall beyond their own professional boundary. However, systematic analysis of the IV 
MUP to identify where failures occur, using techniques such as failure mode effects 
analyses, would allow weaknesses to be highlighted. Solutions can then be considered in 
the wider context, which could include previously unidentified strategies e.g. bar-code 
confirmation of the medicine’s identity.
There are several issues where a further study would provide clarity such as the role of 
double checking, simulation testing of IV preparation, and annual re-accreditation. The 
interviewees cited concerns about solutions requiring financial investment. Cost benefit 
analyses should be undertaken to address this issue, before potential solutions considered.
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Future research should clearly distinguish between the IV preparation and administration 
stages, as much of the current evidence is combined. It would appear that there are 
additional concerns within the paediatric and neonatal environment, where reliance on 
adult IV preparation poses unique risks, this would also benefit from further study.
The results from this study could be used to inform future qualitative and quantitative 
work. The resource implications and practicality of solving some of the issues identified 
warrant urgent attention.
5.6 Conclusions
It is very important to consider the views and concerns of nursing staff whilst IV 
preparation continues to occur in clinical areas. The findings from the nurses interviewed 
in this study suggest that priority should be given to developing solutions to minimise 
interruptions, to the design and provision of a dedicated work space, to reviewing the 
availability of needle free devices and to ensuring that all the relevant information required 
for IV preparation and administration is available to staff in their clinical areas.
There should also be a national review and standardisation of the taxonomy, standards and 
competency required for IV medicines preparation. In the interim this should be 
undertaken at a local level.
Healthcare professionals need to work in partnership with medicines manufacturers to 
enable them to design products that are simpler and easier to use. Preparations requiring 
little or no manipulation in the clinical area were appealing to nursing staff, although there 
was concern about the increased costs required to achieve this. Further work should be 
undertaken to evaluate the cost effectiveness of such changes within the wider healthcare 
system. Consideration should be given to end user testing before medicines are marketed. 
Particular attention should be given to using a human factors approach to minimise the 
potential for error, therefore safeguarding patients.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
The introduction to this thesis described the global epidemic of iatrogenic injury in 
healthcare. The approach adopted in the UK’s approach to understanding the scale and 
nature of this problem was outlined, along with strategies and governmental policies 
designed to address healthcare deficits. The creation of the NPSA was pivotal in leading 
patient safety reform in England and Wales [Department of Health, 2001b]. Medication 
became a patient safety priority, because it is the leading healthcare intervention it was 
unsurprisingly also a main cause of patient injury [Smith, 2004]. Although there is a vast 
and rapidly growing body of patient safety literature, a lack of common and consistently 
applied definitions, terminology and research methods posed difficulties when examining 
and interpreting study findings [Nebeker et al., 2002; Chang et al., 2005; Woods et al., 
2005; Yu et al., 2005]. This was confounded by differences in medication use between 
study settings and countries [Ghandi et al., 2000; van den Bemt et al., 2000; Cousins, 
2005b; Dean-Franklin et al., 2005]. Previous UK medicines safety research had focused 
extensively on prescribing, dispensing and oral medication administration. More recently, 
work on hospital IV errors had identified problems with IV administration and highlighted 
the greater propensity for patient harm [Argo et al., 2000; Bruce & Wong, 2001; Taxis & 
Barber, 2003a]. IV medicines administration was more complex than oral administration. 
Some medicines required manipulation in the clinical area into a ready to administer dose. 
Further investigation of IV medicines preparation in patient areas was warranted [Cousins 
2005a].
Therefore, this thesis focused on IV medicines preparation in hospital clinical areas. 
Specifically, a definition of an IVMPE, with inclusion and exclusion criteria, were agreed. 
This framework was translated into an observational audit tool and its feasibility assessed. 
An in-depth understanding of the processes involved with IV medicines preparation was 
sought and insight into how nurses resolved these issues was gained. Collectively this 
enabled understanding of how PSIs involving medication arise during IV medicines 
preparation.
6.1 IV medicines preparation process
The administration stage of the IV MUP encompassed a wide range of practices. This 
process varied in complexity and the number of component stages, depending upon the
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medicine required and its presentation (section 2.2, figure 2.2 and 5.5). At its simplest this 
was a pre-filled syringe ready to administer to a patient and varied to an individualised 
multi-ingredient prescription, supplied as constituent ingredients. Only the latter requires a 
preparation stage, which may take place either in clinical areas or pharmacy controlled 
aseptic facilities. Initially it was necessary to identify the scope of ward based preparation 
activities, their limits and terminology. In the Delphi study, previously published 
definitions of IV medicines assembly and preparation were rejected [Gandy et al., 2002], 
but agreed after refinement (chapter 2).
Intravenous medication assembly was defined in this study as
“The gathering together on a cleaned tray, trolley or appropriate work surface; the 
items o f equipment and pharmaceutical agents required fo r the preparation o f a medicinal 
product fo r a patient. ”
Respondents did not consider that all equipment and ingredients needed to be gathered 
from the outset. This may be because of differing practices between clinical areas and 
pharmacy aseptic facilities.
Intravenous medication preparation was
“The procedure for using the assembled items in drawing up, mixing, combining or 
reconstituting the pharmaceutical agents, diluents and/or infusion fluids into the right 
form, combination, and strength according to the patient’s prescription sheet. Preparation 
includes using relevant documentation for preparing the medicinal product, calculations, 
and labelling. ”
Respondents rejected the inclusion of any reference to equipment in this definition. This 
revised form is similar to that proposed by the Clinical Resource and Audit Group of NHS 
Scotland [2002]. The boundary between the end of preparation and where administration 
began was not clearly defined. It was suggested that when preparation was remote from the 
patient, all activities undertaken before the patient was approached should be included in 
the preparation stage.
These findings contrasted with those from the nurse interviews (chapter 5), where the 
whole process was commonly gathered together as IV administration. The nurses 
differentiated between the preparation and administration stages, but not assembly. They 
suggested that assembly and preparation were a continuous task in clinical areas, rather 
than the two discreet processes suggested by the definitions. In their opinion, preparing any 
flush solutions required was an integral part of the preparation stage. In addition they 
identified a ‘pre-preparation’ stage that was unique to clinical areas and involved patient
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specific assessment, such as the type of vascular access available. This information 
affected how the IV dose was prepared. The interview findings highlighted differences 
between preparation undertaken remote from the patient in pharmacy aseptic facilitations 
and in clinical areas.
It is important that common terminology, understood by all healthcare professionals, is 
used in medicines research. The findings from this study indicate that terms commonly 
used by pharmacy in aseptic production cannot be directly transferred to clinical areas and 
to other professional groups. IV administration should be subdivided into two stages, 
preparation and administration. Preparation in clinical areas should include patient 
assessment and preparing any flush solutions, this had not previously been recognised.
6.2 Intravenous medicines preparation error definition and framework
A definition of an intravenous medication assembly or preparation error in the clinical
setting was agreed as
“The preparation o f IV  medication that deviates from the prescription, 
manufacturer's guidance, national or locally agreed policy, procedure or guidance, or 
generic standards fo r clean or aseptic preparation. ”
The definition incorporates and expands that previously used by other workers [Taxis & 
Barber, 2003a, Wirtz et al., 2003]. The main differences were including deviations from 
policies procedures and poor aseptic technique as errors. Inclusion of poor aseptic issues 
has previously been debated, and details of breaches were collected and reported separately 
[Wirtz, 2001]. This contrasts with another study where deviation from aseptic technique 
was firmly embedded within the audit [Cousins et al., 2005]. However it is supported by 
other studies which demonstrate high levels of contamination when medicines were 
prepared in intensive care units [Quercia et al., 1986; van Grafhorst et al., 2002].One of the 
main difficulties encountered when including aseptic preparation within the error 
framework, was the lack of standards or agreement on what constituted appropriate clean 
technique in clinical areas. This contrasts with pharmacy controlled aseptic facilities where 
explicit guidance is available and rigorously enforced [Beaney, 2001].
Delphi respondents’ acknowledged that some injectable medicines, such as specials, did 
not come with manufacturers’ guidance and the definition needed to address this issue. 
Previous definitions have not proposed solutions where medicines have been supplied 
without manufacturer’s guidance. In practice respondents reported that this was often
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addressed through local guidance or adopting other published guidance, particularly in 
paediatrics. Therefore, it was appropriate to include adherence to such guidance within the 
scope of the definition. However, this raised a potential problem with analysis of this study 
and meta analysis of published research studies, where different information sources may 
provide different advice. Agreement was not reached during the Delphi on which 
information sources should be given priority when assessing compliance with advice. 
Instead, it was suggested that where conflict arose this should be resolved on a case by 
case basis. A researcher would need to identify organisational policies and procedures 
prior to data collection, as they would affect data analysis, and thus error assignment. This 
highlighted the need for clear explanation of the study setting and working practices in 
research publications. This would enable readers to compare and extrapolate findings to 
their organisations’ practices.
Prescribing issues were not considered within the error framework. However, there was 
awareness that prescribing or dispensing errors could become preparation errors, and it was 
impossible to separate preparation from the earlier MUP stages. Therefore, when agreeing 
the IVMPE definition it was necessary to assume the prescription was both valid and 
appropriate. When using the error framework in practice it would be necessary to identify 
and record prescribing issues separately.
When the IVMPE framework was piloted (chapter 4) a potential problem was highlighted 
with the definition. Anaesthetists record medication they have administered in operating 
theatres, instead of writing a prescription giving instructions for administration. This issue 
is unlikely to arise in other settings in which anaesthetists work such as in critical care, 
preoperatively and postoperatively, where they do prescribe [Wheeler & Wheeler, 2005]. 
This had not previously been identified and further work is warranted to explore this.
Audit has been extensively used as a means of providing quality assurance data that 
minimum standards are achieved and maintained within pharmacy controlled unlicensed 
aseptic units. It would be a logical to extend this to encompass ward based IV preparation, 
using appropriate criteria.
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6.3 Concurrent IV medicines practice developments
During the preparation of this thesis several developments which affected IV medication 
preparation in clinical areas occurred. First was the development of several risk-assessment 
tools which enabled the identification of 'high-risk* items, so these could be transferred for 
preparation within pharmacy [Tunstell, 2004; Beaney et al., 2005]. Some workers 
addressed the issue more widely and assessed risks posed by training, facilities, capacity 
and staffing issues [Lowe & Shaw, 2002; Munro et al., 2003; Zavery et al., 2005] while 
others have successfully applied prospective risk analysis processes, such as failure mode 
effects analysis (FMEA) to identify weaknesses and guide improvements [Apkon et al., 
2004; Adachi & Lodolce, 2005; Bonnabry et al., 2005].
The NPSA commenced work on a patient safety alert concerning the ‘safer use of 
injectable medicines in near-patient areas*, which was released for stakeholder consultation 
in January 2006 [NPSA, 2006]. This timely document addresses risks throughout the 
injectable MUP, and is the first to include a comprehensive, yet practical, approach to 
injectable preparation in all care settings for England and Wales. Although the alert’s remit 
is broader than this thesis, it adopts a similar stance to that agreed within the IVMPE 
definition and framework, as it incorporates poor aseptic technique and policy and 
procedure issues.
Appended to the alert are multiprofessional safer practice standards and a standard 
operating procedure (SOP), both of which include detailed guidance on the preparation 
stage [NPSA, 2006]. It is interesting that in this study the IVMPE criteria, in asking 
whether it was acceptable to prepare medicines in advance either generally or in situations 
where it was paramount that medication delivery was not interrupted, did not achieve 
consensus (chapter 2). The NPSA standard requires that
“Injectable medicine prepared in clinical areas must be used immediately after 
preparation: they should not be stored before use ” [NPSA, 2006;p.l5].
The definition also includes flush preparation within the preparation stage, which mirrors 
the views of the nurses interviewed in this study (chapter 5).
The SOP section on preparation provides national multiprofessional standards for IV 
medicines preparation. One of the difficulties encountered during this thesis was the lack 
of such standards against which practice could be compared. Therefore, issues identified 
during the pilot study (chapter 4) could be resolved by comparison with this standard,
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where non adherence to the SOP would constitute poor practice. An incident which 
occurred in this study, when a solution was withdrawn directly from a glass ampoule 
without a needle is such an example. Other criteria where consensus was not gained for 
inclusion as an IVMPE in the Delphi study, such as hand cleansing before preparation 
would also be included as poor practice (chapter 3). The SOP facilitates a clear distinction 
between poor practice and error. Where practice met the inclusion criteria agreed for an 
IVMPE a potential error would have occurred. If this error was not intercepted and was 
administered to the patient then it would constitute an IVMPE.
The importance of incorporating design across systems to improve patient safety has 
already been highlighted [Department of Health and the Design Council, 2003]. This was 
acknowledged and explored through the report on pharmaceutical packaging and labelling 
for oral doses, but has yet to be applied to IV medicines. Design has also been incorporated 
into the revised draft standards of the hospital HBN ‘facilities for medicines management’. 
It is clearly demonstrated by the statement
“It is important that adequate provision for medicines storage is made available in 
wards/clinical areas to ensure safe practice. The National Patient Safety Agency has 
reported that inadequate and insufficient medicines storage has led to deaths and serious 
harms due to overcrowding and selection errors ” [Architects for Health, 2006;p.21].
The National Implementation Board for the modernisation of NHS medicines 
manufacturing and preparation services was established in 2002, with substantial capital 
investment allocated for modernisation [Gross, 2005b]. NHS manufacturing units produce 
a wide variety o f unlicensed injectable products, in a ready to use format, and it is essential 
to provide patients with safe injectable therapy. NHS manufacturing and preparation 
resources are being directed towards those products associated with the greatest clinical 
risk [Root, 2006]. The implementation board has been working towards standardisation of 
patient controlled analgesia and epidural preparations for pain control, which will improve 
medicines safety in this area [Gross, 2005b].
Together, these developments highlight the risks posed by injectable therapy, especially 
with complex injectable preparation in clinical areas. The findings from this thesis support 
such approaches yet provide a different perspective for improving medicines safety.
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6.4 Capturing data on IV medicines preparation errors
Gathering data on IVMPE poses some unique problems. Document based review and 
voluntary incident reports are insensitive to these types of error [Barker et al., 2002b]. 
Observational techniques have traditionally been employed, but are time-consuming, 
resource intensive and critically dependent upon the competence and skills of the observer 
and methodological rigour [Allan & Barker, 1990; Dean & Barber, 2001; Flynn et al, 
2002]. Therefore, although feasible as a research tool, this may limit the use of direct 
observation as a quality assurance and governance measure.
Piloting of observational audit of IVMPE highlighted the need for extensive observer 
training and competency assessment in aseptic technique and observation, supported by 
orientation in the clinical area (chapter 3). One limitation found was the difficulty of 
completing the data collection form whilst observing the preparation, due to the speed of 
the preparation process. This posed additional problems when multiple deviations occurred 
for a single IV dose. Recent advances using video recording during real and simulated 
resuscitation, anaesthesia and surgery may overcome these limitations [Mackenzie & Xiao, 
2003; Kozer et al., 2004; Weinger et al., 2004]. In the studies audio and video data 
recording and analysis were used in conjunction with additional data sources, such as the 
patient’s clinical monitoring parameters, direct observation, and document review. The 
main advantages of video data capture is that it enables every detail to be filmed on the 
record can be reviewed as needed. Miniaturisation of video equipment with zoom 
potential allows unobscured views. Disadvantages cited for this technique were consent 
issues, privacy, confidentiality, practical logistics and litigation concerns [Mackenzie & 
Xiao, 2003; Kozer et al., 2004; Weinger et al., 2004]. Simulation of IV medicines 
preparation could be attempted, but this might differ from real-life as the time, patient and 
environmental factors would be missing. This could introduce bias, and may explain why 
this has not been attempted.
Another method which has been employed is to assay the IV dose prepared and compare it 
with the prescription [Allen et al., 1995; Femer et al., 2001; Parshuram et al., 2003]. This 
circumvents the many limitations of observational methods, but is only applicable to those 
medicines that are stable and easily assayed. This valid and reliable method could be used 
in conjunction with observational techniques to provide a multifaceted insight into how 
IVMPE arise.
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Continuous voluntary incident reporting is likely to remain the main method of capturing 
information on IVMPE, as it is inexpensive, convenient and can be used continuously 
within NHS Trusts. However, when hospitals analyse reported incidents it is important 
they are aware of the limitations and insensitivity of this method. Low reporting rates do 
not provide organisational reassurances. Currently this is best achieved by direct 
observational audit.
6.5 Analysing IV medicines preparation
Previous IVMPE studies focused on quantification of the problem [O’Hare et al, 1995; 
Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Bruce & Wong, 2001; Hoppe-Tichy et al., 2002; Taxis & Barber, 
2003a; Wirtz et al., 2003; Cousins et al., 2005]. In order to appropriately target measures 
to reduce IVMPE, a clear understanding of how and why errors occur is required [Leape, 
1994]. The NPSA has adopted the systems approach to safety; therefore it is appropriate 
that a human error or human factors approach is employed to understand and analyse 
incidents [NPSA, 2003a]. Human factors has been described as “an applied science o f  
system design that evaluates human strength and compensates for human limitations ” 
[Schneider, 2002b;p. 1156].
Leape [1994] advised that true insight into the origins of IVMPE is only achievable 
through understanding human error and fallibility. Taxis and Barber [2003b] applied 
human error theory to gain an understanding of how observed IV errors arose. This was 
achieved by following a standardised protocol for investigating and analysing clinical 
incidents, rooted in human factors science [Vincent et al., 2000]. Since human decisions 
and actions are a key component of virtually all incidents, manifesting as active and latent 
failures [Vincent et al., 1998]. Analysis must extend beyond the active failure that 
preceded the IVMPE and reach further to explore the local task, team, individual, working 
environment and organisational factors that were present when the error occurred, and 
contributed to its genesis.
Human error theory could fruitfully be used to further analyse the nurse interviews 
(chapter 5). Latent organisation level conditions described by the nurses included: the need 
to embed a fair blame culture in the hospital, evidence of a training or competency deficit, 
unavailability of equipment, and safety concerns with needle use. Medication related issues 
were: ambiguous medicines packaging and labelling, supplying medicines to the clinical
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area that required complex calculations and/or manipulations, difficult or time consuming 
reconstitution, inadequate 'drug additive* labels and inadequate information and guidance 
on preparation. During the pilot study (chapter 4) the observers also questioned whether 
the organisation had yet achieved a safety culture. The organisation would benefit from 
using a tool, such as the Manchester Patient Safety Framework for acute care, to identify 
what its current safety profile is, and prioritise areas for action [The University of 
Manchester and Department of Health, 2006].
Error producing conditions were commonly described within the work environment and 
included; inadequate workspace for IV medicines preparation, interruptions, time 
pressures, competing commitments, understaffing, inadequate knowledge and skills, and 
unfamiliarity with rarely used medicines. These conditions were similar to those previously 
reported from analysis of disguised observation and informal discussion with nurses 
preparing IV doses on wards [Taxis & Barber, 2003b]. In addition these mirror several of 
the risks identified in the NPSA injectables medicine alert. These include cluttered 
workspaces, interruptions and distractions, unfamiliar processes, variable standards of 
training [NPSA, 2006]. Each of these issues identified needs to be assessed locally, and 
escalated to higher levels within the organisation when the means to minimise or avoid the 
risks are beyond their means. During the nurse interviews an example was given where 
resources were found to redesign the clinical area to produce a designated preparation area. 
Another nurse in a similar situation was unable to secure resources for such a change; the 
next level of management needs to take ownership of and rectify this problem. There has 
been little focus on the managerial and organisational responsibilities for improving patient 
safety with regard to injectables, even though issues such as inadequate training and 
information at ward level have previously been identified and made explicit within 
Controls Assurance [NHSE, 1999b; Taxis & Barber, 2003b; Zavery et al., 2005].
6.6 Potential solutions
There are three ways in which healthcare systems can be designed to be safer by reducing 
errors and adverse events. These are system redesign to prevent errors, improving the 
defences within the system so errors become visible and are intercepted, and designing 
processes to mitigate the effect of errors which reach the patient [Nolan, 2000].
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Suggestions for systems change include removing the need for preparation in near patient 
areas. This could be achieved in a number of different ways. Some medicines can be 
purchased in ready to administer presentations, such as pre-filled syringes and ready mixed 
infusions. Wherever possible these should be licensed medicines, supported by unlicensed 
products from commercial or NHS manufacturing units [Gross, 2005b]. The nurses 
interviewed advocated providing medication in a ready to administer form. In addition to 
preventing errors they also suggested that time was saved (chapter 4). The nurses also 
suggested that it would be useful if complex and time consuming preparations were 
supplied to the ward ‘ready to administer’. Those medicines, assessed as ‘high-risk’ for 
preparation in clinical areas, could be prioritised for preparation within pharmacy 
controlled aseptic facilities [Beaney et al., 2005]. Errors can also occur within the 
pharmacy, however a robust double checking system is an integral part of the dispensing 
process, making it more likely that any errors would be detected and intercepted. In 
addition, staff preparing the aseptic products are concentrating on the single function of 
preparing the IV dose, with minimal distraction [Summerfield & Lawrence, 2002].
Medicines should be assessed as practical and ‘fit for purpose’ before they are purchased 
and supplied to clinical areas. There are several opportunities for error minimisation with 
this strategy. It would be useful if all licensed medicine were required to undergo user 
acceptability testing before a product licence were granted. This would ensure that 
appropriate technical information was included with the product and would identify 
difficulties that might arise in practice. For example, to administer lOmg vitamin K as an 
infusion the manufacturer advises this be diluted with 55ml of 5% glucose [Roche 
Products Ltd, 2006]. However there is no commercially available source of 55ml of 5% 
glucose. This approach is not available for unlicensed injectable formulations, which may 
be provided without product information, which may limit user acceptability. This is being 
addressed in part by the National Implementation Board for the modernisation of NHS 
medicines manufacturing and preparation services which is developing monographs and 
stability data for commonly used products [Gross, 2005b].
Other opportunities for intervention of both licensed and unlicensed injectables are at the 
purchasing stage, where Alldred [2006] provides a purchasing for safety framework. 
Hospitals also have the opportunity to assess products before they are included on a
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hospital formulary. The formulary review committee has knowledge of the intended use 
against which to evaluate the medicine [Dorey, 2004; Murri & Somani, 2004].
Another option is to change systems focus on reducing complexity, such as the number of 
steps in the task and the number of choices [Nolan, 2000]. Numerous recommendations in 
this area have been made which, if adopted, would improve medicines safety. These 
include ensuring that the correct strength of medicine corresponding to the required dose is 
available in the clinical area and providing a medicine as a solution rather than an item that 
requires reconstitution, [Beaney et al, 2005; NPSA, 2006]. Automation offers many 
opportunities at other stages in the IV MUP, but at the preparation stage, automation is 
currently limited to bar coding. The impact of its introduction on IV preparation has not yet 
been evaluated.
Constraints can be used as a defence to restrict erroneous actions and are one of the most 
reliable strategies in preventing errors. An example of this was the NPSA alert restricting 
strong potassium containing injectables in clinical areas [NPSA, 2002]. Following the 
alert, the proportion of NHS Trust with formal controls rose from 25% to 68%, and was 
associated with a 27% reduction in the quantity of strong potassium chloride concentrate 
ampoules used [NPSA, 2003c]. The mind functions most efficiently when it is able to 
focus solely on the IV preparation task without other distractions. This is achieved through 
increased understanding and avoiding reliance on memory [Nolan, 2000]. One example 
that was identified by the nurses interviewed was look-alike and sound-alike medicines 
names. Where possible this should be eliminated, or measures to highlight this used. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are pivotal to resolving this problem. Guidance is available 
improving the design of oral medicines packaging and labelling, much of which also 
applies to injectable medicines [Helen Hamyln Research Centre, NPSA, 2006]. For 
example, the nurses interviewed identified problems when medicines names looked or 
sounded similar such as cefradine, cefuroxime, ceftriaxone, cefotaxime, or where similar 
strengths of the same medicine were not clearly distinguished.
Strategies that make errors visible, so they may be detected and intercepted include 
“double checking” and labelling prepared medicines. The nurses’ interviewed (chapter 4) 
reported that they would always label IV infusions, but their practice differed with regard 
to IV bolus doses and flushes. In some cases they used alternative strategies for
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identification such leaving the plastic flush container on the end of the syringe. They 
highlighted this as an error prone area, particularly when more than one syringe of the 
same size was used. Another area for potential error identified by the nurses was that the 
‘drug additive’ label used in the hospital did not require the patients name to be 
documented. Some nurses added this detail to the label, whilst others applied a patient 
addressograph to the infusion container. Labelling all preparations would allow staff to 
readily identify its contents, thus minimising errors. The Trust would benefit from 
reviewing its guidance on labelling prepared medicines, flush solutions and the ‘drug 
additive’ used. This is supported by the findings of the pilot study where labelling errors 
such as no medicine name or dose were observed (chapter 3). It would also be timely; the 
NPSA injectables alert SOP provides clarity on appropriate practice
“All injections should be labelled immediately after preparation, except for 
syringes intended fo r immediate push (bolus) administration by the person who prepared 
them. Under no circumstances, however, must an operator be in possession o f more than 
one unlabelled syringe at any one time... ” [NPSA, 2006;p.21].
Double-checking was discussed during the nurse interviews; they were equivocal about the 
benefits of one nurse routinely checking another’s preparation. It has been reported a 
person would detect approximately 95% of all mistakes when checking another person 
[ISMP, 2003b]. Double checks are most effective when carried out independently, by staff 
trained to perform these checks. Robust double checking is time consuming, therefore with 
the current work pressure it is recommended these should be restricted to at error prone 
steps and high-risk medicines [ISMP, 2003b]. They questioned the robustness of the check 
and the evidence base to support that it prevented errors. Concerns were raised about its 
effectiveness, given the hierarchical nature of nursing and the existing hospital safety 
culture. Despite the potential limitations, most nurses described error-prone scenarios 
where they advocated a ‘double-check’ by a colleague. These were situations where their 
personal performance might not be optimal, such as an unfamiliar medicine, complex 
calculations and tiredness or ‘high-alert’ medicines such as insulin and heparin. Another 
source of checking used was the local IV guide, which for some medicines included a dose 
check table. There is a potential here for bar-code verification of a product’s identity.
Calculations appeared to cause difficulties, and gave rise to concerns amongst the nurses 
who were aware of inadequate mathematical skills. Numerous studies have shown that 
miscalculations contribute to errors [Gladstone, 1995; Flynn et al., 1997; Hand & Barber, 
2000; Ross et al., 2000; Mayo & Duncan, 2004; Preston, 2004]. Complex calculations are
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recognised to increase the potential for IV medicines preparation error [Clinical Resource 
and Audit Group. NHS Scotland, 2002]. Poor mathematical skills have also been identified 
amongst other healthcare staff [Perlstein et al., 1979; ISMP, 2003a; Oldridge et al., 2004, 
Wheeler et al., 2004]. Solutions are required to circumvent the need for calculations and 
have been discussed previously [section 4.5.4]. This appears to pose particular and unique 
problems in the paediatric and neonatal setting.
Major issues were highlighted with knowledge, skills and training of the nurses that 
undertook IV preparation (chapter 5). They described great variability in the training 
provided both at undergraduate and postgraduate level. Training on IV medicine 
preparation was provided rarely or not at all. The nurses who were interviewed indicated 
that formal training focused on theoretical aspects, with preparation skills gained through 
observing colleagues and during practical supervision after completing theoretical training. 
The nurses training had varied, depending on where and when it had been delivered, and in 
some cases occurred 30 years ago. The RCN IV therapy forum [2005] set out the 
knowledge and skills required for nurses involved in IV therapy, but without a nationally 
agreed curriculum there does not appear to be robust process for ensuring staff have the 
requisite skills. An alternative strategy to assure this would be to use a competency 
framework for IV medicines preparation. This is an appealing suggestion, as training does 
not guarantee competence in practice. It could be applied to all healthcare staff, would be 
transferable and provide evidence of pro-active risk management in this complex area. It 
would also address a further issue, where ongoing training or re-certification in IV therapy 
was not available. The NPSA in collaboration with Skills for Health have developed a 
competency template that defines the knowledge and skills needed to prepare injectable 
medicines and an assessment template [NPSA, 2006]. Organisations should adopt these 
and use them to identify training needs and plan delivery. Organisations will also be 
required to have written procedures and protocols for all stages of the injectable MUP. 
This in addition to setting out practice standards, will also assist training.
There should be national standardisation and agreement of which practical aspects of IV 
preparation should be formally taught at both undergraduate and postgraduate level. The 
nurses interviewed expressed concern that training delivered was not always readily 
transferable into practice. Training also needed to be realistic and achievable in the 
clinical setting. Hands on experience in skills laboratories would provide familiarity with
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the techniques involved and consistency in training. Currently, staff may be learning 
suboptimal practice from their colleagues. This could then be supplemented with local 
orientation in their clinical area.
Numerous environmental and facilities issues that constrained the ability to prepare IV 
medicines were identified (chapter 5). These were the lack of a designated area to prepare 
IV doses, with cluttered and cramped working spaces. Some nurses had the opportunity to 
redesign their treatment room to improve these working conditions. These issues should be 
considered when planning, designing and refurbishing clinical areas within the Trust. 
Consideration should be given to improving the working environment through fewer 
interruptions, competing commitments, time pressures and staffing levels. Some solutions, 
such as minimising avoidable interruptions, could be led at ward level; whilst others 
require managerial level input.
An interesting issue that had not previously been identified was the level of health and 
safety concern amongst the nurses interviewed about exposure to antibiotic aerosols, 
opening glass ampoules and using sharps. Some of these could be addressed through using 
novel reconstitution and needle-free devices.
Nurses require easy access to information in their clinical area to enable them to prepare 
IV doses appropriately [NPSA, 2006]. In the study Trust, the main information source the 
nurses interviewed relied upon was the local IV guide. Other information sources relied 
upon for other medicines aspects were less helpful for IV preparation. Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ leaflets used to be a valuable source of information, but they noted that 
recently these were sometimes absent or replaced with a patient information leaflet. Where 
the leaflet was missing, because the medicine had been transferred into a different 
container by pharmacy during dispensing, the leaflet should also be transferred. Another 
explanation for the comments received in the study, was that unlicensed medicines do not 
provide this guidance in any case. This issue is eloquently summarised in the following 
quotation
“...because they are unlicensed products, they are associated unknowns around 
patient safety since such products do not bring with them the guarantees o f product 
quality, safety and efficacy that are taken for granted in a licensed medicine ” [Gross, 
2005b;p.743].
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In such cases the local IV guide becomes particularly important. The nurses reported that 
when they required information that was not in the IV guide, it was difficult and time 
consuming to obtain. It would be useful if additional insights gained by the nurses through 
experience could be incorporated into this guide, for example, how to reconstitute 
teicoplanin without it foaming.
The NPSA alert acknowledged that injectable medicines are often supplied with 
inadequate or no technical information, and that this is not readily available in other 
medicines reference sources. The possibility of addressing this deficit by developing a 
NHS Injectables Medicine Guide is being explored [NPSA, 2006]. Meanwhile, it is 
important that the local IV guide comprehensively provides information to staff in a 
convenient, readily accessible manner.
The vital importance of a safety culture has been described [NPSA, 2003a]. Suggestions 
were received in this study that further work is needed to nurture and embed an open and 
fair-blame culture. This would facilitate learning and sharing of hazards and incidents so 
preventative measures can be implemented. A ‘systems approach* is needed to understand 
and address the issues identified by the nurses. The nurses showed awareness of error 
provoking situations, this wealth of expertise could be tapped and sharpened. It has been 
proposed that some incidents, that have bypassed all the systems defences, can still be 
diverted at the last moment by front line staff with ‘error wisdom*. Reason proposed a 
model that provides people with “Basic mental skills that would help them to recognise 
and, i f  possible avoid situation with a high error potential ” [2004;p.ii31 ].
6.7 Study limitations
The thesis focuses on a single step within the IV MUP, and although this made study of the 
preparation stage practical and achievable, it does not reflect reality. The IV MUP is highly 
complex and actions in one stage are critically dependent upon actions in the preceding 
stages. This was addressed by an explicit assumption that the prescription from which an 
IV dose was prepared was correct and appropriate. However, errors or error producing 
conditions may originate at earlier MUP stages, remain undetected and unintercepted, and 
so be transferred through to the preparation stage. This was beyond the scope of the study. 
Similarly, the IVMPE framework described scenarios for inclusion and exclusion as
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IVMPEs, but unless the error at the preparation stage actually reached the patient these 
were potential IVMPEs.
The Delphi technique (chapter 3) is a qualitative method, so its findings are not 
generalisable. However, this consensus method was used to gather agreement from experts 
and it is not expected to provide wider applicability. The methods were robustly applied 
and clearly described, providing transparency and enabling replication. A number of 
limitations were identified, the main concerns being pharmacist over-representation within 
the sample, failure to recruit infection control or microbiology expertise despite using the 
snowball sampling technique, insufficient piloting of the questionnaire prior to the second 
Delphi round and failure of the attempted validity checks. Survey administration may have 
achieved higher response rates had it been issued at a less inconvenient time for the 
participants, with shorter periods between subsequent rounds. Ideally, criteria from the 
second Delphi round should have been included in the third round to enable test-retest 
reliability to be assessed.
The pilot study of the observational data collection tool (chapter 4) showed that the 
IVMPE definition and framework could be operationalised as an audit tool. This enabled 
the identification of several potential methodological problems which will need to be 
resolved prior to use. These included the need for robust observer training covering 
competency assessment in observational techniques and aseptic methods. The publication 
of the NPSA injectable alert will aid training as it includes national standards for IV 
preparation in clinical areas, and will enable identification of unacceptable practice. This 
will also provide clarity for the audit when coding during data analysis. Previous research 
has demonstrated that effects bias created by the researcher and research process can be 
minimised [Dean & Barber, 2001; Bowling, 2002]. Although pre-registration pharmacy 
graduates were used for the observation it was envisaged that this role was appropriate for 
pharmacy technicians. This has not been evaluated, but technicians have been successfully 
used in similar work [Mansfield, 2001; Munro et al., 2003].
Recruitment into the pilot study and in-depth interviews was slower than expected. The 
effects of researching into this sensitive area must not be underestimated. The requirement 
for explicit informed consent from participants appeared to be a source of concern. It could 
be that the information provided identified potential issues that the nurses had not
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previously considered. It is likely that improvements in the safety culture would improve 
recruitment.
The nurses who agreed to be interviewed (chapter 5) were opportunistically sampled, and 
views may differ from those who did not volunteer. Again this was a qualitative method, 
so the findings are not widely generalisable. A larger sample size may have provided 
additional issues that were not identified by this study and would have enabled full 
characterisation of the categories identified. A key limitation of interview methods is that it 
addresses participant’s perceptions and views, which may differ from reality. However 
through ‘triangulation’, by combining research methods, the limitations of each method are 
addressed [Smith, 2002]. This occurred in the present study as the observations and nurse 
interviews validated the Delphi study findings and consensus achieved in the Delphi study 
provides confidence in the item-pool generated in the first round.
6.8 Further work
Agreement on what constitutes an IVMPE in hospital clinical practice and a framework of 
inclusion and exclusion criteria were agreed. This definition and framework can now be 
used for observational audit for the quantification of IVMPE. Adoption of this definition 
and framework would reduce variability in what is considered an IVMPE. Further 
guidance is needed to enable the audit tool to be used consistently in other settings. Some 
of the guidance could be prepared centrally, such as listing those medicines where filtration 
would adversely affect stability.
Nurses are just one of a range of healthcare practitioners who undertake IV preparation. 
Therefore views of other healthcare professionals e.g. paramedics, doctors, radiographers, 
perfusionists could be investigated. There are several issues identified within this thesis 
where further study would provide clarity, such as the role of double checking and 
eliminating interruptions.
The IV preparation process cannot be addressed in isolation. Consideration should also be 
given to exploring issue that occur during the prescribing and dispensing stages which 
affect IV preparation. These research questions could be asked in a multiprofessional 
environment, such as employing focus groups. This would enable cross boundary issues 
and solutions to be investigated as healthcare professionals may not always consider
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problems or solutions that fall beyond their own professional boundary. Systematic 
analysis of the IV MUP to identify where failures occur using techniques such as failure 
mode effect and criticality analyses would allow weaknesses to be highlighted. Solutions 
and resources could then be targeted at the weak or inadequate defences and prioritised for 
action.
Future research should clearly distinguish between the IV preparation and administration 
stages, as much of the current evidence is combined. In addition, it would appear that there 
are unique concerns within the paediatric and neonatal environment that would benefit 
from further study. This is because many medicines are provided in adult dose units, which 
poses risks of tenfold and 100-fold dose errors in neonates. In addition, paediatric and 
neonatal doses vary according to age and weight requiring a calculation, which introduces 
additional risks [Perlstein et al., 1979; Schneider et al., 1998]. National review and 
standardisation of the terminology used for IV medicines preparation is required [Gandy et 
al., 2002].
The results from this study could be used to inform future qualitative and quantitative 
work. The resource implications and practicality of solving some of the issues identified 
warrant urgent attention. The findings from the nurses interviewed suggest that priority 
should be given to developing solutions to minimise interruptions, to the design and 
provision of a dedicated workspace, to using needle free devices and to ensuring that all 
the relevant information required for IV preparation and administration is available in 
clinical areas. It is also recommended that ‘high-alert medications’ and those requiring 
multi-step preparation should be purchased premixed or prepared in the pharmacy 
department and supplied to the clinical areas in a form ready to administer. It is recognised 
that ready to administer preparation are more costly; but detailed risk analysis are needed.
6.9 Conclusions
This thesis makes several new contributions to the literature on IVMPE. It provides a 
practical, multiprofessional, agreed IVMPE definition for hospital clinical areas, with 
inclusion and exclusion criteria. In line with current opinion, the definition incorporates 
poor aseptic technique. The definition has also been successfully translated into a data 
collection tool and its feasibility as an observational audit tool verified in adult and 
paediatric ward areas. The audit study describes the training and guidance required for
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observers, and is suitable for use with previously validated measures to score the patient 
consequences of the error.
This audit tool provides a valuable mechanism for organisations to assess IV medicine 
preparation practice in clinical areas against safe practice standards. This allows 
identification of any deficiency to enable generation of a prioritised action plan. This could 
be used as a medicines management assurance measure for the Trust Board.
An insight has been gained into the concerns and difficulties that nurses encountered 
during IV medicines preparation in hospital clinical areas. Attention should be given to 
using a human factors approach to understanding and minimising the potential for error in 
these settings. This requires action at an individual, organisational, professional body and 
national level. With the NPSA patient safety alert on the ‘Safer use of Injectable Medicines 
in Near-Patient Areas’, due to be issued in 2006, IV medicines preparation will be under 
scrutiny. Therefore, the findings of this thesis are particularly timely. The NPSA tool 
provides a mechanism for pro-active risk evaluation and describes the organisational 
framework and standards required for injectable therapy. When combined with the audit 
tool developed in this thesis, this would allow identification of whether the framework has 
been implemented and embedded in practice.
The results from the nurses interviewed in this study indicate that priority should be given 
to:
■ Developing solutions to minimise interruptions.
■ The design and provision of a dedicated work space.
■ Reviewing the availability of needle free devices.
■ Reviewing IV training and competency.
■ Providing an SOP for IV preparation.
■ Ensuring that all the relevant information required for IV preparation and 
administration is available to staff in their clinical areas.
In order to address these concerns commitment and investment at individual, local, 
managerial and organisation level is required to further embed a safety culture. Actions are 
required that clearly demonstrate cost is not the over-riding NHS concern and that patient 
safety is paramount. Healthcare professionals need to work in partnership with
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pharmaceutical manufacturers to enable them to design products that are simpler and easier 
to use. Ultimately, it in unrealistic that IV preparation could ever be error free, however it 
should be the goal of all those involved in this critical patient safety area.
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